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Ecological Economics Through the Lens of Social Movements

Ecological Economics Through the Lens of Social Movements

It is easy to see that capitalism cannot be ecological – the growth imperative and drive to make profit by externalizing costs creates the perfect conditions for an ecological nightmare. Environmental regulations have been routinely circumvented by counter measures or innovations that create new forms of ecological havoc. However, constructing a non-capitalistic ecological economy is usually understood to be a very difficult task. In the light of the urgency posed by the unfolding climate catastrophe and rapid species extinction it appears to be a daunting undertaking. As our situation can appear hopeless, even on the left there is a tendency to accept risky techno-fixes proposed by those who cannot see beyond capitalism.

Eco-Leninist fallacy

From the Marxist left one can hear calls for an authoritarian communism where a small vanguard conquers the state power to force climate friendly transformation. Andreas Malm for example speaks about “ecological Leninism” and “war communism” as solution to the climate crises (Malm and Mealy 2020).1

From a historical perspective this is a surprising idea given Lenin’s inspiration for war communism came from the organization of the  German war economy in 1914. What he called “war communist” wasn’t  socialist or communist at all, in the sense of collectivized worker control of industry (Nowak 2020). Malm’s analogue is also astounding given the fact that Leninism was a decisive failure in regards to the Bolsheviks’ own stated goals which animated their revolution in the first place.2 Indeed, it was these very methods of wielding a centralized state power that undermined any possibility for accomplishing the key revolutionary tasks in Russia: ending exploitation and liberating the peasants and workers. Lenin and the Bolsheviks had enormous effects on Russian society, but did not accomplish the goals which animated the revolution in the first place.

In 1917 workers’ gained control over their workplaces through factory committees called Soviets. These councils were the essential democratic achievement of the revolutionary movement, supported by Lenin before the October revolution, but soon after gaining power the Bolsheviks transformed them into tools for their one-party dictatorship.3 From Lenin’s famous maxim “Communism is soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country,” only the latter part remained. People’s self-managed initiatives were discouraged, even if it meant material deprivation. Everything had to go through the party and the state bureaucracy.4

The peasants also liberated themselves in 1917 through their own repartition of aristocratic landholdings. Bolshevik decrees in the early days of the revolution called upon peasants to seize and redistribute the land, but ultimately this popular democratic agency in the countryside was incompatible with the Bolshevik model of social transformation enacted through the repressive power of a centralized state. Their autonomy was crushed first through the forced requisitions of war communism and later through the state-led collectivization enacted by Stalin’s regime: a process much of the peasantry regarded as a second serfdom.5 While some contemporary Leninists seek to distance themselves from the legacy of Stalin, this anti-democratic process was nonetheless an extension of the party-state system that Lenin set in motion. 

With the state power set at odds with the greater part of the Russian population, it became the new agent of exploitation in the hands of a new ruling class. Class dictatorship by this bureaucratic elite drove environmental catastrophe throughout Soviet history, much as capitalist class dictatorship has done all over the world.  So while today’s “Malmist-Leninist” cadres seeking state power might, like Lenin and Stalin, profoundly transform the infrastructure of a country, the society could remain as anti-ecological as before after this metamorphosis. Some of the reasons for this paradoxical result would be – as witnessed in the Soviet Union – wasteful inefficiencies created by state bureaucracy (see Graeber 2015) and silent resistance against undemocratic power by ordinary people (see Scott 1990; Filtzer 1996).6

Capitalist thinking

Difficulty imagining ecological transition stems, at least in part, from our economic thinking. The origin of the modern concept of economy is capitalistic and based on the assumption of scarcity, created by the theoreticians of the industrial system. However, even for many radical scholars it is hard to escape these assumptions about the economy as a distinct sphere governed by laws independent of human agency or institutions.. The fundamental conservatism of economic thinking is reinforced by institutions such as IPCC, which, while proposing radical changes in material and energy flows don’t suggest any structural changes in the world economy nor in economic thinking.7

The economy is usually thought of as the sphere of society that provides us with the material basis for our various activities. Yet a large part of the modern economy doesn’t produce anything material. Instead it produces information, entertainment, advertisements, and other things connected to culture. An essential part of the economy is creating monetary and legal entitlements to material and non-material things. Therefore the economy can include almost anything, making it difficult to find common features to all economic activities. Yet you can say that activities can be called economic if they contribute (directly or indirectly) to good or normal human life. 

Movement economy

To find inspiration for another kind of economic thinking, it is helpful to look at already-existing alternative economies. Anthropological research shows that people in many different times and places have been able to live a good life without causing catastrophic ecological harm. One can find such societies among various hunter-gatherer and horticulturalist societies, even though not all of these groups have been ecologically benign (see e.g. Sahlins 1981; Bookchin 1982; Bradford 1989).8Yet, imitating the life of these societies is thought to be impossible, not befitting modern humans.9 Absent an ecological mode of life, it is common to regard the external force wielded by the state as the only option restricting modern human societies within ecological limits.

Most anarchists regard living a voluntary ecological life as possible in principle. Yet those who have only direct personal experience of acting in small anarchist groups tend to see rapid change possible only for people like themselves, but less so for large majorities of people.

This pessimism concerning our human potential may arise from the lack of social movement experiences. For those of us with activist backgrounds, these experiences have often been formative for one’s social and economic thinking.10 Occasionally we have witnessed inspiring human and social “miracles.” This is even more so for people who have experience or knowledge of the often temporary, local, yet non-capitalistic societies created by movements such as the Kurds of Rojava or the Zapatistas of Chiapas.11 In such movements you can see very different people coming together and doing deeds you perhaps wouldn’t expect from them given their respective backgrounds. People change rapidly or suddenly find a radical side they never knew existed.

From the mainstream economic perspective, movement practices and the societies they create represent only pockets of poverty and parasitism surviving off the production of the normal economy. From the inside, however, what these critics describe as “poverty” is not the primary experience, but on the contrary, the liberation of creative energies and flourishing human interaction. The participation in direct democracy and resulting “public happiness” this engagement creates are enriching experiences.12 These processes happen especially in movements responding to crises where the injustice or irrationality of the social order is widely recognized. 

Perhaps surprisingly, social movements can rapidly create well-being without vast material resources. One reason is the way movements are organized, where a key feature is lack of monetary rewards and coercive mechanisms. Movements may often have strong leaders, but they are leaders in the same sense as the “chiefs” of many indigenous societies: they cease to be leaders when they lose trust. Local movement groups in many of these grassroots struggles exercise a wide degree of autonomy. A common feature of such movements is a consensual process by necessity. Within particular groups, some sort of democracy must prevail – otherwise people vote with their feet and leave. In  general meetings where various groups within the movement convene, the opinion of each group must be taken into account if the movement is to go forward with strength. Examples of movements following this kind of logic are the Occupy movement in 2011, the anti-nuclear-power movement in late 1970s and in 1980s, and the recent anti-NATO movement in Finland.

Such forms of collective action can produce deep shifts of power relations immediately because groups of people possess power that separated individuals do not. Disobedience in a hierarchical structures may spread widely as a result, and can locally disrupt forms of domination. People getting together can assemble a huge “power-to” to be collectively steered. Participants in these organized upswells experience new forms of dignity: both respect and self-respect.  Movements exercising this kind of power can and have moved to redistribute resources quite immediately, even if material flows may be limited in the first stages. However, social richness can compensate, at least for a time, for these economic constraints.

Many of these features are reflected in social movement studies. For example, Klar and Kasser have observed that participation in social movements can increase psychological well-being.13 The history of Nordic environmental movements provides one such example. In January of 1981, thousands of people non-violently resisted the construction of a dam on the Alta river in Sami territory in northern Norway. The sun did not rise over the horizon and the temperature was often below negative 20 degrees centigrade. People had to sleep in tents in the Arctic winter. One tenth of Norway’s police officers – altogether around 600 – came to the site and arrested 800 demonstrators.14 Yet, after some years when the participants were interviewed they said that the time during the Alta action was the best period of their life.

I do not contend that these experiences, observations, and analyses of movement practices apply to all movements or that they offer a blueprint for a future economy. Rather they are presented as indications of surprising human potentialities for a radically different economy that could exist here and now—flowing outward from organizational methods that are democratic and participatory rather than forcefully imposed by an alienated state power. These same hopeful potentialities emerge also during earthquakes and other natural disasters, in what Rebecca Solnit has called “paradises built in hell.”15

How is it possible for movements to create these kinds of alternative ecological economies without an extended period of transition, seemingly out of nothing? Is it only a mirage that disappears when you look more closely? There are many possible answers to these questions. One is the “economic” explanation: An well-established or a newly astroturfed movement usually has money to pay some people to lead the movement and to create normal hierarchical organization. A rising, genuinely popular movement instead has in the beginning no material resources and therefore is forced to organize horizontally and give its participants the “real thing”: autonomy and democracy. Or perhaps it is better to formulate this from another perspective: autonomy and democracy are a normal choice within movements, but when money is involved it easily goes astray.

Another explanation is that our societies are not wholly integrated entities; there is a shadow or alternative society in the midst of the prevailing society on which a movement can base itself.16 A large part of this is a shadow economy which includes the production and distribution of goods and services not recognized in the official economy or GNP calculations. Forms of common wealth that humans have created over thousands of years, and nature during millions of years, belong to this shadow economy. Alongside the official society people routinely participate in that shadow economy. Examples of that include the service production inside households, mutual aid among friends and neighbors, small service people are routinely giving to strangers and aid that workers often give to other workers.17 Therefore people also have a “shadow personality” which may differ widely from what they are in official settings. In movements this shadow society and personality gain strength and come partly to the fore. It is the “energy source” in the rapid creation of the economy of a given movement.

The purpose of the mega-production?

A third explanation is that the compulsion to produce and consume huge amounts of things is socially and politically created, and not directly related to human needs. Of course people always require food and shelter and an array of other products whose composition depends on circumstances. Yet, the amount of material production needed in non-capitalistic conditions can be surprisingly small. To understand this we must analyse what our massive production today is needed for.

The modern economic mega-machine does not exist to lift people from poverty. Furthermore a person whose income is well above poverty-line may nonetheless live in misery; she may have an exhausting and dangerous job with no free time, live in a polluted and ugly environment, have a poor social life, not be respected in any community, or lack dignity or autonomy. In these circumstances, much of her consumption is compulsory or, to use Illich’s term, shadow work – money is needed to get to the job, to keep her maintained for work, and to compensate for distress at work and home (Illich 1981).18 Such a person, despite their normal wage, is in fact poor in many respects.19

In mainstream economics it has been noticed that when the economy grows, larger and larger shares of the production are needed to keep up the economic machinery. Even though productivity is improving, the productive system develops in ways that require more intensive forms of infrastructure, administration, and material throughput. As a result, greater and greater proportions of economic activity become detached from servicing human flourishing or physical needs.  This is called the intensification paradox.20

Maintaining these present hierarchies, the rate of capital accumulation, and the opulence of elites exacts a heavy cost on the rest of society. It requires a variety of social processes and arrangements that drive significant human misery and ecological disruption, exacting vast human toil to enable the extravagance of a few. In a capitalist society (and indeed in those state-socialist societies organized along the Leninist model),  constructing and maintaining this administrative apparatus necessitates dedicated drudgery for an expanding share of the working population.

This unequal distribution of wealth and power must be maintained by organized violence and its corresponding production. That too is economic activity serving only to maintain the exploitative apparatus.. And equally important is the economic activity undergirding capitalism’s ideological apparatus, where the bulk of the population must be indoctrinated into obedience and deference to the ruling class so that the hegemony of this exploitative structure may be entrenched. 

To make this disparaging social order more tolerable, much effort is put into the physical and cultural production of status goods that give toilers a fleeting taste of elite glamour. This constantly changing production transforms lifestyles and creates cultural and physical dependencies on new products, creating the illusion that all these new products and the work associated with them are necessary. Thus in capitalist life commodities are used to compensate for real social relations by attaching social meanings to them.21

The social processes that simultaneously create both poverty and opulence demand enormous commitments of human labor and resources. As a consequence, this expansionary, life-killing system has spread to almost all corners of the planet. Yet in social movement settings, these processes may be weakened; absent the top-heavy administrative structures of exploitative hierarchies, the labor and resource inputs can be drastically reduced while still providing for human needs—possibly to a far greater extent than the capitalist economy is able to! 

A new concept of economy

When we see that the prevailing economy is only one of many humanly possible ones, we can also conceptualize the economy in new ways. Fundamentally the economy is not a sphere of material necessity autonomous from the polity: economic and political structures are interlinked in various ways. The essence of the economy is to produce humans and their relationships.22 In different social circumstances, different kinds of social processes may exist that produce different kinds of humans. Contradictory social processes can exist side by side in a society, which enables rapid and radical societal shifts.

What then would an ecological economy look like based on processes similar to those that exist in social movements? It would go hand in hand with a different kind of polity: grounded on direct democracy, nested confederations and delegates with mandates going from lower to higher levels. As in social movements, power-to would be great while power-over weak and collectively constrained. Poverty reduction wouldn’t depend on economic growth but on reducing opulence and domination. The massive human and material resources necessary to maintain power hierarchies and the wealth of a few would be freed. The fraction of this wealth that does not cause the continuation of ecological destruction could be redistributed to the needy. Thus may fade away status competition, poverty, and the social and psychological inhibitions for resource sharing. 

Wide political participation in local assemblies and other entities of directly democratic self-governance would elevate those of modest means to a status of dignity and respect among one’s community of political peers.. Such is the institutional and cultural basis of public happiness. Working and interacting freely without domination creates a social richness to displace the current primacy of individual material wealth. Public festivals and occasional dancing in the streets and fields might bring about such moments of ecstasy that we can imagine women and men would look at pictures of life in consumer society with pity and astonishment.23

People would enjoy the many things money can’t buy, with richer human relationships being the salt of life. But important relationships ought not be limited to the human world; they would encompass various living beings, ecosystems, and natural formations. The co-operative spirit of the economy could extend to non-human beings, and the idea of subjugating nature would disappear along with the subjugation of humans by humans (Bookchin 1982).24 The ability to enjoy nature as such, without drastic human interventions would be widespread and our present anti-ecological economy would be regarded as one of those irrational practices of a bygone dark age.

This image of the future is a utopian imagining, but it is nonetheless one we can taste the reality of in our social movements of today.

  1. Andreas Malm, “To Halt Climate Change, We Need an Ecological Leninism,” interview with Dominic Mealy, Jacobin (June 15, 2020). https://jacobin.com/2020/06/andreas-malm-coronavirus-covid-climate-change. Malm had even more authoritarian tone in his speech in the Malmö Degrowth Conference in 2018: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2GBkJVHx6mM.
  2. Contrast, for instance, the party-state that consolidated in the 1920s with the political vision laid out in Lenin’s State and Revolution.
  3. Maurice Brinton, The Bolsheviks & Workers’ Control, 1917 to 1921: The State and Counter-Revolution (Detroit: Black & Red, 1975). http://www.spunk.org/texts/places/russia/sp001861/bolintro.html.
  4. See e.g. Murray Bookchin, The Third Revolution: Popular Movements in the Revolutionary Era, Volume 3 (London: Continuum, 2004); Voline, The Unknown Revolution (Montréal: Black Rose Books, [1947] 1990). http://www.ditext.com/voline/unknown.html; Geoffrey Hosking, Russia, People & Empire 1552-1917 (Fontana, London, 1998); Alex Sparrow, “Workers’, Soldiers’, and Peasants’ Councils,” Le Moineau (17 March 2015). https://alexsparrowdotcom.wordpress.com/2015/03/17/workers-soldiers-and-peasants-councils/; and Emma Goldman, Living My Life, Vol. II (New York: Dover, 1970). http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/ANARCHIST_ARCHIVES/goldman/living/livingtoc.html.
  5. Bookchin, The Third Revolution, Volume 3; Voline, The Unknown Revolution; Hosking, Russia, People & Empire.
  6. See David Graeber, The Utopia of Rules: On Technology, Stupidity, and the Secret Joys of Bureaucracy (Melville House, Brooklyn, 2015); James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1990); and Donald Filtzer, “Labor Discipline, the Use of Work Time, and the Decline of the Soviet System, 1928-1991,” International Labor and Working-Class History (Vol. 50, 1996): 9–28. http://libcom.org/history/labor-discipline-decline-soviet-system-don-filtzer.
  7. Joachim Spangenberg and Lia Polotzek, “Like Blending Chalk and Cheese – the Impact of Standard Economics in IPCC Scenarios,” Real-World Economics Review (No. 87, 2019): 196–211.
  8. See e.g. Marshall Sahlins, Stone Age Economics (Tavistock, Lontoo, 1981); Murray Bookchin, The Ecology of Freedom, The Emergence and Dissolution of Hierarchy (Palo Alto: Cheshire Press, 1982); and George Bradford, “The Question of Agriculture” Fifth Estate (Vol. 24, No. 1, 1989): 36–38.
  9.  Notably, of course, modern-day small farmers feed billions of people using techniques similar to earlier horticultural societies, primarily in global South countries. See Colin Todhunter, The Great Flattening: Enclosure, Extraction and the New Age of Concentrated Power (Critical Global Research Collective, UK & India, 2026). https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.32815505.
  10. My own experiences are mainly related to Finnish anti-nuclear and environmental movements and to local struggles in Fiskars village where I used to live.
  11. See e.g. Michael Knapp, Anja Flach, and Ercan Ayboga, eds., Revolution in Rojava: Democratic Autonomy and Women’s Liberation in Syrian Kurdistan (London: Pluto Press, 2016); Andrej Grubačić and Denis O’Hearn, Living at the Edges of Capitalism: Adventures in Exile and Mutual Aid (Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2016).
  12. Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (Penguin Books, London, 2006).
  13. Malte Klar and Tim Kasser, “Some Benefits of Being an Activist: Measuring Activism and Its Role in Psychological Well-Being,” Political Psychology (Vol. 30, No. 5, 2009): 755–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2009.00724.x.
  14. Wikipedia contributors, “Alta-konflikten,” Wikipedia (2020). https://no.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Alta-konflikten&oldid=20846705.
  15. Rebecca Solnit, A Paradise Built in Hell: The Extraordinary Communities That Arise in Disaster (New York: Viking, 2009).
  16. Olli Tammilehto, “The Present Is Pregnant with a Social Ecological Future: The Shadow Society and Societal Phase Shift,” in Social Ecology and the Right to the City: Towards Ecological and Democratic Cities, eds. Federico Venturini, Ines Morales, and Emet Degirmenci (Montréal: Black Rose Books, 2019), 168–83; Massimo De Angelis, The Beginning of History, Value Struggles and Global Capital (London: Pluto Press, 2007).
  17. David Graeber, Debt, The First 5000 Years (Melville House, Brooklyn, 2011)
  18. Ivan Illich, Shadow Work (Marion Boyars, Boston, 1981).
  19. Olli Tammilehto, Globalisation and Dimensions of Poverty (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department for International Development Cooperation, Helsinki, 2003). http://www.tammilehto.info/tammilehto_globalisation.pdf.
  20. David Fleming and Shaun Chamberlin, Surviving the Future: Culture, Carnival and Capital in the Aftermath of the Market Economy (White River Junction, Vermont: Chelsea Green Publishing, 2016).
  21. See e.g. William Leiss, The Limits to Satisfaction: On Needs and Commodities (London: Marion Boyars, 1978); Grant McCracken, Culture and Consumption: New Approaches to the Symbolic Character of Consumer Goods and Activities (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1988).
  22. Graeber, Debt.
  23. Barbara Ehrenreich, Dancing in the Streets: A History of Collective Joy (London: Granta, 2008); Fleming and Chamberlin, Surviving the Future.
  24. Bookchin, Ecology of Freedom.