The Ecology of Freedom begins with an epigraph by the German philosopher Hans Jonas, which calls for the renaturalization of ethics by way of redefining “nature” itself:
Ontology as the ground of ethics was the original tenet of philosophy. Their divorce, which is the divorce of the “objective” and “subjective” realms, is the modern destiny. Their reunion can be effected, if at all, only from the “objective” end, that is to say, through a revision of the idea of nature. And it is becoming rather than abiding nature which would hold out any such promise. From the immanent direction of its total evolution there may be elicited a destination of man by whose terms the person, in the act of fulfilling himself, would at the same time realize a concern of universal substance. Hence would result a principle of ethics which is ultimately grounded neither in the autonomy of the self nor in the needs of the community, but in an objective assignment by the nature of things.1
BOOKCHIN’S ETHICAL NATURALISM
That Bookchin would begin his magnum opus with this remark is a testament to the significance he placed on ethical naturalism within the larger project of dialectical naturalism; how nature, as he argues, “exhibits a self-evolving patterning, a ‘grain,’ so to speak, that is implicitly ethical.”2 Nature displays nisus, or a set of developmental tendencies to attain certain ends that become legible through close observation and eductive reasoning. The degree to which a given natural phenomenon succeeds towards these implied ends forms the ontological basis of “the rational, the good, the just, or indeed the free.”3
Crucially, Bookchin locates his ontology of natural history in developmental tendencies such as “mutualism, self-organization, freedom, and subjectivity” as opposed to those phenomena in nature such as competition, violence, territoriality, and parasitism which naturalistic and evolutionary philosophy have previously misappropriated to justify social Darwinism, patriarchy, and a host of other right-wing ideologies.4 These are clear stakes. If social ecology is indeed able to successfully “remove the taints that blemished a naturalistic ethics from its inception,” it will answer Jonas’ call to reunite ethics and ontology and thus will “provide both humanity and nature with a common ethical voice.”5
FALSE NATURES?
In light of the above claims, it is reasonable to wonder if Bookchin is committing several related logical fallacies: the appeal to nature, the naturalistic fallacy, and the moralistic fallacy. Each, in different ways, concerns the relationship between descriptions of the world and prescriptions for how to live.
The appeal to nature is an error in logic which unjustifiably conflates what is “good” with what is “natural.” This challenge is perhaps easiest to dismiss, as Bookchin explicitly cautions against this misinterpretation:
I cannot emphasize too strongly that nature itself is not an ethics; it is the matrix for an ethics, the source of ethical meaning that can be rooted in objective reality. Hence nature, even as the matrix and source of ethical meaning, does not have to assume such delightfully human attributes as kindness, virtue, goodness and gentleness; nature need merely be fecund and creative — a source rather than a “paradigm.” The function of an ethical philosophy does not entail a mimetic reduction of ethics to its source. Rather, it requires a ground from which to creatively develop ethical ideals.6
The moralistic fallacy is the inverse of the appeal to nature. Where the appeal to nature tries to derive morality from facts, the moralistic fallacy tries to derive facts from morality. It occurs when an argument concludes that something is a particular way because it morally ought to be that way. Might this be what allows dialectical naturalism to say, on the one hand, the liberatory, pro-social, mutualistic tendencies in natural history are objective and therefore ethical, and on the other hand, the anti-social, dominative tendencies are not? Not so fast, warns Bookchin. To observe in nature, for example, the tendency of mutualism, or symbiosis, “does not deny the existence of a harmful parasitism that can destroy its host.” In other words, the potentialities for cooperation or competition, freedom or domination, mutualism or parasitism, exist side-by-side, in dialectical tension. What is natural is not coextensive with what is ethical, and therefore, within nature’s matrix, “libertarian rationality must acknowledge the existence of an ‘other’ that is itself blatantly antagonistic and oppositional.” However, this raises a further question to which we will return, of how to adjudicate between multiple potentialities: the true and untrue, rational and irrational, ethical and unethical.
Finally, the naturalistic fallacy, as defined by G.E. Moore, is a more fundamental meta-ethical error.7 Moore argued that “good” is a simple, indefinable quality—any attempt to define it in natural terms (like “pleasure,” “desire,” or “evolutionary success”) commits this fallacy.8 Bookchin’s dialectical naturalism might seem to do exactly this: ground ethical meaning in the objective properties of nature. However, rather than defining “good” as a static natural fact, Bookchin locates it in natural process and potentiality—a move that evades Moore but leads him to a related but distinct challenge: Hume’s Law, or the Is-Ought Problem.9
Hume’s Law states that one cannot derive an “ought” from an “is” because they are logically distinct. In other words, one cannot validly conclude a value statement from purely factual premises. Bookchin’s response is to argue that nature itself is not just a collection of neutral facts, or “is-es”. Rather, nature has a direction, a potentiality built into it. Bookchin therefore rejects this challenge, deeming it “simply meaningless” from a dialectical perspective.10 His rejection relies on two differing conceptions of reality: a distinction between “immediately present empirical ‘reality’ — or Realität, to use Hegel’s language — that need not be the fulfillment of a potentiality, and . . . dialectical ‘actuality’ — Wirklichkeit — that constitutes a complete fulfillment of a rational process.”11 In a dialectical framework, the “ought” is not an external moral command imposed on nature. It is the immanent potential within a thing or process to realize its fullest and most rational form.
To take a well-known example, an acorn contains the real potential to become an oak tree even if that potential is never actualized due to the acorn being prematurely eaten or failing to find soil in which to germinate. Likewise is true for the development of a spore to fungus, pupa to beetle, larva to bee, or caterpillar to butterfly. In each case, there exists a material, albeit latent potential, even if that potential remains unrealized for a variety of factors. For Bookchin, it is in this space between present and potential reality that ethical significance lies. The fact of nature’s potentiality gives rise to the ethical project of actualizing it. Ethical consideration involves understanding the potential inherent in a phenomenon and orienting one’s actions to consciously abet its development. As he explains, “Perhaps the greatest single role an ecological ethics can play is a discriminating one — to help us distinguish which of our actions serve the thrust of natural evolution and which of them impede it.”12
This brings us back to the question of adjudication raised earlier. Assuming we can identify these “thrusts,” how do we align our actions with respect to nature? How do we, as rational beings, reliably identify the ‘rational’ potential (the oak) over the ‘irrational’ or merely possible outcome (the acorn rotting)? That is, how do we actually make ethical distinctions and verify the soundness of our decisions? Bookchin does not offer a direct answer, only further clues. He suggests, “human activity is expected to occur within an ethical context of virtue, not a value-free context of utility and efficiency,”13 and while “human interests of one kind or another may be involved in these actions [they are] not always relevant to the ethical judgments we are likely to make. What really counts are the ethical guidelines that determine our judgment.”14
NATURE’S TENDENCIES AS VIRTUES
This is Bookchin’s attempt at a reunion of ethics and ontology—an effort to locate the grounds of the good not in transcendental commands or subjective preferences, but in the developmental logic of nature. Often described in terms of their “ever greater levels of”, manifestation, the developmental tendencies observable in natural history, brought into the ethical realm, become a set of virtues, or ethical guidelines.15 So, what exactly are these tendencies qua virtues? And how are they supposed to inform human behavior? The question of which specific tendencies constitute the nisus of first nature—and how they translate into ethical principles for second nature—remains an open and generative area of inquiry within social ecology.
While provisional answers to the first question abound, how to answer the second remains less clear. The virtues are nothing less than the “self-evolving patterning,” the nisus we observe in natural history whose structuring tendencies unfold out of biological development.16 Different social ecologists provide differing answers as to exactly which tendencies they identify, and even Bookchin’s list fluctuates across his work. Tendential candidates include: “complexity, specialization, and consciousness;”17 “complexity, diversity, and freedom;”18 “differentiation, consciousness, and freedom;”19 and “diversification, interdependence, subjectivity.”20
My own provisional reading, which I offer not as a definitive settlement but as a contribution to an ongoing conversation, is that first nature’s developmental trajectory exhibits three interrelated tendencies: differentiation (the unfolding of latent potential into distinct forms), subjectivity (the increasing capacity for experience, agency, and inwardness), and intersubjectivity (the emergence of mutual recognition and relationship between subjects). From these, eductive reason can elaborate corresponding ethical principles for second nature: unity-in-diversity (the integration of differentiated parts into a coherent whole), freedom (the actualization of potentiality without constraint), and mutualism (the conscious, ethical elaboration of intersubjective relations into cooperative social forms). These three tendencies recommend themselves because they appear across Bookchin’s various lists, form a coherent developmental sequence (differentiation enables subjectivity, which enables intersubjectivity), and map cleanly onto the ethical principles most central to social ecology’s political project. Whether this mapping reflects the actual nisus of nature or merely projects our political hopes onto it is precisely what the process of ethical verification must determine.
However, this formulation remains tentative. The relationship between first-nature tendencies and second-nature value-principles—how exactly the former give rise to the latter through the mediating work of eductive reason—deserves far more sustained attention than I can give it here. I leave this lacuna in dialectical naturalist thought to be further explored elsewhere at a later date. My focus in what follows is not to arbitrate definitively between competing lists of tendencies, but instead to think through how the tendencies, presuming at least some exist, function epistemologically within ethics. If Bookchin is correct in saying these tendencies form “elements of an ethical ontology” that “require no explanation, merely verification,” then how does the process of ethical verification actually work?21
THE PRIMACY OF EDUCTIVE REASON
Before we can speak of verifying ethical claims through social processes, we must first understand the prior and foundational act that makes any such verification possible: eductive reason. This is the cognitive act of discerning, from the complex and often contradictory field of phenomena, which potentialities constitute the authentic nisus or “thrust” of a given situation. It is the act of reading the dialectical grain of reality itself.
Bookchin is clear that nature presents us with a tapestry of competing potentialities—mutualism and parasitism, freedom and domination, complexity and entropic decay. The mere existence of a phenomenon does not render it ethical, nor does its prevalence. This is the point at which the naturalistic fallacy critique misfires: Bookchin is not deriving “ought” from any old “is,” but from a rationally discerned interpretation of which “is” represents the authentic developmental thrust. The ethical significance of a potentiality is not determined by its frequency, but by its place within the developmental logic of natural history—its tendency to promote greater differentiation, subjectivity, and intersubjectivity. Eductive reason is the capacity to distinguish between a potentiality that represents a further unfolding of these tendencies and one that represents a deviation, a distortion, or a dead end.
Consider, for example, a forest ecosystem. One can observe both symbiotic relationships that enhance the diversity and resilience of the whole, and parasitic relationships that, if unchecked, threaten to undermine it. Eductive reason, informed by a deep understanding of ecological processes, allows us to discern that the former tendency is more in keeping with the developmental logic of the ecosystem—its drive toward greater complexity and interdependence—while the latter represents a pathological expression that, while “natural” in the sense of occurring within nature, runs counter to its deeper nisus. This discernment is not a matter of personal preference or social agreement; it is a matter of rational judgment about objective relationships and potentialities.
This act of eduction is the necessary prelude to any ethical deliberation about what ought to be done. It is the moment of truth or falsehood, where our interpretation either aligns with the objective, dialectical grain of reality or fails to do so. Without this foundational cognitive act, any subsequent social deliberation lacks an anchor in the very ontology that is supposed to ground our ethics.
TOWARDS A THEORY OF ETHICAL VERIFICATION
How do we use our understanding of nature’s nisus to distinguish between potential actions and guide our judgments? In other words, if dialectical naturalism posits an objective ethics, then how do we objectively verify claims of ethical truth? The preceding discussion of eductive reason provides our starting point: verification begins with the adequacy of our interpretation to the object of our inquiry. But it cannot end there.
For further examination of this question, it’s worth turning to the history of dialectics and the work of two of Bookchin’s greatest philosophical influences, G.W.F. Hegel and Karl Marx. In Hegel’s philosophy, a thought system possesses the ability to account for its own validity from within. This explains the circular structure of his system, in which the logical development of concepts involves a circular movement where each category presupposes and relies on the others. The system is self-referential, with later categories depending on and validating the earlier ones. As Hegel explains:
. . . the science [i.e. philosophical knowledge] exhibits itself as a circle returning upon itself, the end being wound back into the beginning, the simple ground, by the mediation; this circle is moreover a circle of circles, for each individual member as ensouled by the method is reflected into itself, so that in returning into the beginning it is at the same time the beginning of a new member . . . The method is the pure concept that only relates to itself; it is, therefore, the simple self-reference which is being.22
Marx rejects this idealistic theory of verification, wherein the process remains confined to the realm of ideas. Instead, he proposes verification through material praxis:
The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth — i.e. the reality and power, the this-sideness [Diesseitigkeit]23 of his thinking in practice.24
Bookchin is in agreement on this point. He approvingly cites Marx’s critique of Hegel, “[i]t is not enough that thought should seek its actualization; actuality itself must strive toward thought,” and elaborates:
Thought, qua dialectical reason, becomes transformative in shaping the present and the future insofar as human rational praxis objectively actualizes the implicit . . . Without this liberatory legacy [i.e. the ethical implications of dialectical reason] and a human practice that fosters its unfolding, we have absolutely no basis for even judging what is creative or stagnant, rational or irrational, or good or evil in any constellation of cultural phenomena other than personal preference.25
We have reached the first feature of ethical verification in dialectical naturalism. Claims of ethical truth must be verified in practice, not merely in the realm of ideas. Yet the definite contours of this “human practice” require further elaboration. How do we know if we have successfully oriented our praxis towards the rational influence of “what-should-be” as against “what-is”? In philosophical terms, how do we know whether we are dealing with “actuality” [Wirklichkeit] versus that which is an irrational deviation from the ecologized dialectic? More simply, how do we, in practice, objectively verify ethical truths?
Bookchin, for his part, directly addresses this question in The Philosophy of Social Ecology:
One may well question the validity of dialectical reason by challenging the concept of Wirklichkeit [i.e., dialectical actuality], and its claims to be more adequate than Realität [i.e., empirical reality]. Indeed, I am often asked: “How do you know that what you call a distorted ‘untrue’ or ‘inadequate’ reality is not the vaunted ‘actuality’ that constitutes the authentic realization of a potentiality? Are you not simply making a private moral judgment about what is ‘untrue’ or ‘inadequate’ and denying the importance of immediate facts that do not support your personal notion of the ‘true’ and the ‘adequate’?26
His response, however, only alludes to the system of logic for arriving at such an answer, rather than providing an answer itself. He says:
The validity of … Real developmental processes must be tested by a logic of processes, not by a logic of “brute facts” that is analytical, based on a datum or fixed phenomenon.27
And:
The kind of verification that validates or invalidates the soundness of dialectical reasoning, in turn, must be developmental, not relatively static or for that matter “fluctuating” kinds of phenomena.28
Dialectical truths must be verified developmentally. This is the second feature of ethical verification in dialectical naturalism. Yet, as Adam Hill has pointed out, “[t]he question is not whether or not analytical reason can be used to evaluate dialectical claims, but how we know these dialectical claims are actually grounded in the processes from which they claim to be derived.”29 Bookchin’s response, while correct as far as it goes, does not fully articulate the method by which we test the adequacy of our eductive judgments.
To gain further insight into Bookchin’s “logic of processes,” let us consider his understanding of nature, more broadly:
The matrix from which objective reason may yet derive its ethics for a balanced and harmonized world is the nature . . . conceived not merely as a constellation of ecosystems but also as a meaningful natural history, a developing, creative, and fecund nature that yields an increasing complexity of forms and interrelationships.30
Nature is no fixed image on the back of a picture postcard—static and eternal—but rather, an evolving drama that is kinetic and ever-changing.31 In other words, nature is itself developmental and follows a processual logic akin to Jonas’ “becoming rather than abiding nature” referenced at the outset.32 Ethics, as a product of natural history, is itself imbricated in the dialectic, subject to constant change and revision. A corollary of this is that dialectical truths can only be true based on a certain set of circumstances, at a given time, and in a given place. This quality separates objective from absolute ethics, which claims to hold true at all times and in all places. Yet, even if we accept the premise of ethics as historically contingent and socially situated, how do we, when facing a specific ethical dilemma, assess what is objectively true?
To this point, Chaia Heller offers the portmanteau, “dialobjectivity” or dialectical objectivity, as a developmental way to approach objectivity itself.33 Here, objectivity is redefined as something dynamic and not fixed; like Zeno’s paradox of infinite halfway arrivals, where one never quite reaches the destination but continually halves the distance, or social ecology’s grand utopian ideal, objectivity becomes an asymptotic phenomenon whose unfolding horizon forever recedes.34 This is not failure but method: as Heller explains, if we understand objectivity as a standard of perfection, then the pursuit of objectivity becomes “a practice, an active process.”35 While it may be impossible ever to achieve perfect, infallible, or steady-state objectivity, we can nevertheless attain “ever greater levels of” objectivity through a course of action that is open-ended and dynamic. Let this revised, dialectical understanding of objectivity constitute the third feature of ethical verification in dialectical naturalism.
THE SOCIAL PRACTICE OF JUDGMENTAL RATIONALITY
We have established that ethical verification requires: (1) practical grounding in material praxis; (2) a developmental logic appropriate to its dialectical object; and (3) an asymptotic approach to objectivity through ongoing practice. Yet we still face the question: how do we, in practice, move toward that ever-receding horizon of objectivity? How do we test and refine our eductive judgments, ensuring they are adequate to the developmental logic of the situations we confront?
The answer lies in recognizing that while eductive reason is the foundation of ethical discernment—the individual and collective act of reading potentiality from empirical reality—its findings must be tested, challenged, and refined through a social process of rational inquiry. This is not because truth is constituted by social agreement, but because our subjective interpretations of an objective reality are fallible and require the corrective of other perspectives. As Bookchin himself advised, “[i]deas grow and mature best . . . in the tumult of dispute and mutual criticism.”36
Here, we must be precise about the role of social deliberation. Its function is not to create ethical truth through consensus, nor to validate the most rhetorically persuasive position. Rather, its function is to serve as the social embodiment of judgmental rationality—the collective application of our highest faculty to the great project of discerning and actualizing the potentialities inherent in nature and society. The goal is not agreement for its own sake, but rational insight shared by a community.
This understanding guards against two related dangers. The first is the “tyranny of consensus” that Bookchin rightly criticized—the reduction of truth to what a group happens to agree upon, which precludes the dissensus and ideological dissonance so necessary for stimulating innovation. The second is a “tyranny of dissensus” where the loudest or most rhetorically skilled faction wins the day, and their victory is mistaken for an approximation of truth.
What prevents these outcomes is a steadfast commitment to the objectivity of the criteria by which arguments are judged. In a properly constituted deliberative process, the “strength” of an argument is measured by its fidelity to the dialectical reality we have educed. The best argument is the one that most accurately identifies the nisus of the situation—the authentic potentialities for greater differentiation/unity-in-diversity, subjectivity/freedom, and intersubjectivity/mutualism—and most coherently proposes a course of action that aligns human praxis with their unfolding. Arguments are tested not against each other in a vacuum, but against the developmental logic of the world they purport to describe and guide.
This is essentially consistent with the Aristotelian view of rhetoric. Contrary to the Sophist conception, rhetoric does not create truth; rather, it is the best means of discerning truth in contexts where formal proofs do not apply.37 The assembly does not invent the good through its deliberations; it discovers it through a collective, rational inquiry guided by the immanent potentialities of the situation itself.
To this point, we may add a fourth feature of ethical verification:
Judgmental Rationality as Social Practice: Ethical claims are tested and refined through a process of dialogue, debate, and mutual criticism, wherein the adequacy of eductive judgments is assessed against objective criteria derived from the developmental tendencies of nature. This social process is the practical, developmental method for approaching dialectically objective truth.
This formulation avoids the relativism that haunts purely procedural accounts of ethics. It insists that the criterion of verification remains objective—fidelity to the dialectical grain of reality—while recognizing that the process of verification is necessarily social, intersubjective, and developmental. We test our individual eductions against each other, not to see which is more popular, but to see which can withstand rational scrutiny and best account for the full complexity of the situation.
The dynamic nature of these deliberations enables thoughtful and critical exchanges across subject positions, in which participants engage in reciprocal dialogue, offering nuanced rejoinders to one another’s ethical claims. Through this process, we benefit from the vast differences in knowledge and experience within a community and thus strengthen our collective judgments. The capacity for this kind of ethical reason—and humanity’s potential to rationally and ethically develop ecosocial institutions—is what Bookchin emphasized as allowing us to become “nature rendered self-conscious.”38
OBJECTIVITY AS HORIZON, TRUTH AS CONVERSATION
We are now in a position to synthesize the features of ethical verification:
- Eductive Foundation: Verification begins with the rational act of discerning potentiality from empirical reality—reading the dialectical nisus in natural history. This act of eduction constitutes our first approximation of truth, the initial interpretation that we bring forward for testing.
- Practical Grounding: Ethical verification transcends the realm of ideas, manifesting in practical actions and material praxis. The truth of our eductions is proven in their adequacy to guide successful action toward the actualization of potentiality.
- Developmental Logic: Ethics is itself dialectical—contingent, situated, and evolving. Verification of dialectical truths must also be developmental and processual, rather than an analytical approach focused on fixed facts.
- Dialectical Objectivity: Ethical objectivity is dialectical, like an asymptote, approaching but never fully achieving final, complete objectivity. By extension, the pursuit of dialectically objective truths becomes active and ongoing.
- Judgmental Rationality as Social Practice: Individual eductive judgments are tested and refined through collective rational inquiry, where arguments are assessed by their fidelity to objective developmental tendencies, not by their rhetorical power or capacity to produce consensus.
The relationship between these features is crucial. Eductive reason provides the foundation—without it, we have no access to the objective nisus that grounds our ethics. Practical activity provides the test—our interpretations must prove their adequacy in guiding successful praxis. Developmental logic describes the inner dialectic of the object and, therefore, of the verification process itself. Dialectical objectivity reminds us of the open-endedness of the pursuit. And judgmental rationality as social practice provides the method—the concrete process by which we collectively move toward ever-greater levels of understanding.
If Chaia Heller is correct in asserting that “truth is a conversation,”39 we must understand this not in the weak sense that truth is constituted by conversation, but in the strong sense that conversation—properly understood as rational, critical, and accountable to objective reality—is the path by which we approach truth. This means that a united and diverse “we” have the potential to be more ethical than any of us can be as individuals. We come to know the good not through isolated contemplation alone, nor through uncritical acceptance of social consensus, but through the difficult, exhilarating work of thinking together, testing our interpretations against each other and against the world, and allowing our collective rationality to be guided by the developmental grain of a nature that is striving, with us, towards freedom.
- Quoted in Murray Bookchin, The Ecology of Freedom: The Emergence and Dissolution of Hierarchy (AK Press, 2005.
- ibid 467.
- “The Transition to the Ecological Society: An Interview by Takis Fotopoulos,” Institute for Social Ecology, interview by Takis Fotopoulos (11 September, 1992). https://social-ecology.org/wp/1992/09/the-transition-to-the-ecological-society-an-interview-by-takis-fotopoulos/. Originally published in Society and Nature 1(3).
- Bookchin, Ecology of Freedom, 467.
- ibid.
- ibid 368.
- G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica (1903), Chapter I, § 10. fair-use.org/g-e-moore/principia-ethica/s.10#s10p1.
- This is the philosophical engine behind many appeals to nature, which often rely on an unstated belief that “natural = good.”
- See, for example, Rachel Cohon, “Hume’s Moral Philosophy,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018 Edition). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/hume-moral/.
- Murray Bookchin, “Recovering Evolution,” Environmental Ethics (Vol. 12, No. 3, 1990), 270. https://doi.org/10.5840/enviroethics199012311.
- Murray Bookchin, The Philosophy of Social Ecology: Essays on Dialectical Naturalism (Black Rose Books, 1996), 23.
- Bookchin, Ecology of Freedom, 442.
- ibid 401.
- ibid 442.
- See Eirik Eiglad, “The Concept of Free Nature in Murray Bookchin’s Philosophy of Social Ecology,” University of Oslo (2016), 1; Chaia Heller, Ecology of Everyday Life: Rethinking the Desire for Nature (Montreal, Black Rose Books, 1999), 136.
- Bookchin, Ecology of Freedom, 467.
- Bookchin, Philosophy of Social Ecology, 64.
- Dan Chodorkoff, The Anthropology of Utopia: Essays on Social Ecology and Community Development (Porsgrunn, Norway, New Compass Press, 2014), 70.
- Heller, Ecology of Everyday Life, 136.
- Mason Herson-Horvath, “Revisiting Social Ecology’s Natures,” presentation for Institute for Social Ecology Mentorship Program (2023).
- Bookchin, Ecology of Freedom, 467.
- Georg Wilhelm Fredrich Hegel, The Science of Logic (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010), 751-2.
- Meaning, ‘this-worldliness’ or immanence. As Cyril Smith explains in “Karl Marx and Human Self-Creation” (2002), “The odd word ‘Diesseitigkeit’ might carry a bit more weight than is sometimes imagined. It is chosen as the opposite of the much more common ‘Jenseitigkeit’, ‘other-worldliness’ or transcendence.”
- Karl Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach” (Progress Publishers, 1969). https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.pdf.
- Bookchin, Philosophy of Social Ecology, 172-4,
- ibid 24-5.
- ibid 26.
- ibid 129.
- Adam Hill, “Dialectical Naturalism: Its Utility and Its Shortcomings” Bracero (27 December 2021). https://bracero.substack.com/p/dialectical-naturalism-its-utility.
- Bookchin, Ecology of Freedom, 364.
- Murray Bookchin, Social Ecology and Communalism, ed. Eirik Eiglad (Porsgrunn, Norway, New Compass Press, 2007), 23–24.
- See also Heller’s “developmental corrective” in “In Conversation on Dialectical Naturalism” with Peter Staudenmaier, Harbinger (Vol. 4, No. 3, 2024). https://harbinger-journal.com/issue-3/in-conversation-on-dialectical-naturalism/
- ibid.
- This evokes the spirit of Eduardo Galeano’s definition: “She’s on the horizon, says Fernando Birri. I go two steps closer, she moves two steps away. I walk ten steps and the horizon runs ten steps ahead. No matter how much I walk, I’ll never reach her. What good is utopia? That’s what: it’s good for walking.” See Eduardo H. Galeano, Walking Words, trans. Mark Fried (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), 326.
- Heller and Staudenmaier, “In Conversation on Dialectical Naturalism.”
- Murray Bookchin, The Next Revolution: Popular Assemblies and the Promise of Direct Democracy, ed. Debbie Bookchin and Blair Taylor (London and New York, Verso Books, 2015), 34.
- Aristotle, “Book 1, Chapter 2” Rhetoric, trans, W. Rhys Roberts (The Internet Classics Archive, 1954). https://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/rhetoric.1.i.html.
- Bookchin’s translation of Reclus’ poetic restatement of Fichte. Cf. Bookchin, Ecology of Freedom, Chapter 12, “An Ecological Society”;Elisée Reclus, L’homme et la terre (Librairie Universelle, 1905), 1. https://archive.org/details/ReclusHommeTerre1905tome1/page/n7/mode/2up; Johann Gottlieb Fichte, The Vocation of Man, trans. William Smith (Chicago, Open Court Publishing Company, 1931). https://dn790002.ca.archive.org/0/items/vocationofman00fich/vocationofman00fich.pdf. See, in particular passages where Fichte discusses (1) The moral imperative to act upon the sensible world (2) The “I” as the vehicle through which spiritual/moral purpose enters the world (3) Humanity’s duty to perfect and elevate nature through freedom and reason.
- Chaia Heller, The Philosophy and Politics of Social Ecology (manuscript in process). While the phrasing is Heller’s, the idea that truth emerges through dialogue has deep roots in Western philosophy. However, my use of it here diverges significantly from thinkers like Habermas (who grounds truth in consensus under ideal speech conditions) or Rorty (who abandons objectivity altogether). The position I am advancing is closer to the Aristotelian conception of rhetoric cited above (as developed through Bookchin’s dialectical naturalism): conversation is the means by which we discover an objective truth that exists independently, not the process that constitutes it. Readers may also find resonance with Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutics, in which understanding is an event that occurs through dialogue, but a dialogue always directed toward a subject matter that transcends the interlocutors.