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Social Ecology’s Cyborg Dire Wolf Problem

Social Ecology’s Cyborg Dire Wolf Problem

Can what is dead truly be brought back to life? While resurrecting the dead has historically been the purview of organized religion and messianic figures, it has more recently become a story told to us by authors within the realm of science fiction. Yet, on April 7th, 2025 this bit of science fiction might have taken a step forward to becoming science fact: Colossal Biosciences Inc. claimed to have resurrected the extinct dire wolf. On that day major media publications like Time and The New York Times joined Youtubers and other social media influencers in a major news blitz officially announcing the 6-month-old pups Romulus and Remus and their two-month-old packmate Khaleesi. At the time of Colossal’s announcement the two older animals already weighed nearly 80 pounds, were four feet in length, and sported a distinctive white coat of fur. Even at just six months of age, the two oldest pups were already larger than the average gray wolf and on par with a Saint Bernard dog. News outlets, government officials, and social media influencers quickly hailed the young pups as the harbingers of a new age of “de-extinction”—an era where long dead, or recently extinct, species of animals will be revived and re-introduced to their former habitats as a means of addressing biodiversity loss, ecosystem degradation, and other ecological problems.  

Even at the time of the announcement there were disagreements about whether the de-extinction was a good thing. Colossal highlighted how the techniques used in de-extinction technologies would benefit the conservation and preservation of currently endangered species and ecosystems. For example, in attempting to bring back the woolly mammoth—the proverbial white whale of the de-extinction movement—Colossal claimed that it will also be able to help endangered African and Asian elephants. One way the company planned on doing this was using the genetic engineering techniques used in creating the woolly mammoth to bioengineer African and Asian elephants that would be better adapted to survive in a quickly changing climate. Another way that de-extinction technologies would be useful for elephants was that the information learned about elephant health would lead to the creation of a mRNA vaccine to prevent Elephant endotheliotropic herpesvirus—a hemorrhagic disease characterized by damaged blood vessels, bleeding, and organ failure that is the number one killer for Asian elephant calves living in captivity and a significant threat to free ranging groups. Skeptics, however, raised important reservations that the company’s supposedly altruistic aims might undermine existing conservation efforts. These doubts were reinforced when the United States Secretary of the Interior took to social media to state that the de-extinction technologies signaled a new age of biodiversity protection: one that pointed to the promise of industry innovation over government regulation and protection. “Going forward, we must celebrate removals from the endangered list — not additions.” He also told Interior Department employees that “If we’re going to be in anguish about losing a species, now we have an opportunity to bring them back.” Just, “[p]ick your favorite species and call up Colossal.” Perhaps not coincidentally, the Trump administration announced in June 2026 plans to work with Colossal on creating a “BioVault” to preserve the DNA of endangered species while only a month later rolling back endangered species protections.

De-extinction is, unsurprisingly, a hotly contested idea and practice. While companies and states see de-extinction as a possible tool to address biodiversity loss and habitat degradation, others point to how these technologies are not politically neutral: they can reinforce existing practices and beliefs that lead to the extinction of species in the first place and promote technocratic solutions instead of addressing root social problems. Another debate is whether de-extinct animals can be considered genuine versions of the lost species. Just about as soon as Colossal made their announcement, scientists, journalists, and average people pushed back on the assertion that Romulus, Remus, and Khaleesi were dire wolves. Most critics pointed to their genetic impurity as the reason for their skepticism, while others discussed how the animals would never be able to live like their ice age namesakes because of their laboratory origins and their atemporality. The general consensus outside of de-extinction circles was that the three animals were not really dire wolves.

But is the story that clearcut? Have critics been too fast to dismiss their importance because of simplistic ways of thinking? If we were to slow down, might the dire wolves point us towards new ecological and theoretical possibilities?

For our purposes, what is a social ecologist to make of these supposed de-extinct dire wolves? The central theoretical intervention this essay makes is to argue that the young dire wolves known as Romulus, Remus, and Khaleesi disrupt social ecology’s framework of dialectical naturalism. Part I explores the geographic, temporal, and behavioral aspects of the ice age dire wolf in comparison with these three individuals. Part II moves towards a discussion of what makes a species a species and how we ought to understand Colossal’s dire wolves on that basis. It will then explore how dualisms like Native/Invasive, Natural/Artificial, and Pure/Impure lead the animals to be ensnared in the “species problem” that reduces them to abstract ideas of human social problems. Part III shifts to a discussion of what social ecology offers as a solution to the nature/culture dualism that the dire wolves are caught in. Dialectical naturalism points towards how nature and culture can be integrated, as opposed to challenging the concepts of ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ directly. Because of this, I use the ecofeminist Donna Haraway’s concept of “natureculture” to show how as “cyborgs” the dire wolves challenge the concepts used to construct dualisms, points towards alternate ways of ethically relating to the dire wolves, and broaden social ecology’s theoretical horizons. This will be the focus of Part IV.

Part I: Aenocyon dirus & the Dire Wolf

What exactly is a dire wolf? Answers to this question stand at the forefront of the debates around Colossal’s claims of the species’ de-extinction. Taking a first step down this trail, we will get to know the ice age canid known as Aenocyon dirus: when, where, and how it lived, to draw out contrasts—both blurry and sharp—between these Pleistocene predators and the latter-day “dire wolf” pups. From there, we must wrestle with a thornier set of questions about how one de-extincts an individual animal or a species. The de-extinction method used in this case then opens further questions about the biological purity and authenticity of the resurrected animal(s).

Prior to April 2025, it was a scientific fact that Aenocyon dirus—or the “terrible wolf”—was an extinct species of canid. Standing about three feet tall, nearly six feet in length, and weighing about one-hundred and fifty pounds, the dire wolf was the largest of the ice age dogs: bigger than its contemporaries the Pleistocene coyote, Beringian wolf, and gray wolf (Canis lupus). Amongst scientists and paleo art enthusiasts, Aenocyon dirus is best known for possessing the largest head ever seen on a species of dog, with jaws powerful enough to hunt, eat, and break open the bones of the largest ice age megafauna. As for what these canids looked like, Angela Perri, the lead author of a 2021 study looking at the evolutionary origins of the dire wolf, argues that living in the warmer latitudes of ice age North America likely gave dire wolves a red coat of fur, bushy tail, and rounded ears. She describes them as essentially “a giant, reddish coyote.”

While scientists believe they know what Aenocyon dirus looked like, they have yet to agree on where it evolved and from whom. Carbon dating of fossils indicates that the dire wolf evolved sometime around 125,000 Years Before Present—presumably in the Americas, the only place its fossils have been found. When the first dire wolf fossils were discovered in the mid-1850s, scientists categorized them in the same family as the gray wolf due to the similarities of their teeth, skull shape, and bone structure; some debated whether these were even two separate species. This initial categorization has led to over a century of taxonomic trouble. Early theories suggested the dire wolf had split from a common Asian ancestor to the gray wolf, but genetic testing has pushed this view out of favor. Perri’s 2021 genetic study argues that Aenocyon dirus belongs to a lineage of North American canids that diverged from the ancestors of gray wolves more than 5 million years ago. The study also speculates that dire wolves are closer related to modern-day African jackals (Lupulella mesomelas) than North American gray wolves. However, a 2025 study led by Colossal—which was leaked to the press at the time of their dire wolf announcement—argues that dire and wolf-like canids diverged only 4.5 million years ago and that the genus Aenocyon was created through two admixture events. Where 39% of its genetics came from the basal Canini clade (which is the ancestral clade of dire and gray wolves) and 61% coming from the sister clades of Canis, Cuon, and Lycaon. Colossal uses this dual ancestry model as justification for their use of Canis lupus as the genetic, behavioral, and evolutionary model for their dire wolf project.

Although living during the last ice age, Aenocyon dirus did not confine itself to the stereotypical environment of the frozen tundra. Fossils remains have been found throughout the Americas, and it is believed that the dire wolf ranged from Alaska to Venezuela. A 2020 discovery also hints that Aenocyon dirus may have left the safe confines of the Americas to take up residency as far as northeast China. However, most scientists doubt that these remains actually belong to a dire wolf. Living in such a large area means that it inhabited a variety of ecosystems including warm, arid savannahs; high forested mountains; and the mammoth steppe. These diverse habitats were often created and maintained by populations of large grazing species like horses, ground sloths, bison, and camels—ones which happen to be the terrible wolf’s preferred prey based on fossil evidence. Contrary to the image of the ice age being a stable and static time period, ecosystems were often unstable and changed quickly by evolutionary standards. Dynamic ecosystem change frequently led to the localized extirpation of the large grazing animals. Herd animals from elsewhere would come and populate the area after these localized extinction events. This cycle of extinction and migration is one hypothesis for why dire wolves had such an extensive range.

Despite its name, scientists believe that the terrible wolf enjoyed a robust social life due a combination of fossil evidence (including bones, preserved footprints, and other traces), the behavior of morphologically similar animals living today, and comparisons to animals who share a similar niche. Even with its almost comically oversized head and stout legs, Aenocyon dirus closely resembles modern canine species like the African wild dog (Lycaon pictus), dhole (Cuon alpinus), and gray wolf. Behaviorally, all three living canine species hunt their prey in large groups, raise their young as a group, and exhibit what readers might think of as typical canine behavior. For their hunting behavior, all three species chase and exhaust large grazing animals like American bison, water buffalos, and wildebeests. After bringing their prey to the point of exhaustion, they use their jaws to grab its legs or neck after which their packmates come to help kill the animal. Socially, all three species live in large packs. Dholes live in clans ranging from 12 to 40 individuals and have multiple breeding pairs, while African wild dogs and gray wolves tend to live in smaller groups led by a single breeding pair with the pair’s offspring helping to take care of their siblings. Fossil evidence from major dire wolf fossils sites like the La Brea tar pits indicates that dire wolves were also social canids. The remains of over 3,000 individual dire wolves have been found at Le Brea and outnumber the gray wolf fossils by a ratio of five-to-one. Bite marks on fossils at La Brea also show that the dire wolf fed on similarly niched animals to today’s bison, buffalos, and wildebeests. Older fossils evidence that Aenocyon dirus feeding behavior relied on breaking open the bones of their prey while newer remains show more eating of the flesh. Interestingly, few dire wolf pup fossils have been found at the site, indicating that pups did not accompany adults on the hunt.

For all the success the dire wolf had loping around ice age America, it went extinct 15,000 years ago. A primary hypothesis is that the dire wolf was overreliant on megaherbivores which also went extinct around the same time. During the Late Pleistocene about 65% of all megafaunal species worldwide went extinct, with this number rising to 72% in North America and 83% in South America. This coincides with the end of the Late Pleistocene and the beginning of the Holocene, when between 15,000 and 10,000 YBP the climate warmed 6 C. As discussed earlier, ecosystems like the mammoth steppe were characterized as being temporally unstable and led to regional extinctions of megafauna populations that were then reestablished by distant refugia. It is believed that as the climate warmed these ecosystems became permanently fragmented and were unable to lead to the reestablishment of these locally extinct populations, creating larger species-wide extinction events. Another hypothesis offers that the Aenocyon dirus faced competition from smaller predators like gray wolves and coyotes. One of the quirks of this ice age extinction event was that smaller predators were largely unaffected and that new large predators did not evolve to take the place of species like the dire wolf. Finally, human expansion into North and South America might have killed off all the large herbivores that sustained the dire wolf. In the end, it is probably safe to say that Aenocyon dirus’s extinction was not due to any one factor, but a combination of multiple. The precise role of human beings in this extinction event is hard to ascertain, Our ancestors may have helped drive them to extinction—their reported de-extinction, however, has no such ambiguities regarding the role of human agency.

Broadly speaking, de-extinction refers to a process of generating an organism that either physically resembles, is a genetic copy, or fills the same ecological niche as an extinct species. In one sense, if scientists can create an organism that looks like its extinct ancestor or namesake then the species can be said to be de-extinct. Colossal has engineered a wolf that they say looks like Aenocyon dirus, so they can claim that they are one. In the other sense, however, de-extinction entails a genetic continuity of higher fidelity between the new and the old, where recently and long-dead species are only meaningfully “brought back” through a combination of modern genetic engineering techniques like CRISPR and assisted reproductive technologies. Just like in Jurassic Park, if we can retrieve and sequence dire wolf DNA, then an individual with that genome can be created and (through it) the species resurrected. Due to these differing understandings, de-extinction can better be thought of as existing on a spectrum. On one end stands de-extinction as an outcome where an organism is produced whose DNA, appearance, and ecological role is indistinguishable from the original species. This is what most people imagine as de-extinction, as it is broadly presumed that DNA captures that unique essence that makes a species, a species. On the other end of that spectrum is the idea that a species is de-extinct if it is an ecologically functional equivalent or approximation of the extinct species that is capable of restoring the lost ecological functions held by its predecessor. In this sense, de-extinct individuals or species can be grouped together because they often morphologically look and/or act like each other and can provide the same role in their respective ecosystems.

Ultimately, Colossal’s dire wolves are an example of the latter. Colossal claims they are functional ecological proxies of the extinct ice age species. A phrase that pops up repeatedly in Colossal’s internal literature on their dire wolves and in their public facing news stories is that it is a “species preservation company.” Colossal believes that their broader mission is to focus on the preservation of species through advancing conservation science. In some instances this means applying newly discovered technologies towards projects helping existing species. For example, one of the company’s most publicized projects is the recovery of the red wolf population in the southern United States through genetic rescue—the strategy of improving the genetic diversity and fitness of a small, inbred population by introducing individuals from another population. In 2024 Colossal was able to use techniques developed through their dire wolf program to genetically modify two litters of red wolf pups in the hopes of reintroducing lost genetic diversity into the endangered red wolf population. Colossal’s eventual goal is to be able to release these genetically modified red wolves into the wild where their interbreeding with the existing red wolf population will improve the subspecies’ overall genetic diversity. 

In other cases, this means creating what are called “proxy” species to restore the health of an ecosystem. Another of Colossal’s marque projects is the de-extinction of the woolly mammoth to help preserve Siberian permafrost. Since there are no living woolly mammoths, Colossal plans on altering the genome of Asian elephants to express mammoth-like traits like coarse long hair, extra fat tissue, and smaller ears to create proxy elephants that are morphologically similar to their ice age namesake. Colossal plans to reintroduce these proxy mammoths to places like the Pleistocene Park in northeastern Siberia where they will live alongside other ice age proxies like Bactrian camels, wisent, yakutian horses, and kalmykian cows to create an ecosystem similar to a mammoth steppe. Scientists hope that recreating the mammoth steppe will protect Arctic permafrost as the large grazing animals will trample and compact the snow, creating a frozen layer insulating the soil. Colossal’s dire wolf project appears to be a blend of these two examples: in Colossal’s internal literature (like the “Dire Wolf Husbandry Manual”), these animals are to be a functional proxy of Aenocyon dirus that can eventually be reintroduced into places like Pleistocene Park, and the techniques used in their creation will help preserve existing canid species like the red wolf.

When it comes to de-extincting a species, scientists use one of three techniques. The oldest is called “back-breeding.” This is not much different from how one might create a new breed of dog or cow with particular desired traits. It uses selective breeding techniques to resurrect specific ancestral traits within a population of living organisms to create a physical approximation of an extinct species—one that can be considered ecologically as a functional equivalent. A drawback to back-breeding is that it relies on the continued presence of the desired trait(s) in the population. Back-breeding also increases the risk of hybridization between closely related species and can lead to a high degree of inbreeding, causing unknown health complications to individual animals and the population as a whole. Another drawback is that it can take several generations to produce proxies with the desired traits—a luxury that many endangered species do not have.

Back-breeding’s most notorious case study is the attempted resurrection of the aurochs (Bos primigenius): the wild ancestor of today’s domesticated cattle, whose last living individual died in Poland’s Jacktorów forest in 1627. Four hundred years later, two sons of the director of the Berlin Zoo—Heinz and Lutz Heck—launched a project to resurrect them. As directors of the Hellabrunn and Berlin Zoological Gardens respectively, they were closely familiar with the principles of selective animal breeding, and with ties to the Nazi party, they had the institutional and monetary support they needed. Combining historic written accounts with paintings and paleolithic art, the brothers attempted to selectively breed Spanish fighting bulls, highland cattle, brown swiss, along with many other heritage breeds of cattle to produce a proxy aurochs. These “Heck cattle” stood seven to eleven inches shorter than Bos primigenius and weighed no more than the average domestic cow. Yet, their Heck cattle often had the black coat typical of the auroch and the horns to match. Ultimately, their projects met with mixed success. Lutz’s herd was destroyed during the Allied bombings of Berlin during WWII, and what remained of Heinz’s herd was critiqued in the post-war period by scientists for a range of reasons: the lack of actual knowledge the brothers had on Bos primigenius to determine which traits to select, the back-breeding techniques used to breed their cattle, and the lack of genetic similarity to the original species.

The second among these de-extinction techniques is somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT): better known as cloning. This process creates an exact genetic replica of an organism. Dolly, a female Finn-Dorset sheep, was the first animal to be cloned in 1996. She was a genetic duplicate of one of her three mothers. (One provided the egg, another the DNA, and the final mother carried her implanted embryo to term). Cloning begins by first identifying a suitable donor animal, collecting tissue samples from the donor, and then isolating a single cell from the samples. Once complete, the isolated cell’s nucleus—which contains an individual’s entire genetic code—is extracted from the donor cell and inserted into a second donor animal’s ovum. The ovum carrying the new genetic material develops into an embryo and is inserted into the womb of a surrogate who gives birth to the clone. A surrogate can be from the same species that is being cloned, but if one is not available, a closely related species is used to minimize the risks to both the clone embryo and surrogate. SCNT’s advantages over back-breeding include being able to create organisms who are genetically identical to the extinct donor animal and reducing the timeline for de-extinction to as little as a single generation.

While Dolly the Sheep might be the best-known cloned animal, the burcado was the first species to be de-extinct via SCNT. Celia, the last living burcado, or Pyrenean ibex (Capra pyrenaica pyrenaica), was found crushed underneath a fallen tree in Ordesa y Monte Perdido National Park in Huesca, Spain in 2000. Prior to her unceremonious death, Celia was already known as the last living burcado. Biologists collected tissue samples from her ears and put them into cold storage with the hope that technology might advance enough to allow for the burcado’s return via cloning. In 2003, Celia’s tissue samples were used to create cloned embryos that were inserted into surrogate domestic goats, Spanish ibexes, and hybrids of Spanish ibex and domesticated goats. Despite implanting 208 embryos, only seven surrogates became pregnant. Of these seven, six experienced miscarriages and only one burcado made it to birth. Unlike Colossal’s dire wolves, this story does not have a happy ending. Many clones develop abnormalities during their development leading to short, painful lives. Celia’s clone was one of these individuals. She died shortly after being born because her lungs had not properly developed in the womb. The burcado thereby gained the bleak distinction of being the only species to go extinct twice. Yet questions remain even if Celia had lived. A single individual does not make an adequate basis for restoring a species. De-extincting the burcado needs many more clones whose genetic diversity differs enough to act as a founding population. Cloning also ignores that organisms are more than just their DNA. Organisms are holistic entities composed of their genetics, epigenetic effects, the influence of the environment, and their interactions with other species and individuals of their kind. Ignoring these factors in reintroducing the burcado could lead to the creation of proxies that differ in unpredictable ways from their predecessors.

Finally, proxies for extinct species can be created through the techniques used to make Colossal’s dire wolves—genetic engineering. The story of the dire wolf’s de-extinction begins with DNA extracted from grinding up a 13,000-year-old tooth and a set of 72,000 year old ear bones so that Colossal’s scientists could sequence the dire wolf’s genome. Only ninety-one percent of the dire wolf’s genome was able to be reconstructed through this process—meaning that a clone was not possible. From there, the sequenced DNA was compared to the gray wolf’s since Colossal considers it the closest living relative of Aenocyon dirus and the baseline organism from which to bring forth their functional proxy. As Colossal was making a proxy organism and not a clone, they selected 14 genes and 20 desired traits from the gray wolves’ approximately 19,000 genes. This includes a white coat, larger body size, more powerful shoulders, a wider head with accompanying larger teeth and jaws, along with more muscular legs, and characteristic dire wolf vocalizations (howling and whining). According to The New Yorker, “no effort had been made to try to identify genes for behavior” or incorporate them into the proxies. Edited nuclei were transferred to forty-five denucleated ova and developed into embryos in a controlled laboratory environment. Embryos were then inserted into the wombs of two surrogate hound mixes because their overall health along with their size made them ideal candidates to birth the larger-than-average pups. Colossal chose not to use gray wolves as surrogate mothers due to the potential risks to the human handlers and the eventual puppies. After 65 days of intensive care and observation, the first two dire wolves were born on October 1, 2024. A few months later, this process was repeated to produce the third wolf who was born on January 30, 2025.

Part II: Species Problems, Dualisms, & Not Caring about Invasive, Artificial, Impure Dire Wolves

When Colossal announced that it had de-extincted the dire wolf, critics were fast to counter this claim based on the impurity of the dogs’ genetics, their artificial origins, and their lack of nativeness to present-day ecosystems. Commentators were often dismissive in tone and argument, asserting that the three wolves have nothing to offer the public scientifically, ecologically, or socially. This section examines how beneath the surface of these public discussions, each of the contending perspectives rests upon dualistic modes of thought which are built into the very concepts of what a species is. Here the concept of “species” will be examined and then problematized. We will then discuss the various dualisms present in underlying philosophical assumptions about Colossal’s dire wolves—dualisms which situate them in a morally inferior position to their extinct and contemporary wild canid relations. Finally, we will delve into the critics’ commentaries to examine how the Native/Invasive, Natural/Artificial, and Pure/Impure dualisms create narratives that tell us more about human power relations than about the animals in question.

Colossal can claim that their dire wolves are Aenocyon dirus even though they are functional proxies with little genetic, genealogical, or taxonomic ties to their ice age siblings due to the slipperiness built into the concept of a “species.” Originally the (pre-Darwinian) concept of a species was used as a means for scientists to classify and categorize plants, animals, and even humans according to their presumed natural relations. At that early stage of scientific progress, scientists were mainly concerned with determining what constituted a species based on its traits. This was complicated significantly by later knowledge of evolution, DNA, and epigenetics. With dire wolves, for instance, scientists were initially confident of its close relationship to gray wolves because of their apparent physical similarities, whereas many contemporary scientists equipped with genetic studies say that the two are only distantly related. Further complicating this discussion is the fact that there are at least twenty-six distinct concepts used to define a species. There is no single, universal definition that meets the needs of all scientists—whether they be bacteriologists, botanists, paleontologists, or zoologists. This conundrum is what scientists call “the species problem”: the long-standing failure of scientists to agree on how organisms should be identified as a species and how they would, in turn, define what a species is. This species problem often muddles our attempts to categorize a species in relation to other organisms with our attempts to identify what specific thing/essence/feature/set of genomes makes it a discrete species. Confusion stemming from the species problem besets Colossal’s dire wolves; zoologists, paleontologists, and scientific pundits disagree on whether the three critters can be identified and recognized as Aenocyon dirus based on modes of thought that blur these two different goals.

As genetically modified proxy organisms, our pack of dire wolves are ensnared in a set of interlocking dualisms. This is best exemplified by the words of Philip Seddon, a zoologist from the University of Otago, shortly after Colossal’s announcement of the de-extinction of the dire wolf:

[T]he cute pups Romulus, Remus, and Khaleesi are not dire wolfs – they are genetically modified grey wolves… What Colossal has done is to introduce a small number of changes to the genetic material of a grey wolf to produce grey wolf pups with dire wolf features such as pale coats and potentially slightly larger size. So, hybrid grey wolves, or a GMO wolf. The pups will spend their days in a large enclosure being hand fed and closely monitored.

At their simplest, dualisms are sets of relationships in which contrasting concepts—like Mind/Body, Nature/Culture, or Domesticated/Wild—are constructed as being oppositional and exclusive.(Plumwood) Constructing relationships in such a way does several things. First, it creates ways of thinking that reduces the complexity of the world to a set of polarized and antagonistic phenomena. Second, they set the stage for the creation of hierarchical relationships. With dualisms, the nature of each party is made by excluding qualities shared with the other. Through the process of excluding shared qualities, relationships are created where some qualities are determined to be morally superior and given to a dominant side/entity while other traits are deemed morally deficient and given to a subordinated side/entity, which is in turn, defined as being lesser in relation to the dominant entity. In essence, what dualisms create are relationships of domination and subordination that naturalizes the domination of the subordinated entity while construing the differences between them in terms of the logic of hierarchy. In this relationship the very being and identities of the two halves can only be understood through this lens of hierarchy. Colossal’s dire wolves have been sorted into these hierarchical relationships based on difference. There are three interconnected dualisms at work in critics’ arguments about the dire wolves: Native/Invasive, Natural/Aritifical, and Pure/Impure.

Nativeness refers to the notion that an entity or organism belongs where it occurs in a geographic, temporal, and ecological sense. A species has a specific location, time, and ecological set of relations that it belongs to and is inseparable from. Belonging in this context is imagined to provide a morally superior claim to existing than an organism or species that is “out of place” and can be considered “invasive” to this geographic, temporal, and/or ecological location. This raises the question of whether the three dire wolves can be considered native and under what circumstances. Julie Meachen, a vertebrate paleontologist and morphologist at Des Moines University, states that “[a] dire wolf or any other species is not only its genes, but also its environment and all the other species living there.” In other words, Aenocyon dirus is a “native” species that has a geographic location in the Americas, a temporal home of the last ice age, and a defined set of ecological relations as a social predator that feasted on now extinct animals like ground sloths. Colossal’s wolves lack these relationships. If they are native to someplace, their geographic range is the laboratory and managed habitat, their temporal home is the Anthropocene or Capitalpocene, and as first-generation laboratory organisms their collection of ecological relations is quite small and dissimilar to both dire and gray wolves. Currently, the three wolves in question live in an enclosed 2,000-acre ecological preserve somewhere in the northern United States—the exact location has not been released due to safety concerns. Of those 2,000 acres, they largely live in a six acre “managed habitat” certified by the American Humane Society and registered with the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The managed habitat includes amenities such as a husbandry facility—which allows their ten full-time care givers to “get up close and personal with the pups every single day”—and a state-of-the-art veterinary clinic where Colossal staff can conduct everything from routine check-ups to major surgery. It also comes with an extreme weather shelter and natural dens. Depending on their numbers and availability of food, a gray wolf pack’s territory ranges between 50 to 1,864 square miles. Unlike their native gray and dire wolf cousins, Colossal’s wolves were not brought up on a diet of hunting and foraging. Instead, the young pups were fed a steady diet of ground meat and dry kibble by their human caretakers. As they have aged, the three canines have transitioned to a diet of “whole prey items or even carcasses.”  If Colossal’s wolves were ever to be released into the present day (or the ice age, for that matter) they would have to be classified as non-native or “invasive” organisms.

As critters caught in the Natural/Artificial dualism, they traverse a space in which humanity and its creations are viewed as being fundamentally separate from Nature. In Nature, organisms and species evolve independently and live outside of conscious human intervention, while artificial organisms living amongst humans are products of that intervention. Here Nature is a single, timeless, and pure domain unspoiled by human touch. Much like Native species, Natural organisms have a “natural” evolutionary history, a relationship to the world they co-create, and a set of behaviors based on that evolutionary history and ecological relationality. Even if they once existed in Nature, a de-extinct species is at least a partial product of human intervention depending on the method used to create them, the length of their extinction, and other factors. Natural species occupy a dominant and positive place in relation to Artificial organisms because of this purity from human touch and their presumed naturalness. In this context, the Director of the Otago Paleogenetics Laboratory Nic Rawlence’s question of, “how’s it going to learn to be a dire wolf? Currently, it’s a wolf running around in a paddock” directs our attention to the wolves’ subordinated position as artificial organisms without natural behavior. This sentiment is compounded by Beth Shapiro’s own statement that, “I would love to know the natural behavior of a dire wolf. But they are essentially living the Ritz-Carlton lifestyle of a wolf.” Based on information and videos shared by Colossal there is no indication that other adult canids live with the three animals. Unlike Natural canines, Colossal’s wolves lack the learned social behavior transferred across generations and over the course of millennia. Yet, Colossal is attempting to get them to “exhibit general and social behaviors similar to the grey wolf (Canis lupus)” so that they develop a typical canid pack structure. Colossal hopes that the wolves will learn how to communicate with each other through body language and vocalizations, create a balanced and stable pack hierarchy, breed (if determined appropriate and desired via their management plan), and learn how to hunt. Things appear to be going well as at the time of two older wolves’ first birthday they were “developing a more clear social hierarchy with Remus taking the reins as the leader of the pack and Romulus and Khaleesi often waiting for Remus and checking in with him for reassurance and comfort.” Additionally, even without adult or peer mentorship the three canids have demonstrated the beginnings of hunting behavior. In February 2026 Matt James, Colossal’s Chief Animal Officer, is quoted as saying that, “[t]he wolves recently completed their first successful chase, but the final step still required refinement. They returned with the rabbit alive, almost as if waiting for direction.” James also says that the wolves are chasing deer, but it is unclear if they have learned how to cooperatively work together to kill and eat deer. Even as artificial creatures, Colossal’s creations appear to be able to learn some of the presumed behaviors of Aenocyon dirus and actual Canis lupus.

Finally, when Pontus Skoglund, the head of the Ancient Genomics lab at the Francis Crick Institute, muses that the dire wolves “seem optimistically 1/100,000th dire wolf,” he shows us that the canids are caught in the Purity dualism. In Mary Douglas’s seminal text Purity and Danger, she argues that purification is the process of elimination. When purification identifies something, someone, or some group as being “out of place” and in opposition to what is “in place,” it is removed from the system, leading to the status quo being maintained. This line of thinking implies two conditions: 1.) that there is an ordered set of political, ethical, and/or social relations that upholds a system of power; and 2.) that “something out of place” is a contradiction and thus a threat to this orderly system. Dire wolf species purity centers on the notion that as a species Aenocyon dirus has a genetic suite of traits that allows scientists to know that an organism is an Aenocyon dirus and thus be classified as one. As discussed so far, Colossal’s dire wolves can hardly be considered native and natural Aenocyon dirus, and their genetic purity as either Aenocyon dirus or Canis lupus is not much better. As GMOs, the only way that they could be genetically pure is to be a clone, but this is not possible as remaining ice age DNA is too degraded to be useful in the cloning process. Further, while Aenocyon dirus and Canis lupus share approximately 99.5% of their genetic code, that 0.5% difference means that there are still 12,235,000 individual differences in DNA base pairs between the two species. Colossal only altered 14 genes to express 20 desired traits to create their proxies. Millions of alterations would be made to make the grey wolf genome to match that of the dire wolf. As impure Aenocyon dirus, these creatures sit at the heart of a knotty contradiction. Many well-meaning scientists, conservations, and activists argue for their elimination as their existence poses a threat to the purity of “natural” ecosystems and ways of thinking about human/animal relations.

Let us weave these threads of the species problem, dualisms, and resurrected dire wolves together. The core question that critics of the dire wolves have been asking is “are they really Aenocyon dirus?” The implication in posing this question is that there is some characteristic of Aenocyon dirus that makes it a distinct species, which could or could not be identified in these animals. The answer they offer us is a resounding “no”: Colossal’s dire wolves are not actually dire wolves. Yet, trapped within the species problem, critics of the project must reduce the complexity of the dire wolves to answer this question. The three critters cannot be Aenocyon dirus because they lack genetic purity even though they are meant to be functional proxies, not clones. As laboratory organisms they could never really belong somewhere, even if that sense of belonging is historically, scientifically, and culturally situated. And as first-generation animals any behaviors they exhibit would largely be said to be innate and not learned, even if, as animals, they have the capacity to learn. In all three examples the wolves lack that specific essence, quality, or trait—genetic purity, behavior, habitat—that makes a wolf an Aenocyon dirus. Using these dualistic modes of thinking places the wolves into a subordinated position vis-à-vis Aenocyon dirus and Canis lupus. In each of the above examples the interlocking dualisms creates and upholds dominant narratives and beliefs in which the actual living individual animals are not cared about. Critics exclude them from having their own agency, are not interested in talking about the individual animals, or say that they matter in the unfolding stories the animals find themselves ensnared in. The canids’ involvement in the stories so far has been limited to being symbolic objects and discursive devices—representations of abstract ideas and concepts like biodiversity loss, the hubris of technoscience and genetic engineering, and a continued reminder of the capitalist commodification of nature and science. Instead of understanding them as actually living animals, they can be subjected to being linguistic tools used to structure human-based discussion, influence interactions, and manage social dynamics. In sum, this hierarchy treats the wolves no better than as ethereal ideas to be debated, mobilized, and forgotten over time as something new will eventually catch our collective attention. Can we find better ways of thinking that addresses these dualisms in such a way that cares about Romulus, Remus, and Khalessi? 

Part III: Dialectical Naturalism and the Issue of Integration

This section explores whether social ecology can offer better ways of thinking that transcend the problematic dualisms outlined in Part II. First, we will explore how social ecology understands and addresses dualistic thinking. Social ecology’s story about the dire wolves would begin with understanding that the ecological-philosophical conundrum that they are caught in in fact stem from (human) social problems: ones largely rooted in a Nature/Culture dualism that is a consequence of hierarchical society’s ecological dislocation. From there, we will examine how social ecology dialectically integrates nature and culture via the unfolding of nature from first nature into second, and possibly into a “free” third nature. We will attempt to situate Romulus, Remus, and Khalessi within this framework of dialectical naturalism. Finally, this section will conclude with a discussion of dialectical naturalism’s limitations for addressing the dualisms the dire wolves find themselves ensnared in—primarily that how social ecology integrates human culture into nature leaves little room for the wolves to have their own story.

 Let’s begin with examining how social ecology addresses the dualisms and dualistic thinking at the heart of the species problem. One of the most important tools that social ecology has in its toolbox is its social critique of ecological problems. It understands ecological disruptions as arising out of social domination, within human society. Destruction of ecosystems isn’t born out of an unchanging human nature; its causes have a history, can be understood by human social actors, and therefore be solved by human collective action. With our dire wolves and the broader matter of de-extinction, a social ecological critique would foreground how extinction and the biodiversity crisis are the effects of an extractive and anti-democratic social order—a problem with social-revolutionary rather than technological solutions. It would also take note of the fact that these “solutions” themselves are framed by capitalist and scientistic modes of thinking that devalue the natural world and turn it into a realm of technical resource management. Examined holistically, the problem of the dire wolves is not about the wolves. 

Building off of this critique that ecological problems are social problems, social ecology identifies dualisms and dualistic ways of thinking as central ideological underpinnings of most ecological problems. Bookchin identifies the primary culprit behind this problem as the abstraction and disconnection of human society from nature. As he put it in Remaking Society, “[With] the notion of an abstract [human] society that exists apart from nature or an equally abstract natural community that is indistinguishable from nature, a dualism appears that sharply separates society from nature, or a crude reductionism appears that dissolves society into nature.” Bookchin’s corpus of work clearly puts the originating point of this dualism in humanity’s continuous struggle for existence over the material conditions for own survival—i.e. the dualism is created when humanity tries to survive by dominating nature.

[W]e are the heirs of a historic dualism: first, a misconceived nature as the opponent of every human endeavor, whose ‘domination’ must be lifted from the shoulders of humanity . . . and secondly, a domineering humanity whose goal is to subjugate the natural world, including human nature itself. Nature, in effect emerges an affliction that must be removed by technology and methods of domination that excuse human domination in the name of “human freedom.”

Scientists say that we are in the midst of the sixth mass extinction, where the current extinction rate of plants and animals is estimated to be as low as 100-1,000 or as high as 1,000-10,000 times higher than the usual background rate of extinction, and de-extincting animals or creating functional proxies could be tangible ways of promoting biodiversity, restoring increasingly degraded ecosystems, and dealing with the climate crisis through efforts like the Pleistocene Park. Yet, the intervention into the genomes of animals and the manipulation of ecosystems can also be another form of this subjugation at the hands of “a domineering humanity”: especially when these efforts are being led by capitalist companies bent on making a profit from these projects, and hierarchical states who relate to these animals and technologies only as means of upholding the status quote social order.

Social ecology attempts to address the Nature/Culture dualism via a dialectical and developmental integration of culture and nature. This philosophical framework is called dialectical naturalism. Bookchin conceptualizes the evolution of life as a tendential process in the direction of further complexity and freedom out of interrelationships between individual species, the eco-communities that these species form, and abiotic forces. He was less interested in how we draw lines around individual species, and more in the dynamic process of a species’ ecological relationships and its differentiation over time. Over time evolution creates new and more complex forms of life and consciousness in which animals begin to do more than simply adapt to their environment; rather they begin to change the environment itself. Dialectical naturalism is then a cumulative understanding of evolution where as individual species—and life in general—evolves it builds upon itself, creating further levels of complexity, intelligence, and the ability to act upon itself and on nature. This cumulative evolutionary process plays out in the forms of first, second, and possible third nature.

Since dialectical naturalism is a dialectical process, it is driven by the internal contradictions of the system. At the individual level, for example, the relationship between predator and prey drives the need for new behaviors, morphological changes, and the search for habitats as both predator and prey attempt to survive. At the meta-level these driving contradictions play out in the interrelationship between what Bookchin calls “first” and “second nature.” First nature is the realm of nonhuman nature. It is the realm of biological history and evolution where non-human animals possess rudimentary forms of selfhood, consciousness, and the basis of freedom—the freedom from domination and hierarchy as well as necessity and want. Bookchin understands first nature to be “a realm conceived as the full realization of humanity’s potentialities in their most creative form.” Essentially, organisms in first nature have or could have certain traits that find their fullest expression in organisms of second nature—consciousness, institutional social power, and the ability to direct their behavior back onto nature and other organisms in such a way that promotes egalitarian relationships and a world free from want. Second nature, while in many ways acting as a distinct realm from first nature, is itself continuously interacting with first nature. And as Bookchin noted earlier, it is the realm in which human second nature attempts to overcome the physical limitations put onto it but first nature. This realm of social nature is inhabited by humans, as according to Bookchin humans are the “product of evolution that has the fullness of mind, of extraordinary communicative abilities, of conscious association, and the ability to knowingly alter itself and the natural world.” Humans, as a species, gained these unique abilities through our coevolution in first nature. Now inhabiting this distinct social realm we have the unique abilities to (re)produce a characteristically human social nature of our own and manipulate first nature in such a way that is most suitable for our economic, political, and cultural organization. While the social nature of our existence produces these unique traits, humans must deal with the contradictory aspects of the first/second nature relationship—domination and necessity. Yet, as forms of “nature rendered self-conscious” we have the unique ability to deal with the Nature/Culture dualism and first/second nature contradictions through using the social critique of ecological problems to integrate a non-hierarchical ethic into the evolution of the world. Doing so leads to what Bookchin calls “third nature.” Another way to view it is that humans can direct our actions into first nature in such a way that they promote egalitarian relationships and a world free from want. This could create a synthesis between first and second nature so that humans are no longer in an antagonistic relationship with nature, but are instead directly participating in the evolution of life. Doing so aims to position first and second nature in harmony with each other to reinstall ecological balance.

To borrow from Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari by way of the musicologist Gary Tomlinson, dialectical naturalism is similar to an abstract machine: a schema of conditions in which energies and entities meet and fall into a process. Tomlinson’s thinking about “abstract machines” is positioned within the extended evolutionary synthesis. In parallel to Bookchin’s dialectical naturalism, he believes that species are open concepts that are constantly adapting to the world around them rather than staying as fixed or discrete entities. At the same time, species exist in dynamic relations with the “structures outside them, likewise in motion.” However, rather than rely on the contradictions of the system to spur the dialectical motion of the evolution of species and ecosystems, Tomlinson’s abstract machines of evolution are grounded in the scientific concepts of natural selection, niche construction, and mediation—which he argues are the defining dynamics of all life. Yet, some species have experienced the fourth abstract machine of semiosis—or meaning-making. This “meaning” is the “process for the organisms that create it, a time-bound dynamic of self and surroundings.” For Tomlinson it is a form of information sharing in which signs—or representations of something which stands, to somebody, for something in some respect or capacity—are mediated between actors who can make a shared sense of the sign and act upon it. Within his framework, he currently believes only humans, songbirds, and maybe certain cephalopods have the ability to create signs and provide meaning to their worlds.

Thinking of dialectical naturalism as an abstract evolutionary machine offers a different set of narratives than what we hear from Romulus, Remus, and Khaleesi’s critics. First, it enables us to turn away from static concepts like “species” and towards an attempt to capture the dynamism and historical motion that characterizes the evolutionary process. Dialectical naturalism puts forward a process more than a definition of what the dire wolves are, or can be. Second, as animals with meaning-making capabilities, we have the ability to give meaning to the dire wolves. Applying our social ecological critique, we can identify the dualisms that the dire wolves are caught in, address and solve the underlying social issues that situates them in subordinated hierarchies. Finally, as possible organisms of third nature we might be able to put organisms like the dire wolves and de-extinction technologies to use in ways that addresses climate change, the sixth mass extinction, and other ecological problems in such ways that promotes ecological thinking and ways of relating with first nature.

As animals of first nature, the dire wolves have all the evolutionary potential that their ice age namesakes and their existing Canis lupus cousins have. As animals experiencing the pressures of the abstract evolutionary machines of natural selection, niche construction, and mediation they could eventually come to belong to a certain geographic, temporal, and ecological home. Indeed, Colossal’s own goals to boost the genetic health of the red wolf population mimics this strategy. The Mexican Wolf  Interagency Field Team’s efforts to introduce captive-bred Mexican grey wolf (Canis lupus baileyi) puppies to packs in Apache-Sitgreaves National Forest demonstrates that there is a valid avenue for breeding genetically adaptable canines and introducing them into ecosystems. Yet, simply focusing on their potentializes as critters of first nature obscures some of uniqueness of their situation. This includes the fact that they represent a 12,000-year break from their namesake, are a genetic alteration of their donor grey wolf parents, and as first-generation clones, they have not inherited any of the social and cultural history associated with grey and dire wolves. Within the abstract evolutionary machine of dialectical materialism the dire wolves would not be considered animals of second nature—at least not without more proof of their meaning-making abilities. Within our own meaning-making abilities, social ecology is likely to see the creatures as contradictions and inhabiting dualistic—human—social problems. Using social ecology’s critique of ecological problems, they act as another example of human domination over nature and tell us less about the dire wolves and their potentialities. Finally, in the potential world of an egalitarian third nature, instead of being the embodiments of contradictions, examples of domination, and model organisms for exploitation they could be an illustration of Humanity’s ability to add a dimension of ecological consciousness to nature’s development. A world in which our dire wolf pack could actually be a means of addressing these human social problems. This framework also ultimately rests on humans being able to address our own social problems and see the wolves as tools in that solution.

While dialectical naturalism offers us some possible avenues for addressing the Nature/Culture dualism, point towards the deep-seated social issues the dire wolves are caught in, and can show the liberatory uses for the wolves in a possible third nature it does come with limitations. One drawback is the tension between the generality and particularity. As an abstract machine dialectical naturalism is good about talking about the longue durée of evolutionary history. It provides us with an explanatory model of why life has evolved the way it has and shifts the focus from the species problem to the potentialities the dire wolves have. While good as a generalized explanatory model, it struggles with the particularity of the dire wolves. In the dialectical naturalist framework, the dire wolves get framed in a very naturalistic way—just as another species being run through the abstract machines of evolution. While full of future potentialities, when all the traits that make the wolves unique as entities—their transgenic nature, laboratory origins, the webs of social, political, and economic power relations they are caught in—are brought up, they are done so in a way that frames them solely within the realm of human social problems. This leads to the second issue of anthropodenialism. Critics of social ecology have been apt to call out a certain a priori anthropocentrism built into its framework. While stressing the embeddedness of nature within interhuman relations, non-human animals are often ignored as being socially relevant or factoring into the framework. When they are it is usually in ways that are antagonistic or drives the Nature/Culture dualism at the heart of the framework. While this criticism of anthropocentricism may be true to a degree, I think it is more apt to reframe this argument within the guise of anthropodenialism or the blindness to humanlike characteristics of other animals or the animal-like characteristics in humans.(Waal) Denying humanlike characteristics to animals is a way of denying them into the realm of the social, whether that be internally in their own worlds or in ours. Doing so also denies social ecologists the ability to explore their own forms of sociality, agency, and the ways that they transgress our own ideas about how nature and (human) culture are integrated. Finally, dialectical naturalism as a framework is predicated on the idea that dualisms—and in particular the Nature/Culture dualism—are in fact, actual and given entities and phenomena. But is this the case and what are the repercussions if nature and culture are not inherently discrete, antagonistic units? This question leads us to the final section where we will explore “natureculture” as another lens from which to make-meaning with Romulus, Remus, and Khaleesi.

Part IV: Ecofeminism, Natureculture(s), and Transgressive Cyborg Dire Wolves

To take a step forward in providing an alternate way of dealing with the thorny issues associated with the species problem and in some of the shortcomings associated with traditional social ecological thinking entails taking a step backward. This initial step backward begins with a discussion of the entwinement of social ecology and feminism so that readers can understand the influences and theoretical divergences between the two schools of thought. With their joint interest in abolishing hierarchy and the re-establishment of a harmonization with nature, social ecology and feminism share many key goals, but differences in how the origins of hierarchy came to be create theoretical tensions between them and provides us with the first step forward. Next Ynestra King’s the branch of social ecologically influenced feminism will be offered as a bridge that connects the work of social ecology and feminism to produce a form of ecofeminism. Then the work of the ecofeminist Donna Haraway will be used to demonstrate how social ecology has taken for granted the categories of “nature” and “culture” instead of interrogating the concepts. Finally, with the theoretical groundwork laid this section will conclude with outlining the concept of “natureculture”, demonstrating what it offers social ecology, and how it can provide the dire wolves with theoretical room to roam across the boundaries of our theoretical understandings.

Since social ecology’s theoretical beginnings, it has shared a strong—and at times fraught—relationship with feminism. What makes the relationship between social ecology and feminism so important is that the two schools of thought offer something that the other needs. Social ecology provides feminism an alternate means of understanding the subjugation of woman in terms of hierarchy and not simply class; while, feminism offers social ecology a way of highlighting the significance of hierarchy in a very existential form. While being complementary, social ecology and feminism differ in where they see the origins of hierarchy and domination arising. Bookchin placed its origins in gerontocracy—the domination of the young by the old in the earliest days of human civilization in second nature—while feminism finds it in patriarchy—a social system in which positions of authority and power are primarily held by men. For certain feminists calling themselves “ecofeminists”—feminists who explore the connection between women and nature—this domination of women by men shares similar logics and practices found in the domination of nature by humans.

One of the best attempts at intertwining social ecology’s understanding of the subjugation of woman in terms of hierarchy and ecofeminism’s exploration in the connection between the domination of women and the environment comes from Ynestra King. King’s unique branch of social ecological ecofeminism begins with the position that humans currently live in a culture founded on the repudiation and domination of nature and this has a special significance for women because in patriarchal thought, women are believed to be closer to nature than men. Consequently, this gives women a unique vantage in understanding both the domination of nature and of women; as well as, a particular stake in dismantling both forms of oppression.(King) For King, social ecology then becomes the self-conscious attempt to integrate both the biological (natural) and social (cultural) aspects of the relationships between humans and their environment.(King) Ecofeminism grounds this social ecological critique of domination by identifying the domination of man over women as the prototype form of domination which other forms of domination—racism, adultism, speciesism—borrow from. In doing so, ecofeminism develops the connections between ecology and feminism that social ecology needs to reach its own goal of creating a free and ecological way of life. The principles of King’s ecofeminism includes women taking on the life-struggles of all nature as their own as the creation of western industrial civilization in opposition to nature interacts dialectically with and reinforces the subjugation of women; the belief that life on Earth is an interconnected web and because of this human hierarchy is projected onto nature and then used to justify social domination; a healthy, balanced ecosystem that includes both humans and non-humans must maintain biological diversity as biological simplification corresponds to reducing human diversity; and the survival of the species necessitates a renewed understanding of humans relationship to nature, our own bodily nature, and of the non-human nature around us.(King) For King, ecofeminism can bridge this nature/culture relationship through three means. First, women can be integrated into the world of culture by severing the woman-nature connection, but doing so comes at the cost of not questioning the nature/culture dualism along with seeing the severance of the woman-nature connection as a condition for women’s liberation. Second, the woman-nature connection can be reinforced, often with the risk of reinforcing certain spiritual/mystic elements found in ecofeminism along with not recognizing how women’s ecological sensitivity is a socialized perspective that can also be socialized out of them. Finally, it can recognize that although the nature/culture dualism is a product of culture, it can instead be used as a vantage point for creating a different kind of culture and politics that would enable people to transform the nature/culture distinction.

King’s powerful intervention allows us to take a theoretical step forward in a couple of ways. First, their form of ecofeminism takes the social ecological critique that ecological problems are social problems and grounds them in the concrete experiences of woman and nature. This acts as a pivot from analyzing the domination of nature and women in the general sense and moves it towards particular examples. Second, ecofeminism’s focus on the unique vantage of women with nature points towards viewing entities like “nature” and “women” less as discrete, standalone entities but as beliefs, practices, and arguments that are joined and tied together. Finally, recognizing that nature/culture dualism is a product of culture and not as a “natural” entity allows the dualism itself to be interrogated and alternate ways of understanding/addressing them to be experimented with. 

Ecofeminist Donna Haraway takes King’s third solution to the nature/culture dualism and takes it even further. Haraway’s ecofeminist critique of hierarchy, domination, and power—whether that be anthropological, patriarchal, race, or class—stems from a rejection that concepts like nature, women, and humanity can be treated as isolated entities and subsequently that the world can be divided into isolated and conflicting realms based on these concepts.(Haraway, “A Manifesto for Cyborgs”) While being an ecofeminist they reject the essentialist position that women are closer to nature and that women hold an intrinsically ecological position because of this. Instead,

what makes a women is a specific relationship of appropriation by man. Like race, sex is an ‘imaginary’ creation of the kind that produces reality, including bodies that are then perceived as prior to all construction. ‘Woman’ only exists as this king of imaginary being, while women are the product of a social relationship of appropriation, naturalization as sex.(Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature)

While agreeing with social ecology that dualisms like nature/culture reduce the complexity of thought and create systems of domination, they would critique social ecology for taking for granted the concepts of “nature” and “culture” as they themselves serve as ideas, practices, and tools that have been systematically joined “with logics and practices of domination”.(Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature) Breaking apart and separating pairs like man/woman, human/animal, and nature/culture into discrete items like “man”, “human”, and “culture” turns the concepts into something that is natural and inevitable; along with, positing them outside the realm critique to become unalterable, moral, and ultimately inescapable by those it comes to dominate. It also functions as a mechanism for legitimizing practices of denial and domination by passing off cultural particularities as constitutive traits of human nature.(Haraway, Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the Wold of Modern Science) For example, in dialectical naturalism, even though evolution exists on a graded continuum—in which humans exist on the far end—it has long been the assumed position that first nature is this natural realm of the non-human and second nature is this unique realm of the cultural human. Instead of challenging and interrogating what nature or culture is or can be, the framework necessitates that these dualities exist because the framework needs them to. This might help explain the certain level of anthropodenial baked into social ecology’s traditional dialectical naturalism framework as denying other-than-human animals human-like traits allows for the continued naturalization of anthropocentric hierarchies. However, social ecologists are beginning to challenge this through running other species through the abstract evolutionary machine of dialectical naturalism.(Herson-Horvath) Breaking apart human and nature into entities like first and second nature positions both as being inevitable and in its hierarchical relationship, places first nature as an item to dominated and overcome by the humans of second nature. This denies that concepts like nature and culture have a history and are in many ways scientific constructs formed through debates in fields such as biology, ecology, and ethology. Haraway’s deconstruction of the modern concept of nature as formed through scientific debate transforms the concept of nature from a static, inalterable idea into a highly dynamic and contested concept. Bookchin’s own debates with deep ecologists(Bookchin and Foreman; Bookchin, “Social Ecology versus Deep Ecology”) and sociobiologists (Bookchin, “Sociobiology or Social Ecology”) highlights how “nature” and the “human” are not static constructs but are constantly being debated and changed through the interrelationship between science, semiotics, and cultural practices.

After the nature/culture dualism has been split apart, what is one to do with it? Haraway’s solution is that to speak of nature and culture is to really speak of a “natureculture”. Since nature is not an independent realm separated from the human because it is created through the scientific tools we use to come to know it by, we can say that nature is made through culture and what we experience as culture is also made up by what we know of nature.(Penley et al.) Given the permeability of these two concepts we can also say that both are enmeshed within a complex matrix of entangled, co-constitutive, co-creating collective relationships. These conceptual and practical relationships are themselves historically, materially, and politically situated meaning that they have entwined histories, have real world repercussions, and are constantly being contested.(Haraway, The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and Signifcant Otherness) As such, nature and culture are mutually inclusive of one another where each is a partial but vital connection to the other concept in ways that make them not only co-created, but also co-dependent.(Kosciejew) Here there is no nature without culture and no culture without nature. Instead, we must instead think in terms of a “natureculture”.

What then does the concept of natureculture offer Romulus, Remus, and Khaleesi then? First, as natureculture breaks down the boundaries between presumed dualisms like animal/human, nature/culture, and organic/technological it allows the concepts to be transgressed by new phenomena or subjects.(Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature) Instead of relying on the essentialist nature of the species problem or focusing on the abstract possibilities they might offer the humans of third nature we can view Romulus, Remus, and Khaleesi as cyborgs—hybrid creatures that are composed of materials (physical, ideological, technological, semiotic) that traditional thinking believes to be separate.(Haraway, Modest_Witness@ Second_Millenium.FemaleMan © _Meets_ OncoMouseTM: Feminism and Technoscience) As cyborgs Romulus, Remus, and Khaleesi dissolve the presumed nature/culture dualism in several ways. First, their existence signifies a definitive break from the “naturalness” of biological evolution that underpins both the species problem and dialectical naturalism. As their critics have been fast to point out, they are artificial, non-native, and impure organisms nor are they just the animals of Bookchin’s first nature. Instead, their existence is possible because of a series of scientific interventions responsible for the particular genes that make them neither clones of Aenocyon dirus nor purebred Canis lupus. Second, in the age of the sixth-mass extinction and the Anthropocene they problematize the idea of the “environment” and what it means to practice ethics between humans and other-than-humans in these locations.(Haraway, Modest_Witness@ Second_Millenium.FemaleMan © _Meets_ OncoMouseTM: Feminism and Technoscience) Unlike their wild or ice age counterparts, Romulus, Remus, and Khaleesi have no “natural” habitat. Their past, present, and possible future(s) have been shaped by places like the dig site, laboratory, and veterinary clinic, along with governing institutions like the nation-state and venture capitalist companies. Since environmentalism is based on a set of presumptions that sees nature as either a passive location composed of objects such as animals, plants, minerals, and the like that must be rendered more exploitable or protected from human use our pup’s habitats challenge what it means to protect these locations and the entities who inhabit them. Finally, as Harawayian cyborgs, our pups dissolve the boundary between the organic and technological. Instead of the traditional image of a cyborg as an organism that is composed of robotic and mechanical parts, their cyborg nature is due to the hybridization that has occurred because the most organic or biological aspect of their being has been artificially altered: their genes.(Gomez)

Second, using a naturecultural lens affords the three dire wolves the agency to affect humans and to be affected by us.  In the stories we have discussed so far, Romulus, Remus, and Khaleesi have been no more than afterthoughts. For their critics, since the wolves are not really resurrected Aenocyon dirus, they are nothing more than scientific novelties. Given how quickly the three wolves have vanished from the limelight to be overshadowed by Colossal’s more recent announcements that they plan to de-extinct the bluebuck(Jeffrey Kluger, “This Blue Antelope May Be Next on the De-Extinction List”), dodo(Milman), moa(Larson), and the ivory-billed woodpecker it is hard to see whether Colossal sees the three wolves as having any sort of potentiality outside as simply tools for furthering conservation science and species preservation. As for social ecology, it might argue that this is simply a situation in which second nature (humanity) is acting upon nature (non-human nature) through the alteration of the wolves’ DNA. But doing so loses sight that for those who have worked on the dire wolf project, helped birth the pups, and raise them that these are actual animals and their lives and wellbeing affects those around them. Further ethnographic research with the dire wolves; along with, Colossal scientists, officials, and animal care technicians would help draw out these stories and power relations. Also, as critters traversing intellectual ideas, power structures, and hybrid habitats. As such the wolves, scientists, and care technicians are what Haraway calls “others-in-relation”(Haraway, Manifestly Haraway) or recognizing the interconnectedness and interdependence of all beings, including humans and other-than-humans, in a world constantly shaped by their co-creation and co-evolution. Naturecultural thinking takes the disembodied, god’s eye view of the (human) individual and places them in the middle of a relational world full of actors vying for attention and action. Since individuals—both human and transgenic dire wolf—are composed and understood through the relationships they have with specific people, plants, and animals which are themselves co-created by on-going historic, material, and semiotic histories and processes.(Haraway, Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene) Part of naturecultural thinking is to draw out those stories, power relations, and the uncomfortable ethical questions that may arise from them.

Finally, viewing Romulus, Remus, and Khaleesi as naturcultural cyborgs opens the door to more complex articulations and understandings of agency, decenters the presumed importance of individual human agency and action, along with places emerging phenomena and subjects within particular historical understandings. Tracing the stories of affect between the dire wolves, their human companions, and technological apparat highlights the ability for one party to act upon another. As concepts, individuals, and relationships are co-constitutive adopting a naturecultural understanding of the world entails recognizing the interdependence of various forms of life such as humans, other-than-human animals, plants, and microorganisms, as well as, technologies used to know and shape these relational entities. But this ability to act and to be acted upon is not equal. Existing in a naturecultural world does not seek to create a universal egalitarianism between individual animals and species as in a biocentrist understanding. Instead, it recognizes entities have particular histories, relationships, and (unequal) power relations and it matters what sides are taken in these histories, relationships, and power relations.(Haraway, Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene) Instead, attention, respect, and responsiveness to each other can be given and recognized. This allows what Haraway calls “relationships of reciprocal possession”(Haraway, Manifestly Haraway)to be created between entities caught in these relationships. In these relationships neither is the same as what they were before the relationship started as each continues to grow, develop and change from being a part in it.(Haraway, Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene) Focusing on relationships of reciprocal possession decenters the human the definitive ethical subject as the human is one (important) actor among many co-creating and maintaining various political, economic, and social relationships. Embedding ethics in the relational processes, instead of discussing it as a set of added concerns, allows us to speak of particular “response-abilities” owed between entities caught in relationships of reciprocal possession. Where the reciprocal possession of individuals and species entails an ability to continually respond and an ability to act on that response.(Haraway, Manifestly Haraway)

PARTING HOWLS

What differentiates the de-extinction and resurrection of the dire wolf from simply being another instance of humans just acting upon nature itself?  In one sense, there might not be much, if any, difference. If one applies a typical social ecological framework to this situation, Romulus, Remus, and Khalessi’s creation can be viewed as humans applying our uniquely evolved intellectual facilities to address the social contradictions arising in second nature. While Colossal’s de-extinction projects stand to reinforce existing power structures and delay addressing the root social causes of the ecological crisis, social ecologists could nonetheless apply our social critique to transform society and resolve root causes, and deploy such technologies to enhance ecosystemic and population-level biodiversity—perhaps we here see a glimpse of third nature? Unlike Colossal, a social ecology movement could potentially carry out Colossal’s stated goals of preserving species and furthering conservation science.

However, this story does not challenge the nature/culture dualism itself. Such a standard social ecology response sidesteps it to focus on the issue of integration. Romulus, Remus, and Khaleesi are reduced to tools capable of being solutions to human-based social issues. We thereby simplify our thinking, narrow the realms of the social and political to the human, and do not ask ourselves to be affected by the animals themselves. Treating the dire wolves as cyborgs broadens our theoretical horizons. This conceptual move challenges our ingrained assumption that there is a nature that needs to be integrated with humanity, and it shifts our focus from thinking about ecological issues in a generalized sense to finding them in unexpected places like the laboratory. In this new light, we must look back at the wolves’ actually existing relationships to their caretakers and ask what type of moral, ethical, and political obligations might be owed to them.

Naturecultural thinking is not meant to replace social ecology’s dialectical mode of thinking. Instead, my examination of the dire wolves as cyborg critters of natureculture is meant to add another tool into our social ecological toolbox. Bringing the two frameworks into conversation is an act of self-critique of our own theoretical assumptions and is an attempt to ask social ecologists to ask better, more interesting questions than defaulting to our usual answers. But a naturecultural framework too has its limitations. Using one often means having to trace the historical roots and interconnections of various social, scientific, and political beliefs and practices. Something that entails prolonged study and detailed knowledge to accomplish. It also entails getting to know the entities in relations in a real setting. Naturecultural study entails extensive ethnographic work to fully trace out the interconnections, moral quandaries, and unfolding ethical obligations between actors. This project would have been much stronger if the author had been able to meet the wolves and interview their caretakers. Finally, natureculture seldom offers nice moral and political solutions as focusing on unfolding relationality and obligations often means focusing on the messy reality of life. It is less interested in provide certainty, yes/no, or right/wrong answers than it is in focusing on tenuous possibilities that asks all actors to give something in order to accomplish something.

Perhaps a synthesis of sorts is possible. Romulus, Remus, and Khaleesi could be instrumental in addressing ecological issues, but as social ecologists we would have to extend our curiosity and ethical obligations to them. Here, we would have to see the wolves not as tools for our survival but as fellow social ecological companions who are owned certain duties and responsibilities. As critters of an unusual third nature, perhaps they or their descendants’ pups could be cross-fostered with grey or red wolves as a means of promoting the health of their fellow canine cousins. Or maybe grey or red wolves could be brought in to live with the dire wolves to train them how to live as wolves within their ecological preserve. Eventually Canis lupus terriblus could be let out into the areas surrounding the ecological commune of the future. But in the meantime, social ecologists would be responsible for caring for these terrible wolves as they come to know themselves as a new type of canine.