“The ideological situation we face, today, is significantly different. The current crop of antihumanists are coarser, intellectually shoddier, and, alas, far more influential than the romantic anti-Enlightenment writers and poets of a century ago… If most of our ills — ecological as well as social — arise from increasingly dangerous dislocations in the existing society, the problem of how we deal with each other and with the powerful technological means that society has at its disposal for reshaping the planet is a matter of paramount importance. To slight these eminent social problems, to play down the importance of reason in resolving them, indeed, to ignore the need to achieve what socialism in all its forms called a rational society, is in my view suicidal. Owing to the immensity of our social and ecological problems, the turn to an irrational antihumanism serves to paralyze our capacity to act with purpose and sanity.” — Murray Bookchin, Re-enchanting Humanity1
“It always comes back to the idea that if you abandon the discourse of reason, you fall into the black night of passions, of murder, and the dissolution of all social life. But I think the discourse of reason is the pathology, the morbid discourse par excellence. Simply look at what happens in the world, because it is the discourse of reason that is in power everywhere.”
— Félix Guattari, “Desire is Power, Power is Desire”2
“We don’t have time for this massive slow transformation into something that’s sustainable and alternative. I do feel like I’m getting pushed up against the wall. Maybe my ancestors felt that two hundred years ago or four hundred years ago. But I don’t think it matters. I think that the impetus to act and to change and to transform, for me, exists whether or not this is the end of the world. If a river is threatened, it’s the end of the world for those fish. It’s been the end of the world for somebody all along. And I think the sadness and the trauma of that is reason enough for me to act.”
— Leanne Betasamosake Simpson, “Nishnaabeg Anticapitalism”3
Indigenizing Social Ecology: Introducing Bookchin to the Cosmogonic Rationale of Native Thought
In May 1871, following the dreadful semaine sanglante (‘bloody week’) that precipitated the collapse of the Paris Commune, tens of thousands of Communards were taken prisoner, with thousands more fleeing abroad. Among the incarcerated was Louise Michel, an eminent French anarchist and feminist activist, orator, and educator.4 Following her trial, Michel was sentenced to exile and sent away in 1873 on a prison ship to New Caledonia, an overseas French colonial territory in the South Pacific.5 Many women were involved in bloody week and accompanied Michel aboard the frigate–fellow exiled revolutionaries apprehended at barricades, like anarchist and feminist Nathalie Lemel, all banished from the Third Republic until 1880.6
During her seven years in New Caledonia, Michel was sustained by her friendships with the native Kanak peoples, the Indigenous cohabitants of the Melanesia region in the South Pacific, ranging from New Guinea to the islands of Fiji.7 Michel describes late nineteenth-century French colonial affairs between colonizer and colonized on the islands as follows: “French settlers were displacing the natives from the land… the natives felt that French labor practices were, at best, deceptive.”8 Espousing her commitment to mutual aid and revolutionary socialist ideals, she immersed in Kanak culture, customs, and traditions, and she soon found herself embedded in their struggle to emancipate themselves from settler-state rule and the coercive imposition of its anti-ecological bourgeois sensibilities and rapacious extractivist activities. Michel participated in the 1878 Kanak revolt, an act, in large, in response to decades of nickel and copper extraction on the island and the destruction of native crops following French colonial occupation. Afterwards, she became an educator for children in the capital city of Nouméa.9
Michel endeavored to teach the Kanak people her native tongue, and, in exchange, she absorbed the oral histories and spoken poetics. Their stories depicted myths that manifested themselves through interactions with the ascendance of a globalized world in the expression of an ontological and epistemological reasoning inflected by the heterogeneous exchange between Easy, West, and Native. Michel took a particular interest in the “bizarre dialect” of bichelamar creole (the term referencing ‘holothurian’ or ‘sea cucumber,’ a common ocean-based commodity). This ‘bizarre dialect’ is a predominantly English-based creole, an organic product of the global communities formed in the islands through commercial exchange and emigration in the South Pacific. In an excerpt from Michel’s Légendes et Chants de Gestes Canaques (‘Kanak Legends and Chants de Gestes’), she writes, “To my European friends…”
You have the Eddas, the Sagas, the Romancero, the Niebelungen; here we have black bards singing the epic of the stone-age.
As was said, as will perhaps always be said, and as our black bards also say when speaking of defeat or death: the songs have ceased.
Your philosophers discuss the possibility of a universal language chosen from among the dead languages; our stone age villages are making and living that language, taking words from the English, the French, the Spanish, the Chinese, the sea-cucumber fishermen, and giving them their own meaning…
It often has rich constructions: the Diahot of the heavens, the river of the heavens, the Milky Way.10
Michel’s logs during her exile inform a sort of dialogic exchange to which contemporary radical settlers ought to aspire in good faith efforts that engage the principles and forms derived from Indigenous thought and praxis with the present realities of ecological degradation and environmental injustice perpetuated by the durability the productivist illogic maintained by anti-ecological regimes. The formation of a creole, as Michel notes, entails the process of forming a living language, one which defies universal truths or hegemonic objectivity through the intellectual process of taking concepts familiar in one part of the world and alien in another to synthesize a hybrid understanding that reflects the heterogeneity of unique localism in political life and global affairs. Michel’s reference to the Diahot, the longest river in New Caledonia, evinces a uniquely place-based foundation of Kanak ways of knowing rooted in spiritual and material interactions with their local ecology. Such ontological and epistemological bearings, while outside the dominion of canonically Western intellectual innovations, evidently do not discord with the precepts of either ecological ethics or emancipatory praxis. The example of Michel thus admonishes settler radicals from exercising their own reason without deferring to wisdom, especially to prescient insights in Indigenous renunciations of the modern productivist illogic inhered in settler-colonial capitalist domination.
At once an underrepresented figure in the historical narrative of the Paris Commune and anarchist thought, the tale of Michel adeptly situates this critical review of Murray Bookchin’s orthodox rejection of Indigenous cosmologies as irrational, unscientific, and hence incompatible foundations for the rational imaginary and democratic administration of a future ecological and just society.11 Author and educator at the Institute for Social Ecology, Blair Taylor, adds “Bookchin also stressed that his critique was not primarily directed at Native cosmology, but at its white appropriators in the ecology movement,” suggesting that, despite the value of Indigenous principles and forms, their appropriation by settler radicals, in his view, only ever amounts to romantic critiques of the status quo that are neither authentic nor genuine.12 Consequently, social ecological theory upholds a central epistemic claim based in a Eurocentric and hence definitionally constrained line of reasoning, which concludes that Indigenous thought inevitably leads one into trappings of misanthropic appeals to mysticism or primitivism that defy the rational foundations of a democratic society.13 As a result, Taylor, in a recent Harbinger article, points to “sympathetic critics” like Karl Hardy who, like this essay, contend that “Bookchin’s ‘insistence upon a singular or hegemonic Enlightenment cosmology is indicative of and perpetuates the ongoing colonial violence being experienced by indigenous peoples whose knowledges and practices do not fall within the Enlightenment project.’”14
Put simply, Bookchin’s social ecological theory merges discourses of libertarian social theory and the modern philosophy of ecology. In works such as his Re-enchanting Humanity, Bookchin articulates a critical endorsement of Enlightenment ideals that articulate his particular conceptualization of a liberatory theory, adopting the concept of the spirit of liberty embraced during the Enlightenment milieu. The spirit of liberty and the legacy of freedom, he observes, are historically bound in dialectical tension with a legacy of domination, most recently experienced in the form of the irrational logic of productivism extent in both state socialist and global capitalist modes of production. Following the rational and humanist undercurrents of Enlightenment thought, Bookchin condemns the myriad forms of domination, false categories of social superiority, and material inequality, but, in doing so, he also critiques radical counters to the status quo that entail misanthropic remedies that betray the rational and humanist precepts of sound reasoning.15
Of all the eighteenth-century thinkers of the European Enlightenment, this essay selects the contributions of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, a heterodox thinker of his own time who, like Bookchin, utilized reason to travel back through the evolutionary chain of human society and observe the origins of human nature in organic society, to use Bookchin’s term.16 For Rousseau, this primordial state of nature revealed the original constitution of humankind, once corrupted by human social institutions on the basis of invidious comparisons (e.g., between ‘rich’ and poor,’ ‘strong’ and ‘weak,’ and so on), the progressive social revolutions toward modernity introduce myriad forms of artificial, unnatural, and uniquely social inequalities into civil society.17 Nevertheless, Bookchin criticizes the tendency to draw from analyses of humankind’s original constitution that “can easily become sinister when they are used to create atavistic movements, socially reactionary impulses, and dangerous fantasies that obstruct attempts to change an irrational society into a rational one.”18
After citing the example of Michel and Rousseau to foreground this endeavor to Indigenize Bookchin’s social ecological thought, the discussion benefits from the insights found in political theorist Jane Anna Gordon’s Creolizing Political Theory: Reading Rousseau Through Fanon complement, inform, and augment this challenge to a particular orthodoxy in social ecology. Gordon notes how “creolizing political theory… involves the task of theorizing in such a way that we create conversations among thinkers and ideas that may at first appear incapable of having actually taken place, that confound at least one conception of the dictates of rigorous scholarship.”19 The often-cited example in social ecology circles of Abdullah Öcalan and the hope for the success of the ongoing praxis of democratic confederalism by the freedom fighters of the Rojava Revolution in Syria is evidence within the theories’ own intellectual development and practical application that attests to the value of expanding dialogues between social ecology and non-Western struggles against coercive and anti-ecological regimes.20
This endeavor entails a critical appraisal of Bookchin’s theories of social ecology, one that reassesses his orthodox rejection of Indigenous cosmologies by examining how Native cosmovisions interact with rational scientific inquiry, contemporary philosophies of ecology, and aspirations of actualizing alternative modes of production. To that end, this essay places Bookchin’s emancipatory theories of social ecology in conversation with three cases of Indigenous critical theory rooted in cosmology throughout the so-called United States. First, the development and application of pono science in Native Hawaiian communities demonstrate how Indigenous cosmologies, rather than undermining the basis of reason that drives scientific inquiry, incorporates deep respect for the natural world within environmental investigation and land use policies in a manner that minimizes disruption and harm.22 Finally, Yurok, Hupa, and Oneida author Kaitlin Reed describes how “settler-colonial paradigms… transform relationships to landscape from one of sustenance and kin to one of extraction and labor” in the particular case of cannabis cultivation in northern California. The cultivation of cannabis pre- and post-cultivation legalization has galvanized Indigenous resistance to the market-driven illogic of productivism and the place-based harm it causes through dispossession, ecological degradation, and environmental racism.23 In sum, Native communities’ demands for environmental justice and sovereignty complement endeavors to realize anticapitalist modes of production and ameliorate relations between social and natural worlds through non-state forms of social organization that, although rooted in an Indigenous spirituality, accord with the practicable ends of achieving a democratic confederation.24
Note, this essay uses the term ‘Indigenous’ and ‘Native’ interchangeably. It strives to be as specific as possible whenever required by history or circumstance. ‘Native American’ is used to refer to Indigenous peoples within the borders of the so-called United States, while unique tribal names (Kanak, Yurok, Potawatomi, Mohawk, etc.) are used for precision.
Re-enchanting Humanity: The Enlightenment Roots of Bookchin’s Emancipatory Thought
Bookchin engaged with a variety of European political and philosophical thinkers from the pre- and post-Enlightenment eras. The purpose of highlighting Rousseau among them all is that his A Discourse on Inequality (or Second Discourse), and later The Social Contract, critically navigated the intellectual debates of the Enlightenment milieu that posited the rational and secular basis for human rights and civil government.25 Like Hobbes and Lock, Rousseau’s concern in his Second Discourse was to identify the state of nature; however, rather than depicting this state, free of social constructs, as a ‘war of all against all,’ he emphasized, on the one hand, the innate human condition of freedom and, on the other, the natural human faculty for self-improvement and moral development. Rousseau critiqued the first revolution into human instituted society based on property as the source of social constructions of superiority that exacerbate artificial inequalities by coercively transforming members of organic society into competing proprietors.26
Nevertheless, it is this view of progress, to which “we owe the best and the worst things among us, our vices and our virtues, our sciences and our errors; that is to say, a great many bad things to a very few good ones,”27 that Bookchin retains in his revolutionary epistemics. He reaffirms the claim that the actualization of human liberty and independence will, in turn, drive individual self-improvement and collective social progress towards an ecological and just society. However, human reason must be revived with an ecological ethics and the sense of autonomy required for collective self-governance. But in Re-enchanting Humanity, he constricts the revival of reason to irreligious and narrowly Eurocentric contours, dismissing theological origins of the philosophy of science as ecclesiastical fetters rather than a spiritual expression of a reasonably felt sentiment of wonder.
Western civilization in particular singled out reason as the faculty that, more than any other, gave humanity a unique status among all other forms of life. The West saw reason as the generative source not only of logic, discourse, and reflection but also of moral awareness and empathy… The Enlightenment, as the rational and humanistic movement in eighteenth-century Western Europe came to be called, was appropriately named for its all-embracing rationalism. To the thinkers of the time, the world itself was inherently rational… This sweeping vision of ‘man the knower’, as Homo sapiens (a name that dates from 1802), helped to reinforce the emerging natural sciences in their struggle against theological restrictions, fostered a belief in social progress, and nourished the technological innovations of the Industrial Revolution, whose limits, if it had any, have since bounded beyond the reach of prediction.28
The theory of social ecology, as it is expressed in Bookchin’s The Ecology of Freedom and much like Rousseau, winds back the evolutionary clock to trace the development of human society through its successive revolutions upon leaving the state of nature. Both theorists find in the state of organic society, with small bands of hominids grouped together by voluntary association impelled by conditions of perilous scarcity and want, the intrinsically human qualities of voluntary association and mutual aid. However, Bookchin adds to Rousseau’s depiction of a savage incapable of reason that of a society wherein individuals are valued, cared for, and participate equally in nascent society as members of an irreducible minimum.29 They are, in Rousseau’s terms, bound by the innate drive for self-preservation or self-love (amour de soi-même) and a natural sentiment of pity at seeing another being suffer—the basis for love beyond oneself. But this innate drive becomes corrupted by social institutions that foster an egoistic perversion of self-love based on pride and appearance (amour-propre).30
Relations between the social and natural worlds, at this point, are untouched by the binarism between first and second nature. However, this state of affairs ends once the initial social revolution toward a barbarous logic of exclusive ownership and the desire to surpass one’s neighbor through force, fraud, and sabotage for the purpose of attaining wealth and prestige supersede the primordial bonds of human societies. The evolutionary transition is expressed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth-century evolutionary social theories by heterodox political economist Thorstein Veblen.31 This transition, Veblen describes, from a peaceable stage characterized by sharing and communal usufruct to barbarous human institutions and habits of thought undergirds the sociocultural stages that led up to the contemporary state of recurring economic crises enabled by idle absentee owners in the financial sector whose relationship with the community at large may be characterized, in a word, as parasitism.32 On the imposition of colonial property norms in Indigenous communities during the nineteenth century, Veblen writes on “the debauchery and manslaughter entailed on the Indian population of the country… the traffic of the furtraders converted a reasonably peaceable and temperate native population to a state of fanatical hostility among themselves… [as] outlaws in their contact with the white population.” This “sclerosis of the American soul,” Veblen writes, is rooted in “The Great Adventure of the Americans… the seizure of the fertile soil and its conversion to private gain.”33
Rousseau notes that before the conditions of “nascent government” were possible, humankind existed among nature and each other, absent any conscious concern for consideration, envy, or greed.34 Eco-critic Greg Garrard writes that prior to the state of society, “people venerated a fecund Magna Mater or Great Mother figure… [before] men were to complete the process of her annihilation begun by the dominance of the male Judeo-Christian sky god.” Garrard continues to assert that the Western contours of reason, themselves emerging from the Judeo-Christian tradition, “became the means to achieving a total mastery over nature, now conceived as an enormous soulless mechanism that worked according to knowable natural laws.”35 In Bookchin’s analysis of organic society, he counters the anti-ecological misinterpretation and application of Enlightenment ideas, invoking Pyotr Kropotkin’s socioecological identification of a “mutualistic naturalism” innate in humankind.36 He even challenges Rousseau’s insights, naming “the ‘father’ of much of the anti-rationalistic romanticism of the nineteenth century.”37 But throughout all this criticism, Bookchin neglects to acknowledge that the Western canon is insufficient for adequately assessing the epistemological underpinnings of the very voluntary associations and irreducible minimums admired in Native societies.38
Bookchin’s theories of social ecology benefit from further innovations in scientific and philosophical inquiry, but his espousal of Enlightenment ideals cannot claim to be untainted by a certain reverence to cosmogonic principles transcribed into a secular terminology of reason. For example, Bookchin expands on the dialectical method developed in Hegel’s Phenomenology of the Spirit to ground his social ecological theory in a dialectical analysis of human sociocultural evolution by incorporating contemporary ecological insights into his reassessment of dialectical methods.39 But it should be noted that Hegel’s work is essentially a secular retelling of Christian eschatology, the praised human spirit driving humankind toward its teleological improvement.40 His innovation takes Hegel’s observation of the dialectical dance between ideals and reality and applies the dialectical relation to first and second nature. In a word, the productivist mentality views the nutriment gifted by nature’s non-human life-supporting systems (first nature) as separate from and inferior to the domain of human life-activity and accumulation of wealth in civil society (second nature).41 The investigation of the historical tensions between first and second nature and the manner in which these tensions concomitantly affect the evolution of social and ecological systems lays the basis for the philosophical method of dialectical naturalism.42
The purpose citing Veblen as an interstitial social critic between Rousseau and Bookchin is to point out that Bookchin’s formulation of dialectical naturalism and social ecological theory are developed out of a progression of uniquely Western innovations in philosophical and scientific inquiry. Veblen, for example, based his theories on the emergent Darwinian causal lens popular in his own intellectual milieu.43 His critiques of capitalism, like Bookchin’s, also retained an “embrace of the free spirit of anarchism and [a] belief in the centralizing thrust of modern technology.”44 However, the rise of reason has been employed to dismiss the value of reverence and hence has produced a praxis of reason without wisdom. “Even theology,” writes Bookchin, “Eastern as well as Western, despite its emphasis on the validity of faith over reason, commonly used reason to justify faith to its followers.”45 While this assertion suggests that reason is superior to and incompatible with reverence, Indigenous thought attests to the inverse claim that faith can be used to justify reason. Nevertheless, Bookchin constructs his theories to a Eurocentric purview, even in spiritual concerns, that marginalizes Indigenous and non-Western thought by essentializing a uniquely Western conception of human freedom espoused from the ancients to the radicals.
Western culture has nurtured a sense of individuality that is vastly more than isolated, hedonistic, and materially egoistic. Indeed, self-realization as a fulfillment of individual intellectual and spiritual potentialities was a major goal, if not the major goal, of thinkers such as Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, the Renaissance thinkers, Luther, the French Enlighteners, Hegel, Marx, and Freud, among many others.46
The excerpt above denotes that Bookchin’s acceptance of Enlightenment concepts could not itself be characterized by blind faith. However, his primary contention was not with Enlightenment ideals but the manner in which those ideals were misinterpreted and applied to oppressive principles and forms. Bookchin observes how enlightened rationality transmogrified into a modern and illogical anti-humanist mentality that proliferates ecological degradation and compliance to a state of domination and enslavement sustained by corporate coercion and the hierarchized supervision of nation-states.47 Rousseau describes this state of society as governed by a “‘fraudulent’ social contract,” i.e. “the usurpations of the rich, the brigandage of the poor.”48 Bookchin writes on the subject, “theories of work, society, behaviour, even sexuality… [all] served as an ideological justification for a hierarchical society, modelled on a hierarchically structured ‘natural order.’”49
Rousseau’s design of government in his later work, The Social Contract, intended to remedy the inequalities of civil society through a republican construction of a public authority, legislators and magistrates selected through an electorate of citizens in a manner that represents the general will. Those elected are charged with the defense of their constituents’ civil liberties and innate human rights. However, public authority is designed as a fortress for wealth, and it awards privileges in proportion to guile and cunning rather than merit and service, betraying Rousseau’s ideals. Modern society, he observes, fuels a love for domination and possession that, absent the conditions for knowing and experiencing freedom, supersedes a love for independence and liberty.50 Mortimer J. Adler writes on the subject, “According to the naturalist view, espoused by Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, John Locke, and J.J. Rousseau, an unjust law is a law in name only.”51 That is to say, for Rousseau, the laws of early bourgeois civil society, by intensifying rather than ameliorating inequalities in the community at large and degrading the general human condition, posited vacuous claims to equality and security bound to systems of private property rights and hence had no true claim to just authority. This early inquiry into just authority and the quest for an ‘authentic’ social contract continues into Bookchin’s theories, such as his plan for the anarchic election of mayors or the organization of municipalities administered through human-scaled institutions and direct participation (e.g., the New England town meeting).52
However, civil society having thus far failed in its charge to level social inequalities through some form of redistribution, whether according to merit or need, Bookchin notes in the earlier part of his remarks that modern society has “nurtured a sense of individuality that is vastly more than isolated, hedonistic, and materially egoistic” than promised, a similar chain of reasoning as Rousseau’s Second Discourse. The deviation from the Enlightenment concept of individuality applies here to rationality. And Bookchin, on the subject of scientific inquiry and knowledge production, warns that science should not be confused with scientism.
Scientism is a state of mind or even a creed that claims that the scientific techniques and criteria used typically in physics can be applied to all domains of knowledge and human activity… with a view toward achieving the effective control (rationalization) of human beings as well as the natural world, it emphasizes efficiency and value-free ‘objectivity’ in social affairs. Although scientism has been prevalent over the past two centuries, it is a naive failing of the Enlightenment thinkers and of many nineteenth-century writers on social theory and politics, even Utopians like Charles Fourier — a failing that persists in words like social science and political science… with the result that science as such is blamed for the harmful effects of scientism on social life, notably for fostering the dehumanization and mechanization of everyday life.53
Beside one orthodoxy in Bookchin’s thought, that which rejects spirituality and posits that reason is often used to justify faith, is the sensible orthodoxy which cautions against both misanthropic religiosity and hyperrational, anti-humanist scientism. From this position, rather than undermining the epistemological underpinnings of social ecology, the following three cases showing the cosmogonic origins of Indigenous rationale expand social ecology’s lexicon of critical theory. Each case attests to an alignment of complementary elements between Indigenous knowledge and emancipatory social ecological theories, each with the practical aim to achieve the dissolution of domination in all its forms through direct action that prefigures utopia.
Social Ecology Encounters the Modalities of Indigenous Thought: Continuities from Hawai’i, the Pacific Northwest, and the Great Lakes
Although Bookchin has thus far been portrayed as a largely Eurocentric critic of neoliberal corporate coercion and the hierarchized consolidation of political authority in both capitalist and state socialist regimes, sociologist and political theorist Damian White reminds critics in Bookchin: a Critical Appraisal that the renowned progenitor of social ecology chastised “the failure of radical currents in the US to connect with the ‘indigenous radical traditions.’”54 The essence of confederalism aligns with Mississauga Nishnaabeg author Leanna Betasamosake Simpson’s assertion that “the alternative to extractivism is deep reciprocity. It’s respect, it’s relationship, it’s responsibility, and it’s local.”55 Furthermore, Indigenous socialists of The Red Nation concur with Bookchin’s critique of the anti-ecological dimensions of an irrational productivist logic in neoliberal nation-states and revolutionary socialist projects: “The phrase ‘Land Back strikes fear in the heart of the settler. But… it’s the soundest environmental policy for a planet teetering on the brink of social collapse.”56 However, one may ask at this point: How are radical currents supposed to truly connect with Indigenous radical traditions if, at the same time, critics are expected to sidestep the unique origins of Native critical theory in favor of Western philosophy’s claim to universality and objectivity? If that is the orthodox expectation, how can our engagements constitute anything but misguided endeavors of colonial erasure? Alternatives expressed in Indigenous critical theory, like social ecology, aspire toward non-state forms of social organization; however, they are intimately linked to the “resurgence” of Indigenous traditions and customs.57 But this truth does not preclude Indigenous critiques from harboring insights complementary to Bookchin’s rational formulation of an ecological ethics.
“A central task for social ecological theory,” writes Taylor, “is to incorporate what is useful in the historical and theoretical scholarship that Bookchin didn’t have access to or neglected.”58 Following Gordon’s endeavors to creolize political theory, this essay intends to put forth a response to Taylor through three concise examples of Indigenous thought and praxis with the intention to Indigenize social ecology. Accordingly, this reassessment follows Gordon’s method “of theorizing in such a way that we create conversations among thinkers and ideas that may at first appear incapable of having actually taken place,” confounding social ecology’s Western conception of reason with a defense of the principles and forms derived from Native cosmologies.59
When Rousseau provocatively diagnosed the Enlightenment as one more example of the moral decay of empires and offered his challenging portrait of political legitimacy he reversed the geopolitical values of his day, suggesting that it was Europe’s backwaters where freedom and virtue had a present and a future. He tied alternatives that he prized not only to the periphery but to its greater riches in the brown and black world, seeing in them elements of the ancient political past that he hoped might still materialize, if now in modern conditions.60
This effort to Indigenize social ecology challenges the latter half of Taylor’s that such efforts in social ecology must proceed “without also smuggling in the problematic political assumptions that he correctly warned of, and which still frequently characterize much of the ‘decolonial’ and postmodern theory that still suffuses the academy today.”61 As Gordon points out, insights into the conditions and requisites of liberation and enslavement are enhanced through dialogues with the “greater riches in the brown and black world.” “Seeing in them elements of the ancient political past” that one might hope still materialize in modern conditions, this essay points to the ‘greater riches’ of Indigenous worlds. Despite Bookchin’s rejection of anarchy, citing the necessity for redistributive and democratized social structures, an intellectual coalition of this sort is characterized by the concept of anarcho-indigenism, introduced by Kanyen’kehà:ha (Mohawk) activist and political scientist Gerald Taiaiake Alfred. The term recognizes “important strategic commonalities between indigenous and anarchist ways of seeing and being in the world,” such as “a rejection of alliance with legalized systems of oppression, non-participation in the institutions that structure the colonial relationship… and confrontation with state power.”62
As contemporary intellectual endeavors seek to creolize political theory and Indigenize anarchy, this essay provides three cases as inroads for Indigenizing social ecology. First, Native Hawaiian environmental scientists are developing a theory and praxis of pono science rooted in Native Hawaiian cosmology and spirituality. Its essence is concisely captured in the term aloha ‘āina, literally meaning ‘love of the land.’63 Second, Potawatomi environmental scientist and author Robin Wall Kimmerer establishes a continuity between Indigenous cosmologies, philosophies of ecology, environmental science, and land use, describing how Indigenous environmental knowledge lays the to the foundations for a “democracy of species” out of the principles in the Great Lakes creation story.64 Finally, examples of Indigenous resistance to cannabis cultivation in northern California further evidence the practicability of Native decolonial thought and anticapitalist modes of production that, although rooted in Indigenous spiritualities, seek to escape the anti-ecological productivist illogic of settler-colonial capitalist domination.65
Pono
“Hawaiians,” writes Kānaka Maoli activist and scholar J. Kēhaulani Kauanui, “are emphasising that the ‘rights’ being fought for [on the islands] emerge from our own cosmologies and ancestral ties to the land.”66 Responses to co-constitutive ecological and social problems by Hawaiians and non-Hawaiians alike thus proceed from an epistemic footing outside the purview of Bookchin’s so-called rational social ecological theory. Native Hawaiian communities evidence a counter to Bookchin’s claim that Indigenous cosmology is incompatible with a modern scientific rationale.
Pono science is a recent community and academic movement emerging in communities throughout the islands of Hawaii. For example, founded in 2017, the Waimānalo Pono Research Hui in the Waimānalo community of Oʻahu conducts environmental science through community-based and participatory investigatory methods.67 Indigenous cosmologies inform the philosophies of ecology behind scientific inquiry and, in turn, the policy recommendations that inform debates on political ecology. Pono constitutes a form of ethical engagement between Indigenous peoples, non-Natives, and ecological systems. Pono science seeks to minimize the scientist’s tendency to strip the object of investigation of its own subjectivity and mitigate an investigator’s disruption of local peoples and ecologies by incorporating Indigenous knowledge and consideration for one’s non-human surroundings.
The term ‘pono’ literally translates from Native Hawaiian to ‘righteousness.’ It is inscribed in the island’s state motto: “Ua Mau ke Ea o ka ʻĀina i ka Pono,” or “The sovereignty of the land is perpetuated in righteousness.” However, the term is polysemous, simultaneously conveying the meaning of such words as ‘goodness,’ ‘morality,’ and so on.68 These principles are derived from the traditional Hawaiian practice of Hoʻoponopono, which may be imagined as a community-based practice of reconciliation and forgiveness that, unlike Western justice systems, employs a therapeutic jurisprudence that actualizes restorative justice.69 Indigenous reverence therefore has practical implications for the justice systems founded in the state of society as it does with the epistemological foundations of a restorative economy.
Deep connections exist between Native Hawaiian cosmologies, identity, ways of knowing, and everyday life. Leilani Holmes, in her Ancestry of Experience, seeks to understand the nexus through the way her “Hawaiian kupuna (elders) talk about knowledge and transformation.”70 Families, she writes, express their understanding of their Native Hawaiian identities as being deeply rooted in their history of colonial encounters, ancestral ties to the land, and ways of being that have been passed down through generations. The conversations she records reveal how Hawaiian identity is embedded in the stories, language, and everyday customs particular to space and place that shape their worldview and lived experiences. The elders speak to her about how the knowledge “about your homeland, your ‘ohana (family), the flow of life, your language—and the names—all the understanding you should have” are traditionally conveyed through group chants, storytelling, and engaging in ceremonial subsistence practices like farming kalo (taro) in the lo’i (taro patch).71
Holmes’s discussion inevitably touches on the experience with colonial violence and dispossession, loss of language and cultural practices, and the urgency to pass down Hawaiian values like aloha (love), kokua (help), and aloha ‘aina (love of the land) to younger generations, underscore how Native identity and reasoning is intimately tied to maintaining a reverence to ancestral connections and cosmological principles in the face of historical and ongoing threats.72 Their dialogues demonstrate how Hawaiian identity, spirituality, and knowledge systems are not abstract concepts but are actively constructed, negotiated, and sustained through Native voices, storytelling, and contemporary debates about land use and reclaiming sovereignty. The conversations depict ways of knowing and being grounded in a living tradition, recalling the introductory example of Michel and the Kanaks bichelamar creole woven into the rhythms of their conversations and collective meaning-making processes.
The customs and traditions of Hoʻoponopono necessarily extend to Native philosophies of ecology, environmental science, and land use policy negotiated between Hawaiians and non-Hawaiians on the island. The aspiration throughout such discussions is to keep debate grounded in the pono principles derived from Hawaiian cosmologies and spiritualities. Such principles accord with the radical democratic desire to achieve an agonistic pluralism espoused by such contemporary theorists as Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau.73 While it may emerge from a cosmovision, pono, and similar practices throughout the South Pacific, are evidently neither an impediment to scientific inquiry nor policymaking; consequently, they suggest reasonable responses to the standard best practices of intensifying anthropogenic climate change.74 Furthermore, pono attests to a clear dissolution of the dualism upheld between first and second nature at the crux of the productivist illogic in anti-ecological regimes.
Skywoman
The reciprocal relationality that binds humankind to the natural world through aloha ‘āina, ‘love of the land,’ echoes Potawatomi environmental scientist and author Robin Wall Kimmerer’s description in Braiding Sweetgrass of a “the dictates of real government: the democracy of species the laws of Mother nature.”75 Kimmerer identifies the natural laws underpinning a democracy of species in the legends of the Great Lakes region shared within the collectivity of tribes who share the territory with historical and genealogical links to the effaced democratic spirit embodied in the Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) Confederacy.76
The cosmogonic origins of Great Lakes oral tradition informs a deep place-based history which, for generations, has prescribed the traditional tenets for interacting within the social and natural worlds. Kimmerer observes how Indigenous thought produces a “practical reverence.” “Ceremonies,” she writes, “transcend the boundaries of the individual and resonate beyond the human realm. These acts of reverence are powerful pragmatic… and magnify life.”77 The purpose of faith in the present-day syncretic confluence of Native philosophies of ecology with contemporary environmental science and political ecology is to facilitate the “translation of reverence and intention into action.”78 In asking the question, “Might science and knowledge be purple and yellow to one another, might they be goldenrod and asters? We see the more fully when we use both,” for the two do not undermine but enrich each other.79
The Ojibwe, Potawatomi, and other Great Lakes tribes share the creation story of Skywoman, the divine Magna Mater figure who, upon falling to earth, took in the gifts of all the non-human beings and reciprocated the gesture by creating humankind to act as stewards in their interrelations with the natural world.80 Kimmerer’s own work as a botanist and environmental scientist illustrates how reverence, rather than undermining her rigorous scholarship, nuances her methodology with a sensitivity to her humility, wonder, and compassion as a scientist who refused to be “colonized by the arrogance of science.”81 “How, in our modern world,” writes Kimmerer, “can we find our way to understand the earth as a gift again, to make our relations with the world sacred again? I know we cannot all become hunter-gatherers—the living world could not bear our weight—but even in a market economy, can we behave ‘as if ‘ the living world were a gift?”82
In her chapter “Maple Nation,” she recounts of an “honorable harvest” season in the relationship between humans in the act of collecting buckets of maple sap or baskets of strawberries.83 Through these observations of Native human-non-human relationships, she contemplates the duty of humankind to respectfully coexist with the natural world in relationships of giving and nonexploitation; that is, she concludes that individuals and communities must “pledge reciprocity with the living world” and affirm “our mutual allegiance as human delegates to the democracy of species… If what we aspire to is justice for all, then let it be justice for all of Creation… a relationship of respect, responsibility, and reciprocity. And love.”84 From these principles, she proposes the following guide for responsible citizenship and restorative economies in an ecological and just society:
Know the ways of the ones who take care of you, so that you may take care of them.
Introduce yourself. Be accountable as the one who comes asking for life. Ask permission before taking. Abide by the answer.
Never take the first. Never take the last. Take only what you need.
Take only that which is given. Never take more than half. Leave some for others. Harvest in a way that minimizes harm.
Use it respectfully. Never waste what you have taken. Share. Give thanks for what you have been given.
Give a gift, in reciprocity for what you have taken.
Sustain the ones who sustain you and the earth will last forever. 85
Like pono, Kimmerer’s descriptions of the application of Native traditional knowledge, suffused with spirituality, to contemporary scientific inquiry and land management. Her writing on Indigenous philosophies of ecology and the restorative practices that emerge therefrom attest to the practicability of economies of place-based scale organized to meet the demands of human liberty and the irreducible minimum. In any case, the cosmogonic rationale informing Kimmerer’s reason in no way obstructs either the rigors of her scholarship or the practicability of the recommendations and conclusions she draws from her particular meld of faith and rationality. What is irrefutable is that the Native logic she articulates certainly dismantles the productivist illogic of anti-ecological regimes. Such praxis ought to be praised by contemporary social ecological theorists, regardless of one’s cosmological horizons, for they are evidence of the possibilities for dismantling the first and second nature binarism, dissolving hierarchical statist chains of command into human-scaled, non-state, and democratized communities, or achieving the revolutionary end of a post-scarcity society desired in emancipatory social ecological theory.
In essence, Great Lakes cosmology—beginning with Skywoman and the bottom-up and organic history of Native democratic thought from the Haudenosaunee Confederacy to Kimmerer’s “democracy of species”—retains the radical democratic ethos of Bookchin’s social ecological critiques. But Kimmerer’s conceptualization goes further in so far as the spiritual contours of her reason enable her to elevate non-human agency and challenge the anthropocentric contours of Western political thought through a pragmatic affirmation of a more-than-human or, simply put, divine essence in the interrelation between humankind and their non-human neighbors in the land of creation. Therefore, while Bookchin might characterize such theories as “good intentions” yet “just another case of the simplistic sentimentality so characteristic of nature philosophies as a whole… a naive vision of the natural world,”86 Kimmerer’s imaginary of an ecological and just society centers on an Indigenous ecological ethics that not only engenders possibilities but has actually witnessed restorative economies instituted and sustained in communities that prioritize sustainability and human needs over endless growth, competition, and exploitation.
Cannabis
The third and final example considers Yurok, Hupa, and Oneida scholar Kaitlin Reed’s observations of the ongoing dispossession of the Yurok and other Native peoples along the Pacific coast aggravated by the commodification and shifting legal parameters of cannabis. The example serves to draw out the continuities in the prior examples of Indigenous thought discussed up to this point, namely, that Indigenous cosmologies foreground the anti-ecological contours of settler-colonial capitalist domination characterized by corporate coercion and the settler-state public authority’s reduction of Native sovereignty to a liminal space as, on the one hand, members of their own Indigenous forms of nationhood yet, at the same time, subject to the primacy and hence arbitrary whims of settler-state jurisdiction.87 Nevertheless, Indigenous responses to settler-colonial capitalist property norms steeped in legacies of colonial violence, theft, and ecological disruption accord with Bookchin’s revolutionary calls to ‘de-commodify’ nature and institute “recommunalization with its wealth of creative libertarian traits” to permit communal usufruct of forcefully enclosed lands.88
Furthermore, Reed’s Indigenous epistemics are far less at odds with Bookchin’s own insights than one might initially assume. Reed, for example, critiques the “appropriation of Native American cultures and spiritualities within the context of American environmentalism,” noting how the typically ‘progressive’ associations of settler-state consumerist cannabis culture with environmentalism evince an insincere “inclination to romanticize the environmental ethos.”89 “This environmental ethos,” she writes, “far from a New Age metaphor… guides Indigenous ecological management practices.”90 In a similar manner, Bookchin critiques the “sizable corps of lifestyle anarchists [who] were abandoning the socialistic content that serious social anarchists like Michael Bakunin and Peter Kropotkin had claimed for their anti-authoritarian beliefs and were preoccupied with their own egos and desires.”91 He also condemns “New Age mystics” whose “mentality demonizes human beings.”92
In the young urban scene of the ‘60s and ‘70s, Bookchin depicts a libertine scene of such insincere white lifestyle radicals, the result of “the colonization of society by a bourgeois sensibility,”93 who “flagrantly smoked marijuana under the very noses of the police.”94 Prior to the legalization of cannabis in the state of California, Reed notes how grow sites, “predominantly clustered in remote and biologically sensitive watersheds that are near sensitive habitat and critical Salmon spawning areas.”95 That is, in addition to using the illegality of cannabis as a means of eternizing the white supremacist core of settler-state practices of discipline and surveillance, early illicit grow operations encroached on Indigenous lands and disrupted local ecological systems.96 The history of illegal cannabis cultivation in the twentieth century, contends Reed, unmasks government’s attempts to “surveil people of color and maintain the white settler state… [and] create a microcosm of white supremacy… a racial pyramid.”97 As cannabis was legalized and grow operations proliferated, the resultant ‘green rush’ “would not be possible without genocidal land dispossession, imposition of ecological management regimes, and the transformation of kinship networks into commodities.”98 Bookchin remarks on this transformation from the “sixties ‘drug culture,’” one that “provided living alternatives… in the form of communes, personal support systems, a credo of sharing,” to “the present drug culture’ [that] is entirely sinister; it is a strategy for attuning one’s flow of adrenaline to meet the demands of society or simply to render the individual insensate.”99
In the quote above, Bookchin is referring to the whole pharmacopoeia of licit and illicit substances aside from cannabis. Whether or not, then, one believes cannabis renders an individual insensate, the nationwide phenomenon of retail dispensary chains and the unseen activities of the agricultural and land management operations behind them reinforces Bookchin’s that contemporary drug culture is designed to attune “one’s flow of adrenaline to meet the demands of society.” Reed points out that the disruption of ecological systems and Indigenous communities through the sale of cannabis as a commodity is part of the settler-state’s systematic theft of Indigenous peoples—“from gold, to timber, to fish, and now cannabis”—transgressing the rights of Indigenous lands and bodies.100 As a result, she concludes that the federal government and the state of California have “long engaged in patterns of resource rushing” that privilege “‘non-Natives values, economic systems, cultural practices, and cosmologies” and, even in spite of the ecological disruption caused by cannabis cultivation on ancestral Native lands, erect “financial barriers that prevent Indigenous peoples from accessing their homelands, and threats of physical violence.”101
As Reed notes, the case of cannabis cultivation pre- and post-legalization mirrors the history of the gold rush and the boom and bust economy authorized by an avaricious, anti-ecological, and genocidal productivist illogic. For example, in 1876, the town of Deadwood was founded after the discovery of gold in the Black Hills mountain range of the Great Plains region. The territory was part of Great Sioux Reservation lands guaranteed to the Lakota people by the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868. But white settlers and profiteering prospectors flooded into the area in violation of the treaty, staking informal mining claims and property lots through squatters’ rights.102 Though this was an unlawful encroachment on Native lands, the U.S. government did little to stop it. Law and order in the early Deadwood camp arose from ad hoc forms of private ownership backed by the threat of settler violence against the Indigenous inhabitants. The seizure of the Black Hills territory (the site of today’s Dakota Access oil pipeline) was not formally ratified until 1877, after the U.S. defeated the Sioux Nation in the Great Sioux War.103
Reed’s critique of cannabis cultivation evokes an important critique from Coulthard, admonishing against the cries from settler radicals “inclined to advocate a blanket ‘return to the commons’ as a redistributive counterstrategy to the neoliberal state’s new round of enclosures.” Before the ‘commons’ is stripped of its history, Coulthard reminds critics that “the ‘commons’… belong to somebody—the First Peoples of this land.”104 Indigenizing social ecology entails an affirmation of the alternative histories of colonial theft and violence—i.e., the lived experience of those who can claim to be the victims of a white supremacist perversion of Western reason—that “deeply inform and sustain Indigenous modes of thought and behavior… [and] the maintenance of relationships within and between human beings and the natural world built on principles of reciprocity, nonexploitation and respectful coexistence.”105 Accordingly, social ecological theory benefits from the “myriad localized bodies of knowledge” that, as Reed illustrates, constitute a “traditional ecological knowledge” (TEK) at the crux of Indigenous critical theory that aligns with Bookchin’s imaginary of modes of production informed by the rationale of an ecological ethics.
The epistemics of TEK are articulated in works such as Raymond Pierotti and Daniel Wildcat’s “Traditional Ecological Knowledge: The Third Alternative.”106 TEK can be understood, “as an ‘intellectual foundation for an indigenous theory and practice of politics and ethics, centered on natural places and connection to the natural world… an intellectual foundation [that] does not homogenize diverse bodies of knowledge.”107 In a short critique of the Enlightenment characterization of Native peoples, Reed states simply that “invading settlers could not comprehend the complexity of Indigenous land management practices because they were blinded by their own rhetoric of savagery and primitiveness.”108 As a practical example, she points to earlier settler-colonial alteration of traditional salmon management practices by the Native peoples of northern California. Reed refers to this colonial usurpation of Indigenous land and livelihoods as a genocide of human beings and their “Salmon relatives,” elevating the agency of the non-human world in a manner that is clearly evocative of a reverence to more-than-human phenomena.109 An Indigenized social ecology may break away from its orthodoxies and, by engaging Indigenous cosmologies, “seeing in them elements of the ancient political past that [we hope] might still materialize, if now in modern conditions,”110 incorporate the relationality prescribed by Indigenous principles and forms into its revolutionary ecological ethics and praxis.
Conclusion: Conflicts or Complementarities?
Examining Murray Bookchin’s social ecology in the context of Indigenous cosmologies reveals both significant epistemological tensions alongside remarkable praxical complementarities. Bookchin’s theories, grounded in the rationalist and humanist ideals of the European Enlightenment, initially seem at odds with Indigenous cosmologies, spiritualities, and traditional ecological knowledge. However, contemporary Indigenous thinkers and activists illustrate how these frameworks can coexist and even enhance one another in the pursuit of a practicable, ecological and just society outside the dominion of State authority and corporate coercion.
Native Hawaiian practices rooted in pono, Potawatomi author Robin Wall Kimmerer’s development of the principles and forms for a democracy of species, and the instances of resistance against the settler-colonial capitalist mode of cannabis production in northern California collectively demonstrate that Native American perspectives do not undermine rational scientific inquiry. On the contrary, they offer avenues for integrating a reverence and sense of wonder for the natural world with rigorous environmental science and policymaking. Furthermore, endeavoring to Indigenize social ecology by placing Bookchin’s theories in conversation with contemporary Indigenous thought and direct action not only addresses Bookchin’s own critique of radical movements’ failure to engage with Indigenous traditions but also strengthens the movement’s own capacity to envision and implement truly ecological and equitable societies, especially in non-Western and occupied settings. This transitions away from the Western canon’s particularly Eurocentric claim to universality through an integrative approach that respects the pluriversality of knowledge systems and affirms that spiritual and relational ethics can coexist with rational scientific inquiry, offering a more nuanced and comprehensive framework for addressing ecological and social catastrophes.
In sum, this dialogue between Bookchin’s social ecology and Indigenous cosmologies demonstrates that these seemingly disparate frameworks can indeed complement and enhance each other. By acknowledging the spiritual and relational dimensions of Indigenous knowledge, social ecology can expand its theoretical horizons and practical applications, moving closer to its ultimate goal of an ecological and just society administered through a democratic confederation of different peoples and ideas. This synthesis not only respects the diversity of epistemologies and ontologies derived from the myriad Indigenous cosmogonic traditions but also leverages their collective strength to foster a more inclusive and effective social ecological theory, praxis, and movement.
- Murray Bookchin, Re-enchanting Humanity: A Defense of the Human Spirit Against Antihumanism, Misanthropy, Mysticism, and Primitivism (New York, Cassell, 1995), 13. https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/murray-bookchin-re-enchanting-humanity.
- Félix Guattari, “Power is Desire, Desire is Power,” in Chaosophy: Texts and Interviews 1972-1977, ed. Sylvère Lotringer (Los Angeles, Semiotext(e), 2009), 288.
- Leanne Betasamosake Simpson, “Nishnaabeg Anticapitalism” in As We Have Always Done: Indigenous Freedom Through Radical Resistance (Minneapolis, MN, University of Minnesota Press, 2017), 74. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/j.ctt1pwt77c.8.
- Federico Ferretti, “Anarchist geographers and feminism in late 19th century France: the contributions of Elisée and Elie Reclus.” Historical geography: Feminist Historical Geographies (no. 44, 2016), viii.
- Louise Michel, The Red Virgin: Memoirs of Louise Michel, ed. & tr. Bullitt Lowry & Elizabeth Ellington Gunter (Tuscaloosa, AL, The University of Alabama Press, 1981). https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/louise-michel-the-red-virgin#toc22.
- ibid.
- Jacques Barrau, “Indigenous and colonial land-use systems in Indo-Oceanian savannas: the case of New Caledonia,” in Agriculture, Resource Exploitation, and Environmental Change (Routledge, 2021), 99-111.
- Michel, The Red Virgin, 111.
- ibid.
- Louise Michel, Kanak Legends and Chants de Gestes, tr. Mitch Abidor (Paris, Kéva et Co., 1885/Mountain View, CA, Creative Commons, 2005), https://www.marxists.org/history/france/paris-commune/michel-louise/1885/kanak.htm.
- Murray Bookchin, “Twenty Years Later,” Introduction to the second edition of The Ecology of Freedom (Montreal, Black Rose Books, 1991), xiv-xv.
- Blair Taylor, “Social Ecology, Racism, Colonialism, and Identity: Assessing the Work of Murray Bookchin,” Harbinger: a Journal of Social Ecology (Vol. 4, No. 2, 2023).
- For an example of anarcho-primitivism that contrasts with Bookchin’s views of sociotechnological progress, see John Zerzan, Future Primitive and Other Essays (New York, Autonomedia, 1994), published one year before Bookchin’s Re-enchanting Humanity.
- ibid. Taylor is quoting Karl Hardy, “Continuing the Dialogue,” Institute for Social Ecology blog (2011). https://social-ecology.org/wp/2011/04/continuing-the-dialogue/.
- Bookchin, Re-enchanting Humanity. Note, the terms ‘legacy of freedom’ and ‘legacy of domination’ refer to the two chapters in The Ecology of Freedom (Cheshire Books, 1982), 96-112 & 134-152, https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/murray-bookchin-the-ecology-of-freedom.
- Murray Bookchin, “The Outlook of Organic Society” in The Ecology of Freedom: The Emergence and Dissolution of Hierarchy (Cheshire Books, 1982), 37-51.
- Jean-Jacques Rousseau, A Discourse on Inequality, tr. Maurice Cranston (London, Penguin Books, 1984), 109-137.
- Bookchin, Re-enchanting Humanity, 21.
- Jane Anna Gordon, Creolizing Political Theory: Reading Rousseau through Fanon (New York, Fordham University Press, 2014), 14.
- Debbie Bookchin & the Internationalist Commune of Rojava, Make Rojava Green Again: Building an ecological society (London, Dog Section Press, 2018). https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/internationalist-commune-make-rojava-green-again.
- Rachelle K. Gould, et al, “He ʻike ʻana ia i ka pono (it is a recognizing of the right thing): How one indigenous worldview informs relational values and social values,” Sustainability Science (no. 14, 2019), 1213-1232; Jane J. Chung-Do, et al., “Waimānalo Pono Research: Indigenizing Community-Engaged Research with a Native Hawaiian Community,” Genealogy (Vol. 6, no. 90, 2022), 1-11./efn_note] Second, Potawatomi environmental scientist and author Robin Wall Kimmerer attests to a vision of a “democracy of species, not a tyranny of one” that engenders economies of giving at the local scale, based in reciprocity, mutual aid, and love in interrelations of the social and natural worlds.21Robin Wall Kimmerer, Braiding Sweetgrass: Indigenous Wisdom, Scientific Knowledge, and the Teachings of Plants (Minneapolis, MN, Milkweed Editions, 2013), 76.
- Kaitlin Reed, Settler Cannabis: From Gold Rush to Green Rush in Indigenous Northern California (Seattle, University of Washington Press, 2023), 63.
- Bookchin writes in “The Meaning of Confederalism,” “In a very real sense… highly populated, sprawling, and oversized entities must ultimately be broken down institutionally into authentic municipalities that are scaled to human dimensions and that lend themselves to participatory democracy.” (Murray Bookchin, “The Meaning of Confederalism,” Green Perspectives, 1989). The essence of confederalism therefore aligns with Mississauga Nishnaabeg author Leanna Betasamosake Simpson assertion that “the alternative to extractivism is deep reciprocity. It’s respect, it’s relationship, it’s responsibility, and it’s local.” (Leanna Betasamosake Simpson, As We Have Always Done: Indigenous Freedom Through Radical Resistance (Minneapolis, MN, University of Minnesota Press, 2017), 75.)
- Rousseau, A Discourse on Inequality, 175-176, Maurice Cranston adds in footnote no. 6: “Both Hobbes and Locke assign to natural man a rationality capable of discerning natural law and enabling men to contract together to quit the state of nature. Rousseau’s denial of natural man’s rationality precludes the kind of social contract which both Hobbes and Locke describe, and prepares the way for the formulation of a very different contract.”
- ibid, 136-137.
- Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on Inequality: On the Origin and Basis of Inequality Among Men (Auckland, New Zealand, The Floating Press, 2009), 107.
- Bookchin, Re-enchanting Humanity, 10.
- Bookchin, Ecology of Freedom, 221, 288.
- Rousseau, A Discourse on Inequality, 39.
- Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class (Digireads, 1899), 10-11.
- Thorstein Veblen, Absentee Ownership and Business Enterprise in Recent Times: The Case of America (New York, B.W. Huebsch, Incorporated, 1923), 169.
- ibid, 169.
- Rousseau, A Discourse on Inequality, 124.
- Greg Garrard, Ecocriticism (The New Critical Idiom), 2nd Edition (London, Routledge, 2011), 69.
- Pyotr Kropotkin, P, Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution (1902). https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/petr-kropotkin-mutual-aid-a-factor-of-evolution.
- Bookchin, Re-enchanting Humanity, 11.
- Bookchin, Ecology of Freedom, 285.
- Bookchin, Ecology of Freedom, 17-36; Murray Bookchin, “Freedom and Necessity in Nature: A Problem in Ecological Ethics” (The Anarchist Library, 2011). https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/murray-bookchin-freedom-and-necessity-in-nature-a-problem-in-ecological-ethics.
- Daniel Berthold-Bond, “Hegel’s eschatological vision: Does history have a future?,” History and theory (vol. 27, no. 1, 1988), 14-29.
- Bookchin, “Freedom and Necessity in Nature,” 4-6.
- Murray Bookchin, The Philosophy of Social Ecology: Essays on Dialectical Naturalism (Chico, CA, AK Press, 2022), 73-104.
- Sidney Plotkin, “Thorstein Veblen and the Politics of Predatory Power,” in Thorstein Veblen: Economics for an Age of Crises (London, Anthem Press, 2014), 205-237; Geoffrey M. Hodgson, “Darwin, Veblen and the problem of causality in economics,” History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences (2001), 385-423.
- Sidney Plotkin, “Veblen, Europe and Utopia,” History of European Ideas (vol. 40, no. 2, 2014), 245-258.
- Bookchin, Re-enchanting Society, 10.
- ibid 79.
- ibid 147-148.
- ibid 120, 170-171.
- Bookchin, “Freedom and Necessity in Nature.”
- Bookchin, Re-enchanting Humanity, 125-128; Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract: Or the Principles of Political Right, tr. G.D.H. Cole (public domain, 1762), 81-87. https://scholar.archive.org/work/2qigjycep5cnrdtantidhe22p4/access/wayback/https://www.ucc.ie/archive/hdsp/Rousseau_contrat-social.pdf. See also “Rousseau’s General Will” in Gordon, Creolizing Political Theory, 95-128.
- Mortimer J. Adler, Six Great Ideas (New York, Touchstone, 1997), 201.
- Rousseau, A Discourse on Inequality, 181; Murray Bookchin, The Next Revolution: Popular Assemblies and the Promise of Direct Democracy, ed. Blair Taylor and Debbie Bookchin, The Anarchist Library. https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/murray-bookchin-next-revolution.
- Bookchin, Re-enchanting Humanity, 161-162.
- Damian White, Bookchin: A Critical Appraisal (London, Pluto Press 2008), 168.
- Simpson, As We Have Always Done, 75.
- The Red Nation, Red Deal: Indigenous Action to Save Our Earth (New York, Common Notions Press, 2021), 7.
- Glen Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2014), 11-13.
- Taylor, “Social Ecology, Racism, Colonialism, and Identity.”
- Gordon, Creolizing Political Theory, 14.
- ibid 18.
- Taylor, “Social Ecology, Racism, Colonialism, and Identity.”
- Clifton Ariwakehte Nicholas, Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, Gord Hill, Véronique Hébert, Freda Huson, J. Kehaulani Kauanui, Toghestiy, Anarcho-Indigenism: Conversations on Land and Freedom, ed. Benjamin Pillet & Francis Dupuis-Déri (London, Pluto Press, 2023), 2-3, quoting from Gerald Taiaiake Alfred’s Wasàse: Indigenous Pathways of Action and Freedom (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2005).
- Jamaica Heolimeleikalani Osorio, Remembering Our Intimacies: Mo’olelo, Aloha ‘Aina, and Ea (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2021).
- Kimmerer, Braiding Sweetgrass, 76.
- Reed, Settler Cannabis, 25-49, 152-180.
- J. Kēhaulani Kauanui, “The multiplicity of Hawaiian sovereignty claims and the struggle for meaningful autonomy,” Comparative American Studies An International Journal (vol. 3, no. 3, 2005), 283-299.
- Chung-Do, et al., “Waimānalo Pono Research,” 3-5.
- Paul Lyons, “Questions about the Question of ‘Authenticity’: Notes on Mo’olelo Hawai’I and the Struggle for Pono,” in Native Authenticity, ed. Deborah L. Madsen (Albany: SUNY Press, 2010), 19-37.
- C. Malina Kaulukukui & Lorenn Walker, “Comparison of Native Hawaiian Traditional Ho‘oponopono and Modern Restorative Justice Practices,” in Comparative Restorative Justice, ed. Theo Gavrielides (New York, Springer, 2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74874-6_15.
- Leilani Holmes, Ancestry of Experience: A Journey into Hawaiian Ways of Knowing (O’ahu, University of Hawai’i Press, 2012). http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt6wqmfw.
- ibid 66-100.
- ibid 80.
- Chantal Mouffe, “For an Agonistic Model of Democracy,” in The Democratic Paradox (New York, Verso, 2000), 80-107.
- James Sellmann, “Correlative Thinking in Pacific Island (Micronesian) Cultural Philosophies,” Pacific Asia Inquiry: Multidisciplinary Perspectives (no. 11, 2021), 154-175.
- Kimmerer, Braiding Sweetgrass, 222.
- ibid 371. Also see, John Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2010), 72-77 & 177-218.
- ibid 297-298.
- ibid 48.
- ibid 62.
- ibid 244-247.
- ibid 265.
- ibid 43-44.
- ibid 33-45, 201-242.
- ibid 400.
- ibid 221.
- Bookchin, Ecology of Freedom, 221.
- Kevin Bruyneel, The Third Space of Sovereignty: The Postcolonial Politics of U.S. – Indigenous Relations (Minneapolis, MN, University of Minnesota Press, 2007), 123-170, 217-230.
- Bookchin, Ecology of Freedom, 273.
- Reed, Settler Cannabis, 99, 120.
- ibid 1.
- Bookchin, Re-enchanting Humanity, 174.
- ibid 6.
- Murray Bookchin, Toward an Ecological Society (Montreal, Black Rose Books, 1980), 6. https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/murray-bookchin-toward-an-ecological-society.
- Murray Bookchin, Remaking Society: Pathways to a Green Future (Boston, South End Press, 1990), 91.
- Reed, Settler Cannabis, 157.
- Critical legal scholar and civil rights theorist Lani Guinier writes in 12 Angry Men, “we know from surveys that white youths are just as likely (some say far more likely) to smoke marijuana than black youths, yet African Americans are more likely to be arrested for petty possession.” (Lani Guinier, 12 Angry Men: True Stories of Being a Black Man in America Today (New York, New Press, 2011), 28).
- Reed, Settler Cannabis, 17-18.
- ibid 17.
- Bookchin, Ecology of Freedom, 169.
- Reed, Settler Cannabis, 29.
- ibid 157.
- John F. Freeman, Black Hills Forestry: A History (Denver, CO, University of Colorado Press, 2015), 23.
- Edward Lazarus, Black Hills White Justice: The Sioux Nation Versus the United States, 1775 to the Present (Lincoln, NE, University of Nebraska Press, 1999), 435-464 & Kyle Whyte, “The Dakota Access Pipeline, Environmental Injustice, and U.S. Colonialism,” Red Ink: An International Journal of Indigenous Literature, Arts, & Humanities (no. 19, 2017).
- Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks, 11-12.
- ibid.
- Reed, Settler Cannabis, 3-5, quoting Raymond Pierotti & Daniel Wildcat, “Traditional Ecological Knowledge: The Third Alternative (Commentary),” Ecological Applications (vol. 10, no. 5, 2000), 1333–40. https://doi.org/10.2307/2641289.
- ibid 3.
- ibid x.
- Gordon, Creolizing Political Theory, 18.