Every human being in the United States owes it to [themselves] once and for all to pause in the bustle of daily life, look clearly at the danger ahead, and act within [their] legal means to prevent this H-bomb insanity from bringing all [their] plans, efforts, and aspirations to a catastrophic end. – Murray Bookchin1
This quote from the pamphlet “Stop the Bomb: An Appeal to the Reason of the American People,” was published anonymously by Murray Bookchin in 1954 soon after the apocalyptic scale of the hydrogen bomb became known to the American public. Nearly seventy years have passed since this pamphlet was written, but it could have been written yesterday. While much has changed regarding the particulars of the strategic posture of the nuclear states, the basic facts of our circumstances remain consistent. Potentially at any moment the bombs could fall, and all our plans, efforts, and aspirations could come to a catastrophic end. While the risk posed by nuclear weapons to both humans and the environment has historically been of grave concern to social ecologists, the implications of the State’s possession of nuclear weapons, and willingness to end the world with those weapons, has not been adequately considered as an obstacle that must be overcome to create a truly democratic society. This paper will attempt to articulate the risks of nuclear catastrophe and how this risk both justifies and undermines revolutionary politics.
I will begin by discussing the disastrous consequences a nuclear war would have on human life and the environment. I will then discuss how likely this catastrophe is to occur and the difficulties in making such an estimate. I will then discuss the unique challenges of bringing about a new society within the context of the nuclear age. I argue that these weapons constrain revolutionary movements by forcing them to either enclose or disarm the nuclear apparatus prior to overthrowing the former system—even as the existence of nuclear weapons supplies such movements with revolutionary urgency.
The Impact of Nuclear War on Human Life and the Environment
Murray Bookchin had good reason to be concerned about the hydrogen bomb. If a nuclear war occurs between the United States and Russia, an estimated 34 million people would be dead in the first few hours.2 Following this initial devastation, a collapse of the power grid would unfold, ultimately leading to the death of 90% of the United States population due to starvation, disease, and societal breakdown.3 Moreover, the combination of nuclear winter and the destruction of the ozone layer could potentially result in the total extinction of humanity.4
Even a small nuclear war would be disastrous. In 2007, a group of climate researchers who study nuclear weapons attempted to figure out the outcome of a “small” nuclear war on the climate. They determined that a war involving 100 Hiroshima-sized bombs, the approximate size of India and Pakistan’s respective arsenals, dropped on cities would put 5 million tons of carbon into the atmosphere in the form of smoke and soot where it would remain for a decade. This would massively disrupt food production and cause worldwide famines.5 It is unclear if this hypothetical nuclear war would lead to countries having a greater understanding of nuclear risk and choosing to disarm, or if such an event would merely weaken the taboo against using nuclear weapons, making an even more disastrous nuclear war more likely.
The creation and possession of these weapons by the nuclear states shows their fundamental lack of care for humanity, the environment, and the world as such. The horror of the atom bomb is however not merely a matter of counterfactual omnicide but of actual genocides. The United States’ nuclear arsenal was created through the disproportionate use of Navaho Miners to mine the uranium necessary for their construction. After the weapons were created, nuclear testing has often been done on reservations. The US forcibly relocated the native population of Bikini Atoll to make way for testing in 1946 and has conducted 928 tests on the land of the Shoshone nation alone.6 This environmental racism has led to higher rates of cancer in indigenous communities exposed to radioactive material.
The Structure of the Nuclear Weapons Apparatus
It is generally believed that only the head of a nuclear state has the authority to order a nuclear strike. In the United States this mythology is instantiated in the form of the nuclear football. This briefcase allows the president to transmit nuclear commands to the Pentagon and is viewed by the public as the device which allows the president, and the president alone, to order the use of nuclear force.7 This is, however, a fundamental misunderstanding of how nuclear weapons systems work. Rather than being a singular machine, the American nuclear arsenal is a decentralized network containing 3,750 machines each independently capable of triggering a global nuclear catastrophe.
The President’s unique authority to order a nuclear war is a legal fiction. This authority has always been delegated by the president to military command who in turn sub-delegated the authority down the chain of command.8 This is not some bureaucratic mistake but rather an inevitable result of deterrence doctrine. Singular control over the nuclear arsenal results in a situation where the secondary strike capacity of a state can be removed through decapitation. A single warhead detonated in Washington DC would prevent the US from being able to retaliate. Central control of American Nuclear forces would make a successful first strike against the United States feasible.9 As a result there are a distressingly large number of individual actors who have the ability to fire a nuclear weapon.
In Russia, decentralization is supplemented by automated systems. The Perimeter System or ‘dead hand’ is an automated system that monitors Moscow for seismic, electronic, infrared, and radioactive data that shows that a thermonuclear bomb has been detonated in the city.10 If it ever detects that Moscow has been nuked it will automatically fire the Russian nuclear arsenal at the United States.11 The United States does not automate its arsenal in this way, instead ensuring that personnel with the authority to fire a secondary strike will survive a first strike.
Whether through decentralization or automation, both systems are designed to be dead-hands switches. As Daniel Ellsberg puts it, “Russia and the United States have long made it highly likely, if not certain, that a single nuclear Hiroshima-type fission type weapon exploding on either Washington or Moscow- weather deliberate or the result of a mistaken attack or as a result of an independent terrorist action- would lead to the end of human civilization(and most other species).”12 Additionally the destruction of high command in a structural sense without disarming each nuclear weapons facility independently would result in a high number of independent actors disenfranchised while still having the capability to fire a nuclear weapon and therefore the ability to trigger an automated Russian response.
The Annual Probability of Nuclear War
In the face of such horror, it is easy to overlook questions of degree. It is difficult to say what the real risk of nuclear war is because it has never happened, and if it did happen could not be reflected upon. However, that doesn’t mean we are entirely in the dark. In his 2008 paper “Risk Analysis of Nuclear Deterrence,” Dr. Martin E. Hellman estimates that the annual risk of nuclear war is somewhere on the magnitude of 1% per year.13 This assessment is done on the assumption that calculating the risk of nuclear war can be done in a similar way to calculating the risk of a nuclear reactor having a meltdown when such a meltdown has yet to occur. Hellman makes his estimate based on how regularly the United States and Russia have found themselves in “Cuban Missile Type Crisis,” where both sides use nuclear brinkmanship to bring about their preferred outcome. As nuclear war has never happened its rate of occurrence cannot be precisely calculated. While Hellman places risk at roughly 1% annually it is likely that this is an underestimate due to both the possibility of near misses being classified and the effects of ‘anthropic shadow,’ the form of observer bias caused by our inability to observe outcomes which conflict with our existence, on our risk assessment.
One reason why the 1% figure is likely an underestimation is because it relies on the publicly available historical record. Nuclear states have a vested interest in presenting nuclear weapons as safer than they are. The United States downplays the actual number of accidents involving nuclear weapons, referred to as Broken Arrow events. For example, in 1961 an Airforce plane caught fire, resulting in a Mark 28 hydrogen bomb becoming engulfed in flames. Fortunately, firefighters were able to put out the fire before the explosives could detonate.14 Despite this being an obvious example of a broken arrow event, it is not classified as such. Rather, this event was only discovered by investigative journalist Eric Schlosser through a Freedom of Information Act request and would have otherwise continued to be buried. It is not officially recognized by the US government as one of the official 32 broken arrow events since the creation of the atom bomb. Similarly, it is plausible that there have been crises on a similar scale to the Cuban Missile Crisis that are not known to the public at large.
Another reason why the 1% figure is likely an underestimation is because even if one had an objective historical record from which to work, such a record would still be biased by the effects brought about by the anthropic shadow surrounding the catastrophe of nuclear Armageddon. The paper “Anthropic Shadow: Observation Selection Effects and Human Extinction Risks” defines an anthropic shadow as “the observation selection effect implicit in conditioning our present existence [that] prevents us from sharply discerning magnitudes of extreme risks close (in both temporal and evolutionary terms) to us. This shadow is the source of bias, which must be corrected when we seek to infer the objective chance distribution from the observed empirical distribution of events”.15 Essentially anthropic shadow represents the inability of people to reflect on a nuclear war if they would not survive such an event, additionally events correlated with catastrophic outcomes are observed as less common than they truly are, as only the non-catastrophic outcomes are experienced and recorded. This observation bias surrounding nuclear weapons is an example of how we cannot always focus on the issues of everyday issues as some important issues fall outside the domain of experience.
Anthropic shadows respond to the argument that because there has not been a nuclear war, we should take a nuclear war to be unlikely, as it ignores this unique constraint on empirical assessments of the likelihood of human extinction. However, despite likely being an underestimate, there is no clean way to adjust the 1% annual risk figure in response to these criticisms.
Other arguments that nuclear wars are either extremely unlikely or impossible are equally fallacious. Proponents of deterrence theory, for example, argue that as long as both sides possess adequate secondary strike capacity to destroy the other state, neither will ever fire the first shot. This theory is problematic because it 1) idealizes states as rational actors who will always prioritize their survival over all else; 2) ignores that structures of command and control are highly decentralized and authority to fire nuclear weapons has been delegated by the high command to many people throughout the military hierarchy; and 3) misses the possibility of accidental nuclear war, where a state fires a first strike because it believes that it is firing a secondary strike. Ironically the risk of accidental nuclear war is created by nuclear states working to create secondary strike capacity that they believe will ensure that nuclear war does not occur.
Of course, reducing nuclear risk to a single annual probability is an idealization. Such probabilities are inconsistent and sensitive to the circumstances of each individual state. The nuclear risk posed by the United States, England, France, and Russia is particularly sensitive to their destabilization due to these states keeping their weapons on high alert, i.e. keeping their nuclear weapons in launch position, and therefore ensuring that fewer logistical mistakes are necessary for these weapons to accidentally fire. This gives them a particular form of soft power as other countries know that the destabilization of these countries, either economically or politically, increases the probability of accidental nuclear war.
Regardless of our specific assessments of the annual probability of nuclear armageddon, any reasonable assessment of the risk will place it at an unacceptable level. Regardless of what anthropic theory we adopt, or how skeptical we are of the public record, it seems that the annual probability of nuclear war will not be lower than 1% and is likely to be much higher.
Social Ecology in the Context of Nuclear Enclosure
At first glance, the threat of nuclear armageddon fits cleanly into the worldview of social ecology. Social ecology alleges that hierarchy is the ultimate cause of ecological degradation; there is no greater example of hierarchy than the nuclear state and no greater example of ecological degradation than nuclear war. In his various writings, Bookchin treats nuclear weapons as one reason among many that hierarchical society must be replaced. For example, in The Next Revolution, he says “as long as this irrational society endangers us with nuclear and biological weapons, we cannot ignore the possibility that the entire human enterprise may come to a devastating end.”16 Yet while the apocalyptic nature of the nuclear state morally justifies its overthrow, it also creates practical difficulties that raise logistical questions about how they could be overthrown without ending the world.
Social ecology is a fundamentally revolutionary politics. It is the goal of social ecology to use local action to create democratic assemblies. In Bookchin’s view the local democratic assemblies should work together to create an overarching structure capable of replacing the state: “Such a movement can be expected to begin slowly, perhaps sporadically, in communities that initially may demand only the moral authority to alter the structure of society before enough interlinked confederations exist to demand the outright institutional power to replace the state.”17 It certainly seems that if such a system was established and achieved the necessary power to replace the state as the main political institution, it might be able to take significant actions in reducing nuclear risk. However, it is unclear how we should even think about revolution in the context of the nuclear state.
Bookchin’s argument for revolutionary action goes as follows:
P1) irrational society has created conditions that will lead to extreme ecological degradation, including the creation of nuclear weapons, which will if left unchecked lead to the end of the world.
P2) if we can create a new rational society we can avoid this dire fate, therefore.
C) we must replace our current irrational society with a rational and directly democratic one.
He says, “We are in a position to choose between an ignominious finale, possibly including the catastrophic nuclear oblivion of history itself, and history’s rational fulfillment in a free, materially abundant society in an aesthetically crafted environment.”18 In centering the fact that hierarchical society is the direct cause of nuclear oblivion he justifies taking action to overthrow it. However, in conceiving of hierarchical society as fundamentally irrational he fails to consider that the nuclear arsenal is not a random act of counterfactual violence, but a highly intentional wielding violence to deter the destruction of the state. To overthrow the state without first removing its access to nuclear weapons is to embrace oblivion.
Politics happens at all levels; it is not the case that our enclosure by the state means that politics exists only at the federal level. The scale of the United States does not mean that its political structures do not exist across localities and that power cannot be wrestled from it locally. However, it is unclear how disarmament can be achieved through local community-based activism. In the case of anti-nuclear energy activism, which has historically been a bigger focus for social ecologists, many communities have been mobilized due to plans to build a nuclear power plant in their area. The building of such a power plant can be resisted through local action, and local officials and policies are highly pertinent to whether it ultimately gets built. On the other hand, the building of a nuclear weapons facility is likely to be classified, so the building of such a facility is unlikely to even be known about by the surrounding community.
These facilities are not controlled on the local level but are managed nationally by the Department of Defense, and as a result, success in local elections isn’t necessarily relevant to protecting communities from the risks associated with these facilities. Even if local action could prevent these facilities from being constructed, the weapons could simply be moved elsewhere. While the risk of a one-off nuclear accident is a genuine threat to the communities in which these facilities exist, the moving, or closing, of an individual facility does little to mitigate the wider risk of nuclear armageddon. As a result, the establishment of localized direct democracies doesn’t seem to help reduce nuclear risk.
For example, the nuclear freeze declaration—“a bilateral halt on nuclear weapons production, deployment, and testing”19—was adopted by hundreds of towns in the late 80s and culminated in a protest in New York involving approximately one-million people. This movement represents one example of how directly democratic engagement mobilized many communities against nuclear weapons. However, because local governments lacked the authority to enforce such a freeze, it is unclear what the effect of this advocacy was. Regardless it is still an example worth drawing on as we consider how to advocate for nuclear disarmament on the local level.
This is not to say that social ecology is merely a politics of localism, as it is also a politics of confederation. After all, it is not the goal of social ecology to merely liberate a few communities here and there, but to build an entirely new system. As Bookchin writes,
A confederalist view involves a clear distinction between policy making and the coordination and execution of adopted policies. Policymaking is exclusively the right of popular community assemblies based on the practices of participatory democracy. Administration and coordination are the responsibility of confederal councils, which become the means for interlinking villages, towns, neighborhoods, and cities into confederal networks.21 It is however unclear how to overtake the state without triggering a deterrence. The United States nuclear arsenal was constructed in the context of the Cold War, understood by the military as a conflict between capitalism and communism. In constructing these weapons, the United States has given physical proof that they are perfectly willing to end the world if the capitalist system is to come to an end. In its willingness to commit omnicide, the nuclear state archives immortality through a biconditional: that if they are to come to an end, the world will end with them. This logic is not only implicit in the structure of American defensive capacities but was also made explicit by American political figures during the cold war such as Ronald Regan. Necessarily, if they maintain their nuclear arsenals they will exist if the world exists.
Just as the federal control of and secrecy surrounding nuclear weapons facilities makes them difficult to interact with through local politics it is unclear how to interact with them through the politics of confederation. After all confederation consists merely in allegiances between localities but even the confederation of every community throughout the United States would not necessarily be sufficient to enclose military structures. Without either enclosing or disarming these structures first, overtaking state structure risks leaving nuclear weapons facilities without a centralized command structure. As nuclear systems are designed to be “dead hands” such a decapitation would guarantee cataclysm.22
Conclusion: A Time of Choosing
In President Ronald Reagan’s 1964 speech A Time of Choosing Regan advocates a hawkish American Foreign Policy which he admits might result in the end of the world. He say “We cannot buy our security, our freedom from the threat of the bomb by committing an immorality so great as saying to a billion human beings now enslaved behind the Iron Curtain, ‘Give up your dreams of freedom because to save our own skins, we’re willing to make a deal with your slave masters.’”23
In this speech Regan argues that the US should take an aggressive posture against the Soviet Union to address its human rights abuses. He maintains that this posture is morally required despite the risk of nuclear war. Within the context of Reagan’s presidency and the long history of human rights abuses committed by the US it is difficult for me to read this speech sincerely, and not as a justification for further conflict by the figurehead of another brutal regime.
Yet, we must consider precisely this. We cannot trade our efforts to build a truly democratic society for security from the bomb. We cannot abandon the vast majority of the world’s population to economic subjugation, and we cannot abandon the world to ecological devastation.
We must fight to build a truly democratic society, but we must move carefully. Building a democratic society requires nuclear disarmament. Social ecology already recognizes the need to secure food, water, and shelter as a fundamental part of bringing about a truly democratic society. In light of the risk of nuclear cataclysm it seems evident that the democratic society must secure food, water shelter, and the nuclear weapons apparatus.
- Murray Bookchin, “Stop the Bomb: An Appeal to the Reason of the American People” (Contemporary Issues, 1954).
- Alex Glaser, “Plan A | Princeton Science and Global Security,” Princeton University, (September 6, 2019). https://sgs.princeton.edu/the-lab/plan.
- Peter Vincent Pry, “Statement for the Record Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on National Security Subcommittee on the Interior House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform” (May 13, 2015). https://republicans-oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Pry-Statement-5-13-EMP.pdf.
- R.P. Turco et. al., “Nuclear winter: global consequences of multiple nuclear explosions,” Science (Vol. 222, No. 4630, December 23, 1983), 1283-92; Charles G. Bardeen et al., “Extreme Ozone Loss Following Nuclear War Results in Enhanced Surface Ultraviolet Radiation,” Journal of Geophysical Research: Atmospheres (Vol. 126, no. 18, 2021).
- Owen B. Toon et. al., “Rapidly Expanding Nuclear Arsenals in Pakistan and India Portend Regional and Global Catastrophe,” Science Advances (2019), 10
- Jack Niedenthal, “Welcome to Bikini Atoll,” (May 1, 1997). https://bikiniatoll.com/; Haha Noor, “A Message from the Most Bombed Nation on Earth,” Al Jazeera (August 29, 2020). https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/8/29/a-message-from-the-most-bombed-nation-on-earth/.
- Daniel Ellsberg, The Doomsday Machine: Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner (New York, Bloomsbury, 2017), 69.
- ibid 15.
- ibid 69.
- ibid 303.
- ibid 306.
- ibid 305.
- Martin Hellman, “Risk Analysis of Nuclear Deterrence,” The Bent of Tau Beta Pi (Spring 2008), 15-18. https://ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/publications/74.pdf.
- Dan Drollette, “Interview with Eric Schlosser: Why We Can’t Trust the Government’s Figures about Nuclear Close Calls,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (May 10, 2023).
- N. Bostrom, and M.M. Ćirković, “Anthropic shadow: Observation selection effects and human extinction risks,” Risk Analysis, (Vol. 28, No. 2, 2008), 311-317.
- Murray Bookchin, The Next Revolution: Popular Assemblies and the Promise of Direct Democracy (London and New York, Verso Books, 2015), 1.
- ibid 89.
- ibid 2.
- John C. Baker, “The Nuclear Freeze Movement,” Outrider (February 21, 2018). outrider.org/nuclear-weapons/articles/nuclear-freeze-movement.
- Bookchin, The Next Revolution, 74./efn_note]
Once democratic institutions are established on the local level they can be expanded until this new democratic system overtakes the old hierarchical one. “Libertarian municipalism, in effect, seeks to define the institutional contours of a new society even as it advances the practical message of a radically new politics for our day.”20ibid 85.