“I didn’t and still don’t like making a cult of women’s knowledge, preening ourselves on knowing things men don’t know, women’s deep irrational wisdom, women’s instinctive knowledge of Nature, and so on. All that all too often merely reinforces the masculinist idea of women as primitive and inferior – women’s knowledge as elementary, primitive, always down below at the dark roots, while men get to cultivate and own the flowers and crops that come up into the light. But why should women keep talking baby talk while men get to grow up? Why should women feel blindly while men get to think?”
~ Ursula K. Le Guin, “What Women Know”
The essence of the ecofeminist idea is that there is a connection—perhaps in terms of root cause, perhaps in terms of a radical solution, perhaps only in terms of an illuminating comparison—between the oppression of women and the exploitation of nature. Feminist theorists have drawn this connection at the level of cultural imagery, as with the countless personifications of nature and natural processes in female form, and it has been drawn at the level of analyzing social structures that simultaneously produce patriarchal subjugation and ecological vandalism. Ecosystems, non-human animals, and women alike are, for our hierarchical society, both productive and subjected bodies. We as ecofeminists therefore see a triangle of exploitation (nature–woman–non-human animals) that has at its center the human-man.
But if a linkage between the condition of women and the condition of the non-human world is in some sense genuine, what flows, then, from this connection? Are we to understand it as a transhistorical reality rooted in the essence of womanhood? Is it a historically constructed narrative that is downstream of patriarchal social relations? Is it a relationship we ought lean into to chart our path to liberation? Is it one that needs to be overcome, overthrown? Ecofeminism as a theoretical tradition does not possess unified responses to such questions. Here with a particular focus on the ideas underlying an ethics of care and our critique of them, we will explore some of these deep fissures within ecofeminism. How different feminists think about such difficult questions is not merely a matter of varying emphasis. We believe that how they are answered matters deeply for the prospects for social transformation, and an ecofeminism informed by social ecology is essential for averting the essentialist trap that reproduces the very patriarchal assumptions we seek to overcome.
The Many Female Faces of Nature
Our view of nature has changed over time. Nature has been seen in different periods and places as a passive subject, as a machine, as a maternal caregiver, or as a frenzied and undisciplined creature. These images of nature, however, may not strictly succeed each other or predominate during a certain era, but may intertwine with each other, depending on the circumstances. One image may predominate in an era, but not totally. We should not expect, for example, the image of the passive feminine to be universally dominant in the 18th and 19th centuries because of Romanticism being a strong current during that period.
Chaia Heller analyzes the depiction of passive nature as a victimized woman, a renaissance Madonna, an angelic figure, a female waiting for her male to save her. The male is the human. Heller, in addition to being a social ecologist, is also a psychologist, and thus focuses on another aspect of this image: nature, as a fragile form waiting for salvation, is at the focus of interest, but at the same time maintains a low social status. The man, the human being, is the romantic who will save nature, thus realizing both a male fantasy and a social reality.1 This female nature is characterized by a peculiar eroticism. The distinction, and ultimately the antithetical relationship between nature and culture, nature and society, entails an erotic dispute, which can be defused through an erotic encounter. Greta Gaard argues that when nature takes a feminine and erotic form and culture takes a masculine form, then the culture-nature relationship assumes a heterosexual form.2
The passive submissive feminine nature is also emphasized through language. In ecological discourse, w at times hear phrases like “rape of nature” and “virgin forests.” In these depictions nature is not only feminized, but also passive, as female nature must be. Also, in English colloquial language there are various words used to describe women that aim to animalize them, such as “pussy” or “bitch”, which men (and even women) who use them intend as degrading, since they consider non-human animals inferior to human animals.3
The portrayal of nature as nurturing mother or Mother Earth has predominated in a variety of different cultural and historical contexts. It stems from long historical and mythological traditions associated with multiple ancient cultures, perhaps most prominently the ancient Greek culture, according to which Gaia is the ancestral mother of much of the universe4—though coexisting uncomfortably with and alongside a second depiction of her as a raging and disobedient nature:
Central to the organic theory was the identification of nature, especially the earth, with a nurturing mother: a kindly beneficent female who provided for the needs of mankind in an ordered, planned universe. But another opposing image of nature as female was also prevalent: wild and uncontrollable nature that could render violence, storms, droughts, and general chaos. Both were identified with the female sex and were projections of human perceptions onto the external world. The metaphor of the earth as a nurturing mother was gradually to vanish as a dominant image as the Scientific Revolution proceeded to mechanize and to rationalize the world view. The second image, nature as disorder, called forth an important modern idea, that of power over nature. Two new ideas, those of mechanism and of the domination and mastery of nature, became core concepts of the modern world.5
These two rather contradictory images of nature (nature as caring mother, nature as disorder) have persisted through the time since the industrial revolution, while serving a new set of needs: namely capital accumulation through the exploitation of nature. In the transition to capitalism, however, these images were also joined by a new one, of nature as a machine. Descartes compared human and animal bodies to machines, Thomas Hobbes used mechanical terms to describe society, and Isaac Newton used the same terms to explain the movement of the planets. Thus, mechanics offered a unified theory for animal life, society, and the universe.6 As Merchant argues, the mechanistic philosophy of the scientific revolution marked an inflection point in the history of the domination of man over nature—both of man over woman and of the human over the non-human world. This, too, rationalized capitalist exploitation of nature from a new basis.7
Francis Bacon’s New Atlantis stressed the need to manage and explain nature through experimentation and the use of every available scientific tool.8 The mechanistic conception of nature was a necessary interpretative frame for this new form of scientific practice. Bacon, through his work, argued that the way to human progress and the new scientific method was through the absolute subjugation of nature, which he viewed as female. To complete his depiction of nature as female, he drew on a multitude of elements, including the preceding witch-hunt by the Inquisition. In “The Masculine Birth of Time,” he wrote, “I am come in very truth leading to you nature with all her children to bind her to your service and make her your slave,” and “We have no right to expect nature to come to us.” Man must be decisive in order to capture and subjugate nature. “Nature must be taken by the forelock, being bald behind.”9
Romanticism was, among other things, a movement, a reaction to the sweeping mechanical philosophy of the scientific revolution and the rationalistic spirit of the Enlightenment. Although Romanticism was at first a purely artistic movement, it gradually influenced other areas of intellectual activity. Jean-Jacques Rousseau is considered one of the early representatives of Romanticism in philosophy. Rousseau saw in the man who lives in nature purity and virtue and argued that the man living in human society has lost these fine qualities. The true history of man is the one narrated in the book of nature. What comes from nature is true and its elements are purity and virtue, Rousseau argues.10 The formation of societies has brought corruption, immorality, and unfreedom. Rousseau is nostalgic for the primitive state when humans lived according to nature’s rules. Rousseau’s savage is characterized by boldness, freedom, and serenity.11 Thus, Rousseau challenged the rational spirit introduced by the Scientific Revolution and an internal critic of the Enlightenment.
Conversely, the tradition Rousseau fought against contended that the human power that can defeat the Church, bigotry, and prejudice can also defeat nature’s elements. The effort to rationalize both nature and society, which was indeed later successful at uprooting the irrational edifice of feudal Europe, came at a cost: nature ceased to be a guide and became a repository of raw materials, devoid of meaning or content. Romanticism opposed this instrumental treatment of nature by advocating its inverse, the idealization of nature. The Romantics believed not only that we should not treat nature as a repository of materials, but also that we should not spoil nature’s beauty, nor seek to improve upon it.12
In art, Romanticism was expressed in both literature and painting through freedom of expression, a focus on nature, imagination, and dreaming of the past. Nature is the main source of inspiration, presented in an idealized form and, ultimately, deified. This idealized depiction of nature is presented both as a paragon to be imitated and as something distant and inaccessible. Man is required to imitate something ultimately unattainable. Of course, we should not delude ourselves into believing that the Romantics were able to significantly influence the economy and productive activity. Quite the contrary. Romanticism developed at a time when the industrial revolution had begun, and capitalist development was in full swing. Therefore, we can say that Romanticism was furthermore “a reaction against material changes in society, which accompanied emerging and expanding industrial capitalism in the eighteenth century.”13 Romantics hated the barbaric way in which industry was destroying the beauty of nature.
In the nineteenth century a pathological model of femininity afflicted the middle and upper classes. Whilst women workers were laboring in factories fourteen hours a day for starvation wages, wealthy women were confined to a medicalized cage, seen as delicate, fragile, and prone to illness. The medical profession discovered a new field, “female frailty”, which was variously associated with menstruation, menopause, neuropathy, and tuberculosis. This trend further confined the women of “good society” to the house, without affecting the ruthless exploitation of women workers in the wider world. At the same time, the medically induced inactivity of wealthy women reinforced the social prestige of their husbands. The idler and weaker the wife, the higher up the husband in the social hierarchy. The woman “was the social ornament that proved a man’s success: her idleness, her delicacy, her childlike ignorance of ‘reality’ gave a man the ‘class’ that money alone could not provide.”14
This portrayal of women is also the image that develops for nature. As these same forces of capital accumulation and industrialization that birthed Romanticism set to work in the United States, American elite men cultivated their own distinctive outlook on nature that closely parallels these Romantic notions of a feminine, passive nature that needs masculine protection. The protector of woman is the man, while the protector of nature is the human, specifically in the form of the propertied and vigorous man—the conservationist—who experiences and overcomes wild nature, e.g. as a trophy hunter, and who holds the reins over the capitalist society which threatens it. Nature, for the nineteenth-century American conservationist, is simultaneously protected and subdued, the same as their very own wives. Their own prestigious social standing as men flowed from their role as the dominator/protector of woman/nature.
Ethics of Care
Ethics of care is a widespread theory that originated in the field of psychology, but in the last two decades has gained ground in both the field of environmental ethics and environmental education. Ethics of care was initiated by the work of psychologist Carol Gilligan. Gilligan argued that ethical development theorists based their research and findings only on men’s experiences and completely ignored women’s realities. The moral development theory of Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg was based on the concept of the separate, rational, autonomous self of the modernist Western tradition, where the autonomous self was the necessary condition and purpose of Kohlberg’s moral stages.15 Instead of the autonomous self, Gilligan puts forward the self in relations or relational self. The second type of self she proposes pertains to the female gender and its own moral development. Due to the social context, girls are goaded by their mothers to develop a concept of self in which interpersonal relationships are dominant. While boys are encouraged to differentiate and distance themselves from their mothers in the construction of an assertive and independent selfhood, girls are steered to develop a self that is largely defined by social relationships. Women’s subservient position in a patriarchal society is reproduced by molding girls into self-effacing caregivers who understand themselves in terms of the relationships they have to others around them.
Consequently, the moral system embraced by women, Gilligan argues, appears to be different from that of men. The latter base their moral decisions on reason, cognition, and the concept of justice, while women base their moral decisions on emotion and obligation to others. She cites examples of women for whom morality is not based on rights but on responsibility.16 This means that women strongly feel the sense of responsibility towards persons to whom they are committed and do not take as much under consideration rules that must be universally applied. Gilligan’s studies of moral evolution show that men make more decisions based on a rights-based ethic, while women on a duties-based ethic. Men base their moral decisions more on abstract rules, whilst women consider the consequences for everyone affected by their decisions and make choices that can only be considered ethical in the specific context of that decision.
According to Gilligan, care, relationships, love, responsibility, and trust are the main values of the female moral system. All these values are summarized in the ethical theory that Gilligan calls the “ethics of care”. The ethical stance suggested by the Ethics of Care emerges from the practice that women implement in their lives. To use one of her examples, the mother-child relationship is (she argues) a relationship in which the principles of justice and rights can hardly be applied.
Gilligan’s theory has fed into feminist and ecofeminist thought, but additionally into animal ethics. Feminist ethics of care treats animals as individuals with feelings, which can even communicate with each other, and argues that humans have moral obligations towards them.17 Furthermore, this approach has political dimensions, since it emphasizes how patriarchal ideology has led to the oppression of both women and non-human animals.
The tendency to adopt an ethics of care has also spread to the field of environmental ethics, often maintaining a clear feminist character, and even to the field of environmental education.18 This diffusion of an ethics of care into environmental thought was in particular advocated by the segment of ecofeminism called “cultural ecofeminism,” and not by ecofeminist theorists as a whole.19 These philosophers call for developing a caring relationship with nature that resembles the way a mother cares for her child.20 According to another tendency, empathy plays a special role in this special relationship between women and nature. For example, Nancy Chodorow points out that many women exhibit an enhanced empathy for other living beings. This capacity, Chodorow argues, is a result of women’s potential for motherhood and of women’s identification with their own mothers.21
These views, however, rather than advancing the cause of women’s emancipation from their continuing oppression, reproduce essentializing gender stereotypes that leave women trapped in the role of the subordinate caretaker. In addition, they may ultimately promote a sexism in reverse, i.e. depriving men of the ability to experience emotions such as empathy, at least to the extent that women do. Most centrally, however, the problem that arises from such a philosophical position is the reproduction of false dualisms, which in the end perpetuate and consolidate exploitative relations between human-nature, human-non-human animals, and men-women. Naturalizing these dualisms, as the ethics of care does, leaves open no possibility for the actual transformation of their corresponding relations of domination. As with the Romantic outlook on nature, such thinking can offer us only the idealization or romanticization of the subordinated subject.
For a Liberation Relationship with Nature
As we have seen, the depictions of nature are as many as the depictions of women themselves. Women, like nature, are sometimes portrayed as vulnerable and passive and at other times as fierce. The parallels between nature and woman are not accidental. If we consider how they are both exploited, it becomes clear which aims (and whose) these representations serve. In contrast, the dominant figure of the human and the white Western man must obtain opposite characteristics. The patriarchal image that has prevailed is that of the fierce and aggressive man on the one hand, and the passive woman on the other. The man is the hunter, the one who kills, who gets blood on his hands to bring food to his family. He is the one protecting the family from external enemies. The woman takes care of the children and the household; she is the one who nurtures and comforts. At home, the mother passes on some basic knowledge to the children. But this learning is seen only as a preparation for the real knowledge that the children will get outside the home, and certainly not from the mother. The children acquire the real knowledge when they leave their mother’s care and the house and enter both physically and mentally into the realm of real learning and reasoning which is controlled by men.22 In this image, the principle of care operates only within the protected context of home.
In modern times, the male prototype is the white Western man, who is proficient and smart within the context of capitalist society. He manages to survive in such a cruel and unfair world (which he himself works to maintain) by making good deals, outwitting his opponents, and securing material goods for his family. While Western women may today play a similar role, in the not-so-distant past their portrayals in the work arena were limited to nurses or secretaries: the former a specialist in care, extending a role supposedly assigned to her by nature, and the latter a mouthpiece reproducing the voice of her male boss.23
Capitalism ensures that the various models of the woman-nature relationship ultimately serve its stability and omnipotence. A woman’s role as caretaker in the home enables capital’s exploitation of the male worker, while anchoring a male class compact against her between the worker and his boss. Ariel Salleh writes:
An ecofeminist analysis asserts that an enclosure and privatization of women – the subsumption of women’s time, energies, and powers – through patriarchal family and public employment alike, parallels the class exploitation of labor by capital, and at the same time it makes the latter possible. Women’s position as “mediator of nature” constitutes a prior condition for a transaction that takes place between capitalist and laboring men – big men and small.24
From the perspective of ecofeminists, it is painfully counterproductive to seek a “natural order” in women’s role as caregivers, not only because such a natural order does not exist and all such gendered arrangements are produced historically, but also because the very notion of such a natural order reproduces and buttresses the ideas, practices, and institutions of patriarchy in a capitalist society.
In this theater of representations, we must question which is the model that will allow us to implement change and ultimately subvert the power relations that govern nature and society. By choosing an ethics of care as a model for our relationship with nature, we run the risk that we reproduce these primordial stereotypes. This ethics of care entails at the same time accepting the existence of a special relationship between women and nature. But this is an admission of an unacceptable statement, namely that women, according to some natural law, are destined to care, something that men should not do or in some essential way lack. Some ecofeminists, who self-identify as social ecofeminists, argue that “the very idea of a feminine connection with nature seems to many to be regressive and insulting, summoning up images of women as earth mothers, as passive, reproductive animals, contented cows immersed in the body and in the unreflective experiencing of life.”25
Janet Biehl, one of the most prominent past exponents of social ecology, argues that ecofeminism’s adoption of such a particular identification of women with nature reproduces patriarchal norms.26 According to her, ecofeminism was a revival of these constricting stereotypes. However refurbished, however “greened,” they had no place in the feminist struggle—they simply opened the door to a new iteration of the “feminine mystique.”27 According to this perspective, women accept their role as emotional beings, leaving reason to men. The rational society advocated by social ecology is not compatible with such a separation. According to Biehl, the woman-nature mystique is both insulting and untrue. If people are to live on this planet, we will all need every bit of reason, ethics, and self-control that is available. Fortunately those aspects of the human condition belong to us all. Recognizing our common capacity for reason is not only necessary for human emancipation; it is necessary for saving the planet.28
Assigning to women the “emotional” role reproduces the dominant dualisms imposed by Western patriarchal culture, and ultimately leaves the “reasonable” role to men.29 From the perspective of gender politics, this does a disservice to both women and men. Women are confined to this passive emotional role and are considered intellectually inferior since they cannot think rationally, and their decision-making process is supposedly defined by emotion. Thus, men win at the game of intelligence, but they are not in touch with the world of emotions, and they lack certain abilities such as the ability to be loving fathers. This critique doesn’t pertain only to the way ecofeminism perceives and espouses the ethics of care, but also to the ethics of care itself, since its distinction between a male and female ethics rests upon a fundamentally problematic binaristic gender essentialism.
In the field of politics, assigning these roles to women and men results in sidelining women from real decision-making power where reason is seen as necessary and primary. In the fields of environmental philosophy, environmental ethics, and even environmental education, the values highlighted by the ethics of care are also problematic. Advocating a caring relationship with nature is not in itself gender essentialist or a Trojan horse for women’s subordination, but it becomes such when rooted in the cultural model of the nurturing mother. Even when motivated by ecofeminist aims, in adopting this model as our ethical frame we trap women in a role that was ultimately imposed upon them by patriarchy. It seems indeed that the woman-nature connection is a social construct created by men—even as it has been taken up and attempted to be wielded towards emancipatory purposes by ecofeminists. Such a position has ideological undertones aiming to sentimentalize and degrade both women and nature. The depictions of nature ultimately served the purpose of subjugating women, nature, and non-human animals. The image of the passive nature and the nurturing mother reproduced by the ethics of care theory reproduces the same stereotypes that ecofeminists seek to abolish.
Furthermore, these specific ecofeminist perspectives romanticize, sentimentalize, and ultimately degrade humanity’s relationship with nature. All romantic depictions of nature, as Chaia Heller has written, fail to capture key aspects of social reality. Instead of seeing the real social target, or if you like, the real social opponent, this latter-day ecological Romanticism diverts its energy to quixotic windmills such as “technology” or “Western civilization.”30 When the objects of our desire to defend from oppression or destruction are but idealized abstractions—purity of womanhood, Mother Earth, transcendent connection to nature—then the targets of our resistance will be similarly diffuse and take the form of demonized abstractions that cannot be meaningfully challenged by organized, radical movements. Thus, we at times come across environmental thinking, and certain sections of the environmental movement, that flounder in directionless critique of organized society, agriculture, technology in general, or even (in its most fringe) language and symbolic thought as such.31
To break out of these conceptual problems, to change our gendered relationship with nature, we must first think about the overall place of women in society. The solution is not of course to ask women to become more masculine, nor should we demand the “equal admittance for women to a sphere marked out for elite males and to dominant institutions which are themselves viewed critically only to the extent that they exclude women (and elite women especially).”32 Demanding the equal participation of (some) women in the institutions of domination and their accession to the caste of elites is not a liberatory feminist project. Their incorporation into hierarchical structures as they exist today would sustain oppressive relations in modified form, perhaps then with new social groups to be subordinated. Instead, contemporary environmental philosophy and especially ecofeminist thought should seek to overthrow patriarchal, oppressive, and dominant institutions. Indeed, this should be done by uniting oppressed groups in a common struggle, since as many ecofeminists recognized, many systems of oppression are mutually reinforcing.33 Seeking reconnection with nature is a process of becoming aware of and unlearning ideologies of racism, sexism, heterosexism, and ableism, such that we may set aside our reductive idea of nature as a dark, heterosexual, ‘beautiful’ mother.34 In the course of the struggle for women’s liberation—and that of all other oppressed social classes—we must radicalize and redefine our relationship with nature as human beings, not as women or men.
The contribution of social ecology by its ecofeminists exponents like Janet Biehl and Chaia Heller and by its founding theorist, Murray Bookchin, is very important. Bookchin advocated a holistic view of nature, according to which “ecological wholeness is not an immutable homogeneity but rather the very opposite—a dynamic unity of diversity. In nature, balance and harmony are achieved by ever-changing differentiation, by ever-expanding diversity.”35 Because “the way we view our position in the natural world is deeply entangled with the way we organize the social world,” we must definitively discard a view of nature as passive, static, and homogeneous, and focus on the dialectical unity we can achieve with it.36 This can be achieved not only by shaking off the patriarchal and oppressive depictions of nature and woman, but by achieving what Bookchin called a “rational and ecological society”, which can “free us from the limits that oppressive and hierarchical societies impose on our understanding of nature.”37
To create such a society, we must transcend the dominant dualisms. Our task is not replace the male hegemonic relationship with nature with a supposedly female caring relationship. Humanity’s relationship with nature must be demonstrated beyond gender. As Chaia Heller writes, “the belief that certain subjects are more ‘connected’ to nature than others is basically dualistic and patently reflects a lack of an ecological sensibility. The study of a social ecology shows us that all beings within an ecocommunity are interconnected.”38
Conclusion
Nature is portrayed in many forms, depending on the needs of the power institutions, dominant ideology, or reigning philosophy of the day. These depictions serve always specific purposes in specific contexts, mainly nature’s subjugation and exploitation. Whilst analyzing and critiquing certain aspects of the human-nature relationship, some ecofeminist thinkers draw parallels between the oppression of nature by humans and that of woman by man. After all, feminists and other radical thinkers have demonstrated the ways women are oppressed not only by men in general, but also by economic-political systems, and especially today by capitalism.
Some types of ecofeminism (especially cultural ecofeminism) argue for the special relationship between women and nature, which results from the parallel oppressive relationship between humans and nature, and men and women. In order to upend these oppressive relations, they suggest the adoption of a human-to-nature care principle, rooted in the mother-to-child care principle, inspired by the ethics of care theory. However, we believe this approach adopted by some ecofeminists uses a model drawn from the dominant patriarchal Western culture that traps ecofeminism within norms not produced by this theory itself.
We propose the adoption of a very different type of ecofeminism, a social ecofeminism, with strong political characteristics of social liberation, which seeks common ground with other liberation movements and aims to truly radicalize the human-nature relationship. In tune with Murray Bookchin’s holistic and evolutionary approach, such a revolutionary feminist project would instead emphasize the need for re-appropriating Reason in order to achieve a just, ecological society.
- Chaia Heller, Ecology of Everyday Life, Rethinking the Desire for Nature (Montreal-New York- London, Black Rose Books, 1999), 15.
- Greta Gaard, “Toward a Queer Ecofeminism,” Hypatia 12, no. 1 (1997), 114-137
- Greta Gaard and Lori Gruen, “Ecofeminism, Toward Global Justice and Planetary Health,” Society and Nature 2 (1993): 21.
- Hesiod, Theogony 117. Notably, this understanding of nature as mother also developed independently in other contexts.
- Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature (New York, Harper and Row, 1980), 2.
- ibid 199.
- Carolyn Merchant, Ecological Revolutions, Nature, Gender, and Science in New England (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 199.
- Francis Bacon, New Atlantis (London, Kila, MT, Kessinger Publishing, 1992).
- Francis Bacon, “The Masculine Birth of Time,” and “The Refutation of Philosophies,” quoted in Merchant, The Death of Nature, 170.
- Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, trans. Franklin Philip (Oxford-New York, Oxford University Press, 1994).
- ibid 147.
- Ιosif Botetzagias, The Idea of Nature: Views About the Environment from Antiquity to Modern Times (Athens, Kritiki, 2010, in Greek), 150.
- David Pepper, Modern Environmentalism, An Introduction (London-New York, Routledge, 1996), 189.
- Barbara Ehrenreich and Deirdre English, Complaints and Disorders, The Sexual Politics of Sickness (New York, Feminist Press at CUNY, 2011), 7.
- Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child (London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd., 1932); Lawrence Kohlberg, The development of modes of moral thinking and choice in the years 10 to 16 (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 1958).
- Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice, Psychological Theory and Women’s Development (Cambridge-Massachusetts-London, Harvard University Press, 1982), 99.
- Josephine Donovan and Carol J. Adams, “Introduction,” in The Feminist Care Tradition in Animal Ethics, eds. Josephine Donovan and Carol J. Adams (New York, Columbia University Press, 2007), 2-3.
- Kyle Whyte and Chris Cuomo, “Ethics of Caring in Environmental Ethics: Indigenous and Feminist Philosophies,” in The Oxford Handbook of Environmental Ethics, eds. Stephen M. Gardiner and Allen Thompson (New York, Oxford University Press, 2015), 234-247; Constance L. Russell and Anne C. Bell, “A Politicized Ethic of Care: Environmental Education from an Ecofeminist Perspective,” in Women’s Voices in Experiential Education, ed. Karen Warren (Dubuque, Kendall/Hunt Publishing, 1996), 172-181.
- Val Plumwood, “Feminism and Ecofeminism, Beyond the Dualistic Assumptions of Women, Men and Nature,” The Ecologist 22, no. 1 (January-February 1992), 10.
- Deane Curtin, “Toward an Ecological Ethic of Care,” Hypatia, 6, no.1 (1991): 60-74; Roger J.H. King, “Caring about Nature: Feminist Ethics and the Environment,” Hypatia, 6, no.1 (1991): 75-89.
- Nancy Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering (London, University of California Press, 1978).
- Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, 22.
- Rosemary Pringle, Secretaries Talk: Sexuality, Power & Work (Sidney Allen & Unwin, 1988), 29.
- Ariel Salleh, “Nature, Woman, Labor, Capital: Living the Deepest Contradiction,” in Is Capitalism Sustainable, Political Economy and the Politics of Ecology, ed. Martin O’Connor (New York-London, The Guilford Press, 1994), 114.
- Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, 20.
- Notably, Janet Biehl distanced herself from the specific political commitments of social ecology in the 2000s, after Murray Bookchin’s passing.
- Janet Biehl, “Féminisme et Écologie,” Le Monde Diplomatique, May 22, 2011: 2-3.
- ibid.
- Plumwood, “Feminism and Ecofeminism,” 12.
- Heller, Ecology of Everyday Life, 14.
- See, for example, John Zerzan, “Language: Origin and Meaning,” Fifth Estate (No. 315, Winter, 1984). https://www.fifthestate.org/archive/315-winter-1984/language/.
- Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, 27.
- Greta Gaard, “Toward a Queer Ecofeminism,” Hypatia 12, no. 1 (1997): 137.
- Chaia Heller, “For the Love of Nature: Ecology and the Cult of the Romantic,” in Ecofeminism: Women, Animals, Nature, ed. Greta Gaard (Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1993), 231.
- Murray Bookchin, The Ecology of Freedom, The emergence of Dissolution and Hierarchy (Montreal and New York, Cheshire Books, 1982), 24.
- Murray Bookchin, The Philosophy of Social Ecology, Essays on Dialectical Naturalism (Palo Alto, California, Black Rose Books, 1995), 86.
- ibid 87.
- Chaia Heller, “Toward a Radical Eco-Feminism,” in Renewing the Earth, The Promise of Social Ecology, A Celebration of the Work of Murray Bookchin, ed. John Clark (London, Green Print, 1990), 161.