Now Reading
Reviving, Using, and Thinking Utopian: A Recovery of Murray Bookchin’s Utopianism

Reviving, Using, and Thinking Utopian: A Recovery of Murray Bookchin’s Utopianism

“I’m a utopian,” Murray Bookchin declared in a lecture delivered at the 1978 Toward Tomorrow Fair in Amherst, Massachusetts. “I want to see this word revived. I want to see us use it. I want to see us think utopian.”1 Bookchin had been writing on utopia for nearly two decades at the time, in the essays collected in Post-Scarcity Anarchism (1971), in which he asserted the need to recover the “non-repressive utopia envisioned by anarchism,” and in those soon to be included in Toward an Ecological Society (1980), which made the case that such a utopia was not only realistic, but as a result of deepening ecological crisis, a necessity.2 At Amherst, Bookchin delivered a refrain that would continue to resurface in his work: “if you don’t do the impossible, as I’ve cried out over and over again, we’re going to wind up with the unthinkable—and that will be the destruction of the planet itself. So to do the impossible is the most rational and practical thing we can do.”3

This urgent appeal to the utopian was renewed in the opening pages of The Ecology of Freedom (1982), which in addition to showcasing Bookchin’s comprehensive anthropological and philosophical analysis, expanded on his utopian vision and dedicated its closing chapter to the subject.4 Following this, Remaking Society (1989) reiterated the utopian commitments of his earlier work, both clarifying and extending his analysis through additional reflection on the preceding decades.5 Consistently centered in his major works, lectures, and speeches, utopianism is an enduring facet of his legacy. In examining Bookchin’s project, anarchist historian Peter Marshall notes that his renewal of anarchist thought in the postwar years is defined not only by its anthropology of hierarchy and domination, synthesis with ecology, dialectical nature philosophy, and municipalist political program, but also by the fact he “unabashedly places himself in the utopian tradition.”6

This commitment to the utopian is rarely elaborated in the literature surrounding Bookchin. Neither of the two major surveys of his work examine the content of its utopian dimension or the ways Bookchin defines and develops his utopianism.7 Often, it is treated as little more than a reductive affirmation of his expansive vision; as ‘ecotopia,’ narrowly synonymous with his writings on ecotechnology and the potential to renew urban forms; or for critics, cause to dismiss his body of thought.8 Utopianism is, of course, commonly used as a pejorative—shorthand for an imaginative flight of fancy, the very ‘impossibility’ that Bookchin urges is necessary. But as Dan Chodorkoff, utopian scholar and co-founder of the Institute for Social Ecology, clarifies, “the utopian tradition represents one of the oldest forms of social theory, one that offers both a critique of the existing society and a vision for a different world.” It is on this foundation that Bookchin’s commitment to the utopian rests.9

In what follows, I address this standing gap in the literature by providing an overview of Bookchin’s writings on utopia, and in doing so, demonstrate that Bookchin’s utopianism is more expansive than the previous literature has allowed. In addition to identifying what defines Bookchin’s utopianism as a form of social critique, I examine the ways in which his utopian vision is central to his overall philosophical and political project and thus deserves to be examined in its own right. Taking Bookchin’s Amherst lecture, with its call to revive, use, and think utopian, as a guide, I identify three main threads through which his utopian writings can be organized: first, to revive utopianism requires distinguishing it from what he calls an extrapolatory “futurism”; second, to use utopian means locating the utopian project firmly within the libertarian socialist tradition in which he positions himself; and third, to think utopianism involves conceptualizing utopia as an organic, dialectical, and open-ended process rather than as a blueprint.

Reviving the utopian: utopianism versus futurism

Responding to popular culture in the immediate postwar decades, Bookchin would critically contrast contemporary figures lauded as ‘utopian’ such as the architect Buckminster Fuller (who was also in attendance at the Towards Tomorrow Fair), systems theorist Herman Kahn, and sociologist Alvin Toffler to those from the historical utopian tradition, including François Rabelais, Charles Fourier, and William Morris.10 The difference between them is, for Bookchin, located in their respective sensibilities. While the historical utopians envisioned sweeping alterations to the basic structures of the societies in which they lived, the ideas of their supposed present-day counterparts are limited to narrow extensions of the present. Displaying a disinterest in the kinds of radical change that defined the utopian visions of the past, they leave the structures underlying present society untouched to instead focus on alterations to other aspects, such as the forms of architecture, communications technologies, or energy sources in use.

What this comparison makes apparent, in Bookchin’s analysis, is that “the radical thrust of utopian thinking… has been transmuted by academics, statisticians, and ‘game theorists’”— the Fullers, Kahns, and Tofflers of the present—“into a thoroughly technocratic, economistic, and aggressive series of futuramas that can be appropriately designated as ‘futurism.’”11 Rather than offering visions of widespread societal transformation, futurism substitutes for utopia various “scenarios” which retain endless facets of the present, presupposing that “existing cities, media networks, multinational corporations, market structure, monetary relations, and even military and police machinery—all will continue to exist in one form or another.”12 In this process of transmutation, utopianism is shorn of its radical content, becoming a futurism that “does not challenge existing relationships or institutions, but seeks to adapt them to seemingly new technological imperatives and possibilities—thereby redeeming rather than critiquing them.”13

In failing to challenge existing relationships and institutions, what Bookchin names as futurism “merely extrapolates the hideous present into an even more hideous future and thereby effaces the creative, imaginative dimensions of futurity.”14 The future no longer carries the promise of radical change, but is reduced to an object for technical manipulation and management.15 Futurism’s transmutation “has made utopianism a matter of foresight rather than dreamy visions,” and has “abolished the future,” replacing it with a present that “acquires a stagnant eternality.”16

In contrast, a genuine utopianism for Bookchin, like that of Fourier and Morris, is one which,refuses the continuity of the present: “however widely at odds utopias were in their values, institutional conceptions, and visions (whether ascetic or hedonistic, authoritarian or libertarian, privatistic or communistic, utilitarian or ethical), they at least had come to mean a revolutionary change in the status quo and a radical critique of its abuses.”17 While not all utopias are liberatory, anarchist, or ecological, the fundamental role of utopianism is a rejection of the present and overcoming of its “hidden presuppositions.”18 Conceptualized in this way, it is important to note that utopia is not any imagined ideal society, but one which carries out the function of a total social critique. For Bookchin, its power lies in the fact that “utopia redeems the future. It recovers it for the generations to come and restores it to them as a future that they can creatively form and thoroughly emancipate.”19

From his earliest writings, it is this utopianism that provides the foundation for Bookchin’s ecological politics. In his own words, “futurism, in fact, is the specious ‘utopianism’ of environmentalism as distinguished from the unsettling logic of ecology”—the divide between futurism and utopianism is synonymous with the divide between an environmentalist politics which seek the technical management of environmental exploitation, and a radical, ecological politics which seeks the reharmonization of society with nature.20 Bearing this in mind, any response to contemporary crises must revive the utopian impulse, in its call to remake society. As Bookchin stresses:

Corrective alterations in a basically irrational society are becoming muddled with attempts to achieve a free society that involve fundamental social reconstruction. Present-day society, in effect, is not being remade… Reforms in the name of justice are being advanced, in effect, to manage a profound and growing crisis rather than eliminate it.21

Even such ideals as renewable energy, decentralization, and the reconfiguration of the urban environment around a human scale—while necessary to any ecological politics—cannot define utopia in themselves. As Bookchin would repeatedly stress, these too can be made tools for the maintenance of the status quo.22 Recovering the future, in the face of ecological crisis, requires more than technical alterations: it necessitates “doing the impossible,” drawing on utopianism’s power as social critique to fundamentally reconstruct society.

Using utopian: utopianism as the history of freedom

If Bookchin’s utopianism is first distinguished by its commitment to total social transformation, it is next defined by the characteristics of the transformation it envisions. For Bookchin, “what crucially distinguishes utopias, be they real or specious, from each other is the extent to which they are libertarian.”23 To determine this, he provides a general account of identifiable trends in history by which meaning has been imparted on the evolving concept of freedom.24 As part of his anthropology of hierarchy and domination, Bookchin draws out a  countervailing “legacy of freedom”—examples of historical resistance to hierarchy and domination and alternative social forms. Importantly, when examining this legacy, he turns not only to political movements which actualized resistance, but also to the utopias drawn in the imaginations of the oppressed.25 If utopianism first necessitates remaking society, Bookchin next requires that it attend to the historicized development of the concept of freedom within the human imagination. By doing so, including tracing changes in literary and artistic utopias, various elements which make for a genuinely liberatory utopianism may be discerned.

He begins his account of the utopian tradition with the utopias of early myth, whose “ideas of freedom were confined to the mythopoeic imagination.” Where tribal life gave way to hierarchical societies—and with it, “conflicts, injustice, and warfare”—newly-created underclasses turned to “dreamlike fantasies of a return to a ‘golden age’ that was beyond recovery.”26 These images of a forsaken Garden of Eden or islands of Lotus-Eaters, to name two examples given by Bookchin, are expressions of desire for a primitivistic retreat from humanity into animality, in which “‘freedom’ takes on the treacherous form of an absence of desire, activity, and will.”27 In seeking escape from the newfound injustices of hierarchy and domination, these early utopias rendered humanity as passive and nature as eternal, timeless, and static. Given that such visions were adopted and fostered by emergent ruling elites, this retreat did not offer a liberatory vision of freedom.28

This early utopianism would be overturned by the development of two countervailing influences identified by Bookchin. First, utopia would take on a new character when a sense of futurity was introduced to it, driven by Christianity—as the dominant intellectual and cultural influence in Europe—imagining a future salvation on Earth.29 Inspired by the scriptures addressing themselves to the eventual upending of hierarchies and end of domination, radical social movements continually emerged in Europe which sought to abolish wealth and poverty in the present and fought for an immediate end to feudal hierarchy.30 While eclectic in character, what these movements and conflicts achieved was to shift freedom away from the “vegetative placidity of wistful reverence of the past,” and toward active, meaningful opposition to hierarchy in various forms and a redistribution of the means of life.31 In their visions, freedom is no longer irretrievably lost, but becomes something created through human action: the promise that the future can be recovered.32

In addition to acquiring a sense of futurity, utopia would also find itself grounded in place. For Bookchin, the paradigmatic example of this is the medieval folk utopia of Cockaigne. Whereas the Garden of Eden was consigned to the past, the paradisiacal garden of Cockaigne was separated from the utopian dreamer only by geography—off to the west, beyond the European peninsula, but nonetheless accessible to humanity in the present. A land of natural abundance “in which toil was unknown and roasted partridges dropped into one’s lap,” it existed in defiant opposition to Christian doctrines of austerity and earthly denial. As a result of this natural bounty providing for the complete satisfaction of needs and limitless access to pleasure, it is a land entirely free of war and conflict, implicitly opposed to hierarchies and forms of domination justified by a supposed natural scarcity. With its emphasis on place, Cockaigne located utopia within nature, not outside or above it, offering the nascent recognition that emancipation might be found not in supernatural deliverance, but located in the material world.

The Renaissance would produce utopias, such as those seen in writings of François Rabelais and  the Marquis de Sade, which furthered these images of abundance and pleasure, placing them alongside questions regarding the relationship between individuals and institutions. Rabelais’ Abbey of Theleme, summarized by Bookchin as “a land of Cokaygne dressed in … Renaissance earthiness and sexuality,” is a utopia where freedom is enjoyed by a privileged elite. However, Bookchin argues that this should not “conceal the intimate association it establishes between pleasure and the total absence of domination.” In the Abbey, “the rebellion of free will and the right to choose against ‘laws, statutes or rules’ is thus identified with the claims of earthly pleasure against the life-long penance of denial and toil.” This emphasis would later be echoed by the Marquis de Sade, whose writings Bookchin notes are rightly criticized for their egotism, but in de Sade, “libertinage becomes libertarian when it opens the most internalized repressions of the psyche to the light of reason and passion.” For Bookchin, their utopias remain far from ideal, but “what these utopians affirm are the claims of personality over the power of customs, tradition, and institutions.” Given an explicitly social context—Rabelais’ Abbey, for example, being a subversive reworking of a monastic order and the building which houses it—these utopias advanced beyond the Cockaigne imagery by suggesting that not only could freedom emerge through the uniting of reason and pleasure, but that doing so could serve as the foundation for a consciously-formed community. With them, individual choice is established as a utopian horizon: people may refuse the society before them and construct something new in its place.

While the visions offered by utopias such as Cockaigne or Rabelais were partial and incomplete, Charles Fourier and his Enlightenment-era “harmonic society” would join these nascent concepts of freedom in a more rounded liberatory utopia. Fourier’s vision is of a community entirely free of coercion, achieved by being structured around a number of rational principles “formulated in opposition to the monotony of industrial work, the puritanical values of the time, the burden of poverty that was inflicted on the senses as well as the body.” Unlike Rabelais’ Abbey, Fourier’s phalanstery is not a singular institution, but a model intended to redefine the structure of society as whole, “neither a rural village nor a congested city, but rather a balanced community combining the virtues of both.” And where Cockaigne relied entirely on a fantastically bountiful nature, for Fourier, “abundance, indeed luxury, will be available for all to enjoy because technological development will have removed the economic basis for scarcity and coercion.” Finally, beyond freedom as relief from domination, scarcity, and unjust institutions, the phalanstery is meant to satisfy individual desire not by enabling an unchecked egoism, but through its emphasis on complementary association—the individual is offered the fullest opportunity for development in Fourier’s utopia by being surrounded by diverse personalities, diversity in labor, and the variegated pleasures of art and nature. “There was no contradiction in Fourier’s mind,” Bookchin writes, “between human artifice and natural fecundity, any more than there was between body and mind, play and work, freedom and order, unity and diversity.” It is the wholeness of this vision that leads Bookchin to refer to him as the first social ecologist.  

Bookchin’s study of literary and artistic utopias concludes with William Morris, whose News From Nowhere (1890) brought the critiques advanced above forward to the Industrial Revolution, presenting a “bucolic recovery” of a libertarian world of craft artisanship and simple living. Looking to the communes of the medieval past, Morris’ vision would “advance a message of human scale, the integration of agriculture with crafts, the production of lasting, truly artistic works, and a nonhierarchical society”—an anti-technocratic, anti-capitalist utopia that was “clearly ecological” in its values. Following Morris, Bookchin sees the libertarian utopian tradition entering a fallow period, marked by the dominance of Marxist socialism and its embodiment in the repressive, authoritarian Soviet state. It would not be until decades later, amid the failures of the classical workers’ movement, the rise of nationalist politics, and the emergence of the post-war Fordist consumer society, that the anarchistic utopian tradition which interests him would be retrieved.

By Bookchin’s account, the emergent Civil Rights movement, the New Left, and the New Social Movements—including the feminist and ecology movements—would extend the ideals of freedom beyond the historical utopians, universalizing them to include women and the ethnically oppressed. They would also recover questions concerning the relationship between society, nature, and technology that had traditionally preoccupied anarchist and utopian thinkers. Where Fourier’s technologically-enabled abundance had been relegated to the imagination, it now appeared as an immanent possibility, and these new movements reflected the demand for this abundance to be shared among all—while confronting the challenges posed by the new conditions of militarization, nuclear proliferation, and a now-recognizable ecological crisis. In Bookchin’s assessment of the era, “ideals of freedom whose threads had been broken by Marxism were once again picked up and advanced along anarchic and utopian lines to encompass universal human interests—the interests of society as a whole, not of the nation-state, the bourgeoisie, or the proletariat as particularistic phenomenon.”

For Bookchin, this cumulative development of a historicized freedom reveals tendencies which lend it meaning: a commitment to an existing, secular world, including fulfillment of the sensual claims of the body; a rationally structured society, in which the ethical and humane takes precedent over the chaos and conflict of elite competition; esteem for labor, not only as the limiting of toil but in making work pleasurable; and finally, “the high premium that is placed on community,” in opposition to the “asocial behavior” of ruling classes. Furthermore, while each of these qualities have variously surfaced in a wide range of utopias, the specifically libertarian socialist utopia—the “non-repressive utopia envisioned by anarchism”—requires conscious action and choice on the part of humanity to achieve the universal realization of all these qualities at the level of everyday life. For Bookchin, utopia is “by definition, the world as it should be according to the canons of reason in contrast to the world as it is,” and it is the libertarian utopian tradition that has “reasoned out its theories in accordance with human history, not theological, mystical, or metaphysical history” and recognizes that “the world had always made itself through the agency of real flesh-and-blood human beings, facing real choices at turning points of history. And it could remake itself along proven alternative lines that confronted people in the past.” When Bookchin uses utopian, it is not to gesture to the scale of his project or the loftiness of his vision. Rather, it is with clear intent and in conscious engagement with this tradition: Bookchin situates his utopianism in this historical continuity, allowing the legacy of freedom to inform his project of social transformation.

Thinking utopian: utopia as process

This sketch of the history of utopia as the history of freedom leads to a final element that is key to Bookchin’s utopianism. For Bookchin, not only does history provide a meaningful concept of freedom by which  the potential for a genuinely liberatory utopia might be actualized, but the utopian impulse is potentially constitutive of this historical process—a process that remains ongoing and open-ended. As Bookchin defines them, utopias are only those “revolutionary visions of a future that are emergent, the results of deep-seated processes that involve the radical reconstruction of personality, sensibility, sexuality, social management, technics, human relations, and humanity’s relationship with nature.” His utopianism is thus not simply a free flight of the imagination, but a call for visions grounded in the real potentialities that have emerged for radical change. In this way, Bookchin’s utopianism functions as a critique of present-day society and is central to his dialectical nature philosophy. In following this organic mode of thought, while history elucidates the characteristics of the libertarian utopia and the tendencies which have marked the development of freedom, these will continue to evolve as historical circumstances change. Bookchin  does not pair his utopian critique with a vision of utopia as a perfected society in which freedom has been fully and completely realized. Rather, a true utopianism will—must—continue developing into the future.

This open-endedness means that the libertarian utopia is, in Bookchin’s assessment, one which is resistant to being conceptualized in terms of ‘blueprints’ that “design without discussion and impose without consent.” Such an approach  would subvert the necessary dimension of choice, and represent a “regression” to the “scenarios” conjured by futurists. By contrast, “a libertarian vision should be a venture in speculative participation. Half-finished ideas should be proferred [sic] deliberately, not because finished ones are difficult to formulate but rather because completeness to the point of details would subvert dialogue.” As he emphasizes, “to move from ‘here to there’ is a demanding process, not a dramatic gesture. It will always be marked by uncertainties, failures, digressions, and disputes before it finds its sense of direction.” Artistry and creativity should be brought to bear as part of this:

Whether as drama, novel, science fiction, poetry, or an evocation of tradition, experience and fantasy must return in all their fullness to stimulate as well as to suggest. Utopian dialogue in all its existentiality must infuse the abstractions of social theory. My concern is not with utopistic ‘blueprints’… but with the dialogue itself as a public event.

For Bookchin, then, utopianism is not only a process, but one that must be actively practiced in the public realm. Assuming the form of participatory, collective decision-making, Bookchin’s political utopia is ultimately constituted through the practice of direct democracy that forms the core of his libertarian municipalist politics. Given his definition of direct democracy as “the continual exercise of […] self—its very formation by one’s direct intervention in social issues—in asserting its moral claim and right to empowerment,” the practice of direct democracy is necessary to, and at the same time is itself constitutive of, the liberation utopia. It is what actively countervails technocratic manipulation, authoritarianism, and hierarchy: the freedom realized in the libertarian utopia is the reempowerment of the individual through direct control over daily life, which is ultimately the power of individuals to collectively imagine and create their own futures.

The rejection of utopian blueprints, however, does not mean that any society capable of being democratically deliberated upon is an acceptable utopia to Bookchin, or that his extensive critique of the present is not also paired with a vision of the future. His utopia—the reharmonization of humanity and nature along rational lines that he terms an “ecological society”—does not take the form of a singular concrete vision, but instead builds on his dialectical nature philosophy to advance an ecological ethics which would serve as ground for utopian dialogue. “A libertarian institution is a peopled one,” he writes, and “its purely formal structure will be neither better nor worse than the ethical values of the people who give it reality.” Chodorkoff summarizes the principles of this naturalistic ethics as nonhierarchy and interdependence; mutualism and complimentarity; unity in diversity; the tendency toward diversity, complexity, and freedom; dynamic balance; and spontaneity and change—principles Bookchin draws from the study of ecology, and which overlap with those drawn from his study of revolutionary history. “It is this grounding of his utopia in nature itself,” Chodorkoff further argues, that sets his utopian vision apart from others in the tradition “and ultimately forms the basis for his definition of an ecological society.” 

Embodying these principles, Bookchin’s ecological society is a vision of an associative world marked by the precedence of a “conscious cultural affinity” and universal humanitas over the biologism of blood kinship and the “ethnic parochialism and political exclusivity” that underlie the prejudices and violence which define today’s status quo. This creative association is given structure in the commune: decentralized, human-scale, and “containing the best features of the polis,” with many communes confederally networked throughout their shared ecosystems, bioregions, and biomes. These would be “artistically tailored to their natural surroundings,” an aspect of which Bookchin offers a more concrete picture:

We can envision that their squares will be interlaced by streams, their places of assembly surrounded by groves, their physical contours respected and tastefully landscaped, their soils nurtured caringly to foster plant variety for ourselves, our domestic animals, and wherever possible the wildlife they may support on their fringes. We can hope that the Communes would aspire to live with, nourish, and feed upon the life-forms that indigenously belong to the ecosystems in which they are integrated.

In these sensitively sculpted communes, both work and “positions of public responsibility” would be readily rotated, and labor would return to a form “more craftlike than industrial,” with an “overwhelming emphasis on quality and permanence,” so that “the past would always live in the present as treasured arts and works of generations gone by.” Furthermore, while “we can expect that they would subtly integrate” renewable energy sources “into a highly variegated pattern” of power production and localized manufacturing, the shape that any of the above would take cannot be determined in the abstract, as they must instead be worked out in practice, responsive to the specific ecological conditions of each commune.

The ideas advanced by the libertarian utopian tradition are apparent in this vision of an ecological society. Yet Bookchin departs from prescriptive utopianists like Fourier, who enumerated all aspects of his phalanstery’s structure, or Morris, with his highly descriptive journey through a post-revolutionary England. Instead, Bookchin gives the commune and confederal “Commune of Communes” no prescriptive form. Bookchin notes, “any institutional relationship of which we could conceive would remain a hollow form until we knew the attitudes, sensibilities, ideals, and values of the people who establish and maintain it.” For Bookchin, these remain inaccessible in a present “saturated with the values of hierarchy and domination.” In the end, Bookchin opts for a thinking utopian that means seeing the utopian tradition as a continually unfolding, open-ended process, and one which necessitates an ongoing utopian dialogue embodied in the political practices of direct democracy and confederalism. Again, Bookchin does not lay out a blueprint for how to build his utopian vision. He emphasizes the ethical basis on which the reconstruction of society should take place, ultimately providing only a suggestive elaboration of those principles in his provocative but nonetheless incomplete vision of freedom.

Conclusion

Approaching half a century since his lecture at Amherst, Bookchin’s utopianism risks being lost in the same way he warned the utopian tradition more broadly had been forgotten. While the overview of his utopianism elaborated here is necessarily brief, by examining its content, three pillars can be identified which give it shape: refusing futurism and recognizing the necessity of a total social transformation, engaging with the tradition and historicizing the development of freedom, and connecting it with an organic mode of thought that leaves the future radically open. With each corresponding to major aspects of his thought, the utopian is deeply interwoven into his project, and cannot be reduced to a general descriptor, whether positive or negative. As he made clear not only at Amherst, but repeatedly throughout his body of writing, the word utopian carries specific meaning, inseparable from both the critical and reconstructive dimensions of his project.

The study of Bookchin’s work, and the scholarship of social ecology more broadly, would benefit from renewed attention to its utopian dimension. Such attentiveness has already allowed for a small sample of literature to trace the early development of his politics and philosophy, contextualizing it both within the postwar moment and in the overall development of radical ecology and eco-socialism. Critical analysis could further be placed on his work within the context of the utopian tradition, and especially the art, literature, and activism contemporaneous with his writing. Similarly, scholarship on Bookchin in the field of utopian studies is limited thus far, as is his relation to either Marxist utopian tradition—an influence on his own utopianism—or anarchist utopianism, whose historical commitment to creative and pleasurable labor, and contemporary concerns with process, prefiguration, and resistance to revolutionary closure point to the continued significance of Bookchin’s work. Additionally, given renewed interest in a utopian, ecological politics and the potential for “communal luxury,” at a time when questions of scarcity and abundance are both increasingly pressing and complex, further evaluation of Bookchin’s utopianism appears more relevant than ever.

Finally, as Bookchin emphasized, imagining the future is an ongoing process, and social ecology must continue to evolve in dialogue with new critiques of oppression, hierarchy, and domination, as historical conditions change and new ideals of freedom emerge. Today, the pressing issues of bodily autonomy and gender abolition, the active fight against neofuturist surveillance regimes and the international rise of technological fascism, and an increasingly expansive and ever-deepening ecological crisis all call for a response from within social ecology and beyond the scope of Bookchin’s analysis. For social ecologists—whether as intellectuals, activists, or artists—who wish to avoid ‘perfuming the sewers’ of the present, Bookchin’s utopianism is a dimension of his thought that cannot be ignored.